SUDAN STUDIES

for

South Sudan and Sudan

Number 52 **July 2015**

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Editorial

Welcome to Issue 52 of *Sudan Studies*. A lot has happened in South Sudan and Sudan since the last issue but there is still no peace in either country. In Darfur, recent reports state that, "violence in Sudan's Darfur has surged to levels not seen in a decade," and go on to detail the displacement and death that have resulted from renewed violence by government troops and militias.[1] In South Sudan, fighting continues in many areas with the inevitable human suffering war brings. The resumption of fighting there after the crisis of December 2013 has led an increased urgency to attempts to understand and explain the reasons for the fighting. In this issue, **Gérard Prunier** completes his analysis of the causes of the events of December 2013 and we have reviews of books by Edward Thomas and James Copnall, who both attempt to explain the current 'state' of South Sudan and, in Copnall's case, the interdependence between South Sudan and Sudan.

There is a mix of articles in this issue as is usual for *Sudan Studies*. This diversity is also reflected in the book reviews. The articles address a range of themes and subject areas including politics, social and economic change, culture and technology.

Sudan Studies begins with an article by **Jacob Akol**, who discusses the 'social, cultural and political significance' of the annual 'Summer Dance' held by the Rek Dinka of South Sudan. This event includes a competition between young men to determine who is the fattest among them, competitors having fattened themselves on milk in the months beforehand. The 'Summer Dance' also provides an outlet for young men to complain in song about their marriage opportunities and their treatment by the elders. Akol concludes that both cultural practices are closely linked to the continuation of the Dinka way of life.

Mohamed Babiker Ibrahim and **Omer Yousif El-Tayeb** have written our second article, which analyses the socio-economic changes that have taken place on Tuti Island near Khartoum, as a result of building a bridge between the two in 2009. Both scholars were born and brought up on Tuti and are

[1] 'Darfur's deepening conflict', IRIN Africa Briefing, www.irinnews.org (Accessed 2nd July 2015)

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broadly positive about the changes that have occurred because of the bridge, pointing out that Tuti has now become one of the urban neighbourhoods of Khartoum. They also point to the physical and socio-economic factors that present a challenge to the future development and growth of the Island.
In the second of two articles, **Gérard Prunier** offers an analysis of the immediate causes of the events in South Sudan in 2013. In his first article in *Sudan Studies* 51 (January 2015), he offered an analysis of the 'deep historical causes of the events', arguing that both Sudan and South Sudan are heirs to a political government tradition (*hukum*) that originated during Ottoman rule and that this needs to be acknowledged and understood if things are to change in the region. Prunier concludes that unless a radically new form of government is achieved in South Sudan, the country may well dissolve in the way that has been seen in Somalia and Darfur.

Marilyn Deegan from King's College, London, **Badreldin Elhag Musa** from the Sudanese Association for the Archiving of Knowledge in Khartoum and **James Lowry** from University College, London write about attempts to 'preserve the cultural heritage of Sudan through digitisation'. The authors are involved in a country-wide project, 'Digital Sudan', which aims to transform access to the country's cultural heritage. They begin by outlining existing attempts to digitise Sudan archives held in Britain and Sudan, and initiatives such as the Sudan Open Archive run by the Rift Valley Institute. Many of our readers will know about some of these initiatives through talks at past SSSUK Symposiums. The article goes on to provide details about the cultural materials held in Sudan and the efforts as part of the Digital Sudan project to digitise them and make them available to a wider audience.

Staying with Sudan, **Mustafa Khogali** who also contributed to our last issue of *Sudan Studies*, has looked at the causes of the disaster that occurred in parts of Khartoum State as a result of heavy rains and floods in 2013, which the media widely reported. He concludes that it was human factors rather than excessive rainfall *per se* that accounted for the devastation in some areas of the State. These included a lack of understanding of the local environment leading to building houses on land subject to flooding, the use of weak building materials and a lack of urban planning, leading to badly sited roads that prevented water run-off and led to flooding. He shows that displaced people originally from Kordofan and Darfur suffered most, as they were often poor and as a result, lacked choices about where to build and access to strong building materials.

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The last article is a light-hearted one by **Peter Woodward**, who presents some of the verses written about colonial Sudan by members of the Sudan Political Service. These were collected into a small volume at Independence in 1956, a copy of which is to be found in the Sudan Archive at Durham University. While very much of their time, the verses are funny, poignant and occasionally bitter, reflecting some of the the joys and difficulties experienced by colonial officers.

The next section of the journal contains no fewer than six reviews of books published in English in 2014 and 2015. We are very fortunate in our reviewers: each is an expert in a field covered by the books and they offer a nuanced view, drawing on their own knowledge and experience.
The first four books reviewed cover both Sudan and South Sudan. The first, reviewed by **Adrian Thomas**, is a 'checklist' of *'The plants of Sudan and South Sudan',* published by Kew Publishing and the result of collaboration between Kew Gardens and the Universities of Juba and Khartoum. It brings together information about all the plants in both countries and although it is not a field-guide, will still be useful to anyone interested in plants.

Egbert Wesselink reviews two important publications about oil in Sudan and South Sudan: Luke Patey, *'The new kings of crude. China, India, and the global struggle for oil in Sudan and South Sudan*, and Alsir Sidahmed, *'The oil years in Sudan: the quest for political power and economic breakthrough'*. They provide different perspectives and draw on different sources but together provide a detailed account of the calculations and actions of 'the main decision-makers in government and business'. Wesselink concludes that there remains scope for a study focusing on oil issues in South Sudan.

The third book is by the former BBC correspondent in Khartoum James Copnall, *'A poisonous thorn in our hearts. Sudan and South Sudan's bitter and incomplete divorce'*, reviewed by **Gill Lusk**. It draws on hundreds of interviews conducted in Sudan and South Sudan, and covers the period after South Sudan gained its Independence in July 2011. Copnall argues that both countries remain interdependent and he attempts to outline the complexity of the relationship in order to understand why 'splitting' Sudan did not resolve many of its problems.

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Andrew Wheeler reviews the last book that deals with both Sudans, John Ashworth *et al*.'s, *'The voice of the voiceless: the role of the Church in the Sudanese civil war 1983-2005'*. It tells the story of the Church during those years and 'the social, humanitarian and reconciling role' it played during both civil wars. This account is particularly valuable as the authors were all involved in shaping, witnessing and recording the events as, indeed, was our reviewer.

The last two reviews are of books on South Sudan. The first, written by Edward Thomas and reviewed by **Mawan Muortat,** is about contemporary challenges, *'South Sudan: A slow liberation'*. It draws on extensive interview material from Jonglei State to illustrate what Muortat refers to as the author's 'novel ideas about the nature of South Sudan's internal conflicts', providing a thought provoking and valuable account. I found it particularly interesting to read Thomas's book alongside Prunier's article, both of which attempt to analyse the causes of conflict in South Sudan but come to rather different conclusions.

Lastly, a book by Naseem Badiey, *'The state of post-conflict reconstruction. Land, urban development and state-building in Juba, Southern Sudan'* is reviewed by **Matthew S. Benson**. The book 'provides a detailed historical and political analysis of the gritty accumulations of daily interactions among actors such as state officials, politicians and returnees that are forging today's South Sudanese state', taking Juba, with its huge supporting cast of international experts and advisors, as its case study. Benson suggests that the book will be of great interest to 'scholars of the region as well as academic and policy-oriented students of state-building efforts'.
In the last part of the issue, we have a short notice about the 'Sudan Archaeological Research Society', outlining its activities and inviting readers to join it and/or download its publications and attend its meetings. We hope to have an article about the Society's work in the next issue of *Sudan Studies*.

The final section 'SSSUK Notices', contains information about this year's SSSUK Symposium and AGM. Would members please note that we will be voting on a name change for the Society at the AGM, so please read the notice about this before the meeting. There is also news about the joint seminar series that we have been planning with the Centre of African Studies at SOAS, with the first seminar in November 2015. For up to date details of any of these events, please look at our website, www.sssuk.org

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The Social, Cultural and Political Significance of 'Summer Dance' among the Rek Dinka of South Sudan

By Jacob J. Akol*

Abstract
While travelling in the Dinka countryside one morning in July 1997, in the then war-torn Southern Sudan, I came across a large herd of cattle moving across the road. A good distance behind the herd were three grossly overweight young men sweating and struggling, each balancing on a walking stick, to move forward on a narrow path. The men were on their way to their Annual Dance Centre. The region was at that time threatened by famine and the unexpected spectacle of fat men on the road reminded me that the long-established competitive fattening custom amongst Dinka young men continues come rain or shine, war or famine and even government restrictions over the years. What sustains it? Why do the Dinka place so much value on such a seemingly mundane custom? A closer look reveals that the custom is closely linked to other social events essential for the continuation of the Dinka way of life as we know it.

The People
The Dinka know themselves collectively as *Jieng* or *Muonyjang* (singular) or *Muonyjieng* (plural). The origin of the name Dinka is unknown, though it has become the name by which they are known worldwide. Since their southern neighbours know them as '*Jenge',* a clear corruption of their real name, *Jieng*, the name Dinka is thought to have come from the north. It has been speculated that a visitor from that direction met a man who either introduced himself as 'Deng Gak' or a person under a chief called 'Deng Gak'; either way, the name 'Deng Gak' evolved into the name Dinka. We may never know the origin of the name for sure. In this article, both *Jieng* and Dinka can be taken to refer to the same people.

The *Jieng*/Dinka are a Nilotic people and the largest single ethnic community in South Sudan. They are generally very tall, lanky in appearance and have very dark skin. Their numbers have been estimated at between 2.5 and 3 million.

The Land
The Dinka territory straddles the vast grass swamps of the central White Nile basin, largely on the western bank of the river but extending to

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smaller areas of the eastern bank of the river at Bor, near the southern end of the world's largest grass swamp, known as the *Sudd*. The Dinka are also found in smaller communities in some areas along the eastern bank of the White Nile north of the town of Malakal and all the way to Renk on the border of South Sudan and Sudan.

Dinka-land "is a flat country of open savannah and savannah forest, intersected by many rivers and streams converging upon the central basin of the Nile."[1] As heavy rains begin to fall at around the end of April and beginning of May each year, the numerous rivers and streams fill up and flow into the White Nile through the swamp. By August and September, the rivers begin to overflow and in some cases reverse the flow of the streams to flood the vast plains, lakes and seasonal pools. By the end of October, the rains begin to taper off and with this the floods recede, causing the plains to dry up. By November and December; the drying of the land has truly begun, ushering in a usually very dry and hot Winter from January until the beginning of the rains again in March/April. Too much water during the rainy season and too little water during the dry season have traditionally governed the lives of the *Jieng*.

Livelihood

The Dinka are herders who depend largely on their cattle for their livelihood, though they also cultivate sorghum, millet, groundnuts and beans on the higher ground above the flood plains, where they build permanent homes. The annual activities of the Dinka are influenced by the swelling and contracting of the *Sudd* and the young people move to and fro with the rhythm of the *Sudd*'s floods.

Political Divisions

Politically, the Dinka have been described at various times as a loose confederation of tribes. Lienhardt's list of Dinka tribes in *Divinity and Experience*[2] includes the Aliab, the Cic, the Bor and the Tuic (Twi) at the south-eastern end of Dinkaland as well as the smaller Abialang on the border with Sudan. Included are the Malual Giernyang (of Aweil) further west of Dinkaland, the Ngok (of Abyei), the Twic Mayadit, the Agar (of Rumbek) and of course, the Rek Tribe, which is the largest and occupies the centre of Dinka-land (see Map 1, below).

[1] Godfrey Lienhardt (1961) *Divinity and Experience*. *The religion of the Dinka*, Oxford University Press, p.1

[2] ibid, p.8, Fig 2

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Each tribe is divided into sub-tribes, e.g. the sub-tribes of the largest tribe, the Rek, include the Apuk, the Aguok, the Kuac, the Awan and a few others who live south of the Rek territory.

The sub-tribes are themselves divided into sections, collectively known as *Wut*, each composed of a collection of closely related clans occupying an identifiable territory. Each section has a permanent centre, or headquarters, also known as *Wut*. While the largest sub-tribe of the Rek Dinka, the Apuk, will have more sections than other sub-tribes of the Rek, the Aguok – which I know best – includes the following sections: Wuuny Section with Malek as its Centre, Buothanyith Section with Dhok as its Centre, Agurpiny Section with Kuruec as Centre, Marial Section with Marial as Centre and the Atukuel Section with Atukuel as Centre.

Referring to the seasonal activity of a section or *Wut* or centre, Lienhardt[3] had this to say:

> As the wet season advances, the herdsmen of each sub-tribe converge on a few established centres within the sub-tribal territory, in response to the increasing severity of the season and the limitation of pastures and movement. Here larger camps are formed, and mushroom-shaped shelters are erected on stout piles to protect the men and young animals at night. By day the occupants of such camps fan out with their cattle in their different family groups to take advantage of the best grass in the neighbourhood.

Significant Political, Cultural and Social Events

However, with respect to Lienhardt's meticulous research, these centres have always served a more significant political, social and cultural purpose than just a mere "response to the increasing severity of the season and the limitation of pastures and movement".

Politically, every clan member of a Section has a right to be permanently allocated a piece of land in the *Wut*, to which they return each year. This piece of land is demarcated with specially marked hardwood posts dug into the ground that remain there permanently or as long as they are not worn out by the weather or eaten through by termites – in which case they are replaced with new posts. These posts also serve as pegs to which the oxen of the clan's herds are tethered during the night. There are usually many oxen in a family or clan herd and these are tethered along the top edge of their allocation and bordering other clans' allocations. There is

[3] ibid, p.6

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normally a single bull in a clan's herd and it is usually tethered to a peg in the centre of the herd. The calves are tethered nearer the 'bottom' end of the herd, where the herdsmen and boys spend the night around a smouldering fire called *Gol*, which is a four-to-five foot pyramid built of semi-dry cow dung. The *Gol* issues smoke as it burns throughout the night, thus protecting the herdsmen and their cattle from mosquitoes.

The "mushroom shelters" referred to by Lienhardt "are erected on stout piles to protect the men and young animals at night."[4] However, in later years, i.e. by the 1960s and 1970s, these mushroom shelters assumed a grander stature, with numerous giant wooden supports and grass-thatched roofs. With the war of the 1980's-2005, many of these grand centres were either abandoned when the population moved out to more secure areas nearer the *Sudd* or were deliberately burned down by the warring parties. Even then, the displaced youths would improvise a *Wut* of sorts and continue with their annual activities wherever they found themselves with their cattle.

It is to these *Wut*, permanent or temporary, that the clans of a section would gather each year to participate in *Loor Ker* (Spring Dance) that takes place during the season between planting and the beginning of harvest, i.e. at some time between the beginning of May and the end of July. *Loor Ker* is an eight-day celebration of music, song and dance, which starts each day at about 16.00 hours and ends between 20.30 and 21.00 hours.

Marriage

To appreciate the importance of this annual event, it is necessary to understand Dinka cultural and social customs governing courtship and marriage. Among the Dinka, boys and girls are considered children as long as they are not sexually mature. After that, the boys are initiated into manhood through the painful marking of the head (*gar nhom*). A girl-child ceases to be considered a child when menstruation begins; nevertheless, she remains a girl (*nya*) until she is married or has children, after which she is considered a woman (*tik*).

While it is permissible for a man to have many 'girlfriends' and vice-versa for a girl, it ought to be understood that such friendships do not amount to much more than constant wooing of the girl by the boyfriend and his age-mates, pleading she should grant the man favours if she truly loves him.

[4] ibid, p.6

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However, Dinka girls learn at a very early age to be extremely careful in their relations with strange men and often take care not to be alone with their so-called 'men friends'. The consequences of being caught having sex with a man can automatically lead to her being hurriedly married off to a man much older than herself; thus the burden of a relationship which has gone wrong between a girl and a man falls much harder on the girl and less so on the man, whose penalty may be only that an ox or a cow is handed over to the girl's relatives. There may also be a serious fight with the girl's male relatives, an eventuality usually dreaded and preached against by the elders of the clans.

Traditionally, Dinka girls know, men don't get married just because they have fallen in love: they get married because it is their turn to do so. A man's turn comes only when all his elder brothers have married their first wives. Elder brothers are not simply elder siblings belonging to a boy's own mother but also the elder-sons of their father's elder wives. Thus, if your mother happened to be number three in line, the elder sons of the first two wives will have to get married before you, even if they happen to be much younger than yourself. This often happens if the elder wives' first-born children are daughters followed by a boy. The bigger the family is, with many uncles and their own sons, the more complex it becomes, with many unhappy men seeking redress in *Songs of Drum* (*week loor*), that are performed and publicised for the first time at the Spring Dance (*Loor Ker)*.

The most important factor in deciding a marriage is the availability of sufficient cattle in a family herd to pay the bride price, usually from 50 to 200 cattle, mostly cows and some oxen. Most importantly, among the cattle given in marriage, there are a few cows and a bull which come from stock dedicated to clan divinities; this indicates that a wife married in this way also belongs to the family/clan divinities, thus sanctifying the marriage and making it hard to dissolve without a justifiable cause that meets with approval from the living, the dead and the deities. Thus divorce is not easily entertained in Dinka tradition.

Let's take the example of one man called Kon Lual. His father, Lualdit (Lual Senior) Kon was the first-born of his grandfather Kon and grandmother Amiir, followed by Abiem Kon and lastly by another Lual, called Lualthi (Lual Junior) from Kon's second wife. Lualdit was married off first, followed by Abiem and Lualthi. No problem there but then, Abiem's and Lualthi's fortunes improved because of hard work in their fields and wealth from the marriages of the daughters of their in-

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laws. They married their second wives before Lualdit had the chance to do so. What is more, Abiem decided to get a wife for his son who was junior to Kon Lual, son of Lualdit.

Songs of Drum

The narrative of Kon Lual was the story from which a famous composer, Akuith or Deng Binycok, I am not sure which, composed what became a very popular 'Song of Drum' for Kon Lual, one season. It was a song full of lamenting, woe, curses and doom for the family of Abiem and his son, the entire family of grandfather Kon and grandmother Amiir. The whole Panhial Clan would face a devastating curse if the elder son, Kon Lual, continued to languish in the cattle camp without a wife and children and collapsing like a weed. His case, he cried in the song, had defeated known relatives: the two sub-sections which celebrate at Dhok. Kon's annual appearance as the eligible bachelor of his family (his status identified by his wearing of a huge conical black hat made from ostrich feathers and a long leopard skin worn from his waist down to below his knees) was lampooned in the song as, "no longer worthy of respect from any potential mother-in-law". The hat was condemned as merely intended to 'borrow' girls' favours.

> Kon has failed; Kon has failed; Kon has slipped in the records with his father Lualdit; with father Lual Kon ehh! Father Lualdit has slipped. His brothers have married their second wives behind him! Married their second wives! And I again was bypassed by Lual's brothers. Lual's brothers! Young men have married and Kon has remained an old hide. An old hide in Mayardit's country! An old hide in the country of Aken Mou!

This is a short section of a long intricate song, full of imagery and rich in metaphor, which ends in both hope and despair, calling on the love of his life, Anyuat, to wait, saying:

> Anyuat, don't go. Await the outcome. We are a people awaiting a debate. We have not yet heard the final verdict from Father Abiem, whether he has abandoned me to the cattle camp or will eventually look my way. We have not yet washed Amir Lual's blood into the river….

Finally:

> If Lual Maker (Lual Junior) refuses to look my way, I will take my case to the District Commissioner. All that's left for us is betrayal;

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> we will betray ourselves to an alien government. Kon Lual's wedding will be settled by the *mamur* (Arabic for District Executive Officer). Kon Lual's wedding will await a court summons.

Reflecting on this desperation, that results from a feeling of alienation, I am reminded of what Lienhardt observed in his book about how a Dinka sees his place within the family and the society to which he belongs:

> To have rights in a herd is to have rights in a descent-group, and through that in a political group to which it belongs. To have no such rights or to be unable to assert them effectively is to have no place in the main structure of the Dinka society. It is for this reason that a frequent theme of complaint introduced into songs is that of a young man denied the cattle which he regards as his right, and forced to delay his first marriage until a senior kinsman has taken a second wife. The theme is often accompanied by threats of withdrawing from Dinka society to live and work forever with foreigners. For the Dinka, who never doubts the superiority of his own society to others, this threat of withdrawal is an indication of despair only a little removed from that of a threat of suicide.[5]

Every year, hundreds of young men across Dinka-land complain in songs about the way they have been unfairly treated by their elders, who drag their feet when it comes to discussing their first marriage, often arguing, 'There are no cattle for you to marry a decent girl'. By 'decent girl' they mean from a 'respectable family' that is unlikely to bring shame or incurable disease into the family.

When the elders eventually accept that it is time for a young man to get a wife, they first ask him and his age-mates to inform the elders of the 'useless girlfriends' they have been courting. Often the elders will reject all the girls the young men like for one reason or another: leprosy, tuberculosis, some unknown rare diseases, or simply because of known bad manners, meanness or the wayward habits of any close relatives of the girl. Sometimes the elders may decide to instruct the young men to investigate the availability of a marriageable daughter from a particular family or families and report back another time – which could mean a year later.

A young man treated in this way may take his case as a verbal narrative to an accomplished composer at any time from January to March each

[5] ibid, p.26

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year; the composer will take an ox or heifer in payment depending on how famous he is. Famous composers are often fully booked and find it difficult to fit in late arrivals, which sometimes results in the postponement of the composition of a young man's 'Songs of Drum' until the following year.

The lucky ones, who are often accompanied by a *ping* (or a person with a natural ability to quickly memorise the intricate 'Songs of Drum' as they are being composed), return to their cattle camps and start spreading their songs amongst their age-mates and boys within the cattle camp. By the time the 'Summer Dance' begins, the youth of the clans of the subsection will have memorised the songs and be ready to perform them to the general public for the first time on the first or second day of the celebrations. There is no alternative event for the public exhibition of 'Songs of Drum' but the 'Summer Dance'.

Exhibition of self-fattened men

A significant event at the Annual 'Summer Dance' is the self-exhibition of young men, who decide some three-to-four months before the celebration to fatten themselves up, by gorging themselves on fresh milk and lying idly all day and night in a cooled shed made of twigs or grass. While this kind of competitive exercise usually begins with the participation of dozens of young men in a *Wut*, only a handful eventually succeed well enough to dare parade their attempt at being the fattest man of the year in their section or even the whole sub-tribe. The man that is eventually agreed by popular acclaim to be the fattest man of the year will bask in glory for the rest of the year, until he is replaced by new arrivals at the next 'Summer Dance'.

The young men who participate in the fattening regard it as art, and it may well be, since achieving such a feat is difficult, painful and even deadly. In a situation in which a fat young man suddenly dies ('burst his stomach'), the man is posthumously declared the winner and buried in a unique way, befitting a man who loves his cattle and milk: under a huge pyramid of cow dung in the middle of his cattle camp.

It is important to note here, that the excess weight gained by the contestants is totally lost within a period of three months, which is roughly equal to the time it took them to fatten themselves up with milk, the only food they are allowed to consume throughout the fattening period. All they have to do, after the competition, is to start walking and eating other foods so as to return to normality.

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Conclusion

No one knows the origin of the annual fattening custom among the Dinka. What is known is that various governments of the Sudan and South Sudan have tried at one time or another to stop the practice without success. Not even the long and destructive war between North and South Sudan nor recurrent famines have succeeded in stopping the annual self-fattening. The *Loor Ker* and associated cultural and social activities, such as the publication of annual 'Songs of Drum' and the self-exhibition of those who have fattened themselves, are all performed at the same time annually at designated centres or *Wut*. The question remains, why?

In the Preface to the Third Edition of his book, *Tradition and Modernization*, Francis Mading Deng (himself a Dinka), stated:

> Every society operates on the basis of fundamental norms, assumptions and behaviour patterns that give coherence to life and provide guidance in social relationships. These norms and patterns evolve over a long period of time and become established as essential ingredients of the culture or the way of a given people.[6]

Awareness of this fact should give us pause and caution us to carefully consider alternatives before attempting to make any sudden or radical changes to traditional ways of life.

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[6] Francis M. Deng, (1971) *Tradition and Modernization: Challenge for Law among the Dinka of the Sudan*, Yale University Press, Third Edition, 2004

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

Map 1: 'The Dinka Tribal Groups' (from Lienhardt Figure 2)

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Socio-Economic Changes and Challenges of Tuti Island after the Construction of the Bridge

Mohamed Babiker Ibrahim and Omer Yousif El-Tayeb*

Abstract
This study highlights the socio-economic changes that occurred on Tuti Island and the challenges that face it after the construction of Tuti Bridge (2009) that connects the Island with Khartoum and the outside world. Due to its unique geographical location, certain socio-economic characteristics developed in Tuti Island that differed from those found in Khartoum and caused it to be regarded as a rural settlement within an urban centre (Davies 1994; Ibrahim and Davies 1991). The construction of the bridge was followed by morphological and socio-economic problems, although it has also been considered as the last stage in the natural development of Tuti, which has now become one of the urban neighbourhoods of Greater Khartoum. The bridge is also seen as the first step in improving the regional and national transport system. However, some physical and socio-economic challenges may hinder the future development of the Island.

Introduction
Transportation is the backbone of economic and urban development. African urban and economic growth has been greatly enhanced by its development (Hoyle and Smith 1998). Models of urban growth have been applied in Africa e.g. those by Taaffe, Morrill, Gould and Vance, and together with improvements in transportation, proved to be successful during the colonial era (Hoyle and Smith 1998; Taaffe et al.1963; Vance 1970). In the Sudan, railways have played a special role in urban growth (Abu Sin 1980; El Agraa et al. 1986).

Tuti Island has played a significant role in the establishment of Khartoum and Khartoum North conurbations (Abu Saleem 1979; Davies 1994; Ibrahim and Davies 1991). It is the oldest neighbourhood in the Khartoum conurbation and because of its unique geographical location, the Island has developed its own socio-economic characteristics. Approximately 500 years ago, Tuti was settled by the Mahas, who were migrant agriculturalists from northern Sudan, resulting in a homogeneous and closed "village-like society" of farmers (Davies 1994; Ibrahim and Davies 1991; Lobban 1983). Today, a sizable portion of the population are employed as civil servants.

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Tuti is surrounded by the waters of the River Nile that creates a physical barrier between it and the surrounding urban area . This unique situation enhanced and preserved the distinction between Tuti's rural society and Khartoum's much more urban society until the construction of the Tuti Bridge in 2009. It joined Tuti with Greater Khartoum and brought compelling socio-economic changes to the Island and its inhabitants, resulting in morphological and socio-economic problems that represent a challenge to the future development of the town of Tuti.

Study Area

Tuti Island is located at the confluence of the Blue and White Niles, at latitude15°38'N and longitude 32°32'E. It occupies an area of approximately 3.06 square kilometres and is inhabited by 18,000 people. The island is divided into residential and agricultural areas. The agricultural areas can be divided into three zones: Zone 1 is adjacent to the residential area at the middle of the Island; Zone 2 is planted with lime orchards; Zone 3 is the flood plain and is covered by water during the annual high flood (Figure 1). A fourth zone, lying in the southeastern part of the Island, is dominated by sand dunes. Residents receive services such as education, health care, water and electricity. Water and electricity supply has consistently been up-graded to meet the demands of the growing population e.g. currently, the construction of a water pipe through the bridge is almost finished and this will provide Tuti with an additional source of water from Al Mogren Water Station in Khartoum; street lighting was installed four years ago.

The building of Tuti Bridge was a landmark in the Island's history. It took five years to complete and has played a significant role in transforming the Island into a town and its society into an urban society. In addition, the Bridge has enhanced accessibility and connectivity to the outside world and improved regional and national transportation.

Historically, Tuti grew and supplied Khartoum with fresh vegetables and fruit. Before the Bridge, fresh vegetables and fruit were taken in the early mornings by ferry across the Blue Nile to the markets of Khartoum and Khartoum North, and across the White Nile to Omdurman. Using the criteria of the Sudanese census, urban settlements are inhabited by 5,000 people or more and Tuti Island is therefore considered to be a small town. The social life, available infrastructure and involvement of most of its population in professions other than agriculture also qualify it to be categorised as a small town.

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Methodology
Most information in this article is the result of the cumulative and extensive knowledge of Tuti Island acquired by the authors, both of whom were born and raised there. Two focus group discussions were carried out with key figures from the Island. A third method of investigation was the use of secondary sources.

Socio-economic changes and challenges
It is a well-recognised fact that construction of any bridge will be followed by socio-economic change. In Khartoum, the construction of bridges has raised the value of adjacent land, resulting in the creation of 'first-class' residential areas. Examples of this are the area of Al Safya adjacent to Shambat Bridge; the neighborhood at the western end of Al Fittihab Bridge (new Omdurman Bridge); and the area west of Al Manshiya Bridge, all of which have become first-class residential areas (Ibrahim and Omer 2014). Changes in transportation, agricultural production, land use, housing construction and the modification of ethnicity have also occurred. Each will be discussed in turn.

Transportation
Without a doubt, the construction of the bridge has increased the efficiency of transportation to and from the Island, enhancing the mobility and movement of people and agricultural products. Due to its strategic location at the centre of Greater Khartoum, the construction of the bridge has saved time for Tuti inhabitants travelling to all parts of the conurbation. In the past, the farmers of Tuti found great difficulty in transporting their fruits and vegetables, especially during the high flood. Moreover, on many occasions, hundreds of government employees and students were delayed in getting to and from work or school because of problems with the river transport to and from Tuti Island (Davies 1994).

Before 1958, great time and effort was spent on manually pulling boats against the high and strong current of the Blue and White Niles for long distances along the banks. This was necessary because the high river flood is accompanied by strong currents and therefore, before a boat crossed the river, it had to be pulled for 100 to 200 metres upstream so that it would land in its designated place. Farmers depended on donkeys to carry their vegetables to Greater Khartoum, usually carrying one or two loads every morning to the market. Surprisingly, all their produce was sold in the city

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markets and local customers bought from there and not directly from the farms.

In 1958, the motorised ferry *Bunton* started to run between Tuti and Khartoum. Most of the Island's fruit and vegetables were carried by ferry to Greater Khartoum but at the same time as the *Bunton* came into service, a change took place in the way these crops were sold. New generations of Tuti inhabitants have become better educated and involved in jobs other than farming; because of the lack of family labour, farmers entrusted the growing and transport of their products to hired agricultural labourers who harvested the crops and took them in the late evening to the opposite bank of the river, cleaned them with river water and left them at the *Bunton*'s landing-stage. Cleaning the produce removed dirt and preserved freshness, so that it could be sold for higher prices. Instead of farmers taking their crops directly to the market, they were sold to intermediaries at the landing stage. This method of transportation and sale of agricultural produce continued until the Bridge was built in 2009.

Sales methods then changed only slightly, although the Bridge helped to increase efficiency and also competition between the intermediaries. *Girgir* (*Eruca saliva;* rocket or arugula) and limes are the main crops grown on the Island. *Girgir* is transported by intermediaries in the late afternoon to the bank to the west of Tuti to be washed before its early morning delivery to the closest markets of Omdurman (*Souk al Sha'abi)* or Khartoum North, while limes are sold locally under a large tree (*haraza;* acacia) at Al Sara neighbourhood by the Bridge.

At a national level, Tuti Bridge and the planned Tuti-Khartoum North Bridge are expected to enhance the efficiency of national transportation by connecting Jebel Awliya highway with the Khartoum-Port Sudan highway (*At Tahdi Highway*). This will facilitate the speedy transport of Sudanese exports such as sugar, agricultural produce and animal resources.

Agricultural production

The Island's agricultural sector has changed in the type and sale of vegetables. This has largely been due to the increase in land values and changes in the socio-economic situation of Tuti's population, resulting in a decrease in agricultural land and an increase in the residential area. Agriculture is practiced in three distinctive zones.

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In the past, farmers cultivated various types of vegetables such as okra (ladies' fingers), *mulukhiya* (corchorus / jute, a leafy vegetable), onions, eggplants (aubergines), tomatoes, cucumbers and watermelons. Tradition dictated that any member of Tuti society was permitted to take free vegetables from any farm to their home. Few people did (mainly the poor) and this did not affect the economic viability of these vegetables. Then, strangers came in the night and appropriated large amounts of vegetables, resulting in great losses to the farmers. Today, the growing of vegetables has been largely abandoned and most farmers cultivate only one vegetable, *girgir*. Farmers have substituted vegetables with forage crops such as sorghum (*Abu Sabeen*) and alfalfa (locally known as *berseem*). Two reasons were behind this change: firstly, to avoid the night theft of vegetables and secondly, because these plants give a quick return as they take only one month to grow. This is important as both crops are cultivated in the flooded area of Zone 3, which is covered by water for four months of the year. As farmers lose four months of production, they compensate for this by cultivating quick-maturing crops.

Changes of land use

Changes have occurred in the zoning of land since the1980's. Some land has been changed from agricultural to residential, mostly in Zone 1, resulting in increased land prices and changes in building. Unlike the flood zone (Zone 3), which is cultivated only after the flood, in the past Zone 1 was cultivated year round, with different summer and winter vegetables. It is protected from the annual flood by the canal that brings water from the water pump in the northern part of the Island. The canal separates this Zone from the lime orchards of Zone 2. The canal extends throughout the western area and is basically a high-earth embankment that protects Zone 1. It also protects the residential area from the high annual flood and distributes water for irrigation to the crops grown in Zones 1 and 2.

At present, Zone 1 is becoming a mixture of farmland and scattered houses with empty spaces between them that are expected to fill up with new buildings in the near future.

Zone 4 was fallow land characterised by sand dunes. Until the 1950's, this was the area where Tuti's farmers used to practice rain-fed cultivation. Beginning in the 1960's, that was largely abandoned and the area became fallow, with the exception of some lime orchards. In the 1980's, this Zone was transformed into a residential area, similar to Zone 1. Some islanders

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bought land from landowners and no law was enforced. It should be noted that the changes in land use do not reflect a change in the law because legally, all of Tuti's land is owned by Tuti's inhabitants. There is a difference in the price of land between Zones 3 and 4; that in Zone 4 is much more expensive than in Zone 3 because it is near the Bridge. Zone 3 is also relatively cheaper because of the unplanned narrow and winding streets of the residential area, that reduce accessibility and the easy flow of transport to that part of the Island.

Changes in the construction of buildings

In recent years, changes in the type and morphology of urban design have occurred on the Island. Two- and three-storey buildings have become dominant, replacing the traditional Sudanese single-storey building (Ibrahim and Omer 2014). Building materials have also changed and concrete blocks and fired bricks are now used in new house designs. As a result, an urbanised scene now dominates many parts of the Island. Most residents perceived these changes as an important step towards urbanisation and modernisation. New modern houses are built in old residential areas as well as in the new extensions of Zones 3 and 4. The sale of part of their agricultural land has enabled many landowners to erect new buildings or to modernise old ones. Due to its strategic location and proximity to downtown Khartoum, there is a high demand for rented houses from foreigners, government employees and university students. Accordingly, landowners find that investment in building is more rewarding and economically viable than the cultivation of crops.

Modification of ethnicity

A remarkable change is that from a closed rural society to a more open, urbanised society. This is accompanied by ethnic change. Tuti Island has long been recognised as a homogeneous and conservative, closed society due to its religious background and the dominance of one ethnic group, the Mahas (Davies 1994; Ibrahim and Davies 1991; Lobban 1983). Tuti society was different from the heterogeneous societies across the river in Greater Khartoum. Acquisition of land by 'outsiders' and intermarriage are the chief reasons for changes in ethnicity. Long before the Bridge, in the 1970's there were signs of intermarriage between different people from ethnic groups. The situation was accelerated by the Bridge and the ability of non-residents to purchase land. That land is now in the hands of both the original inhabitants and other ethnic groups, and a gradual transformation from a homogeneous to a heterogeneous society is taking place.

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Challenges in the Development of the Island

The town of Tuti Island is experiencing physical, morphological and socio-economic challenges, some of which are related to the flow of the river, others to an increase in population, and yet others, directly or indirectly to the construction of the Bridge.

Physical environment

Despite community endeavours to prevent or slow it, Tuti Island suffers from river erosion (*huddam*), a process that started in the early 1970's (Ibrahim and El Borai 1991). As much as 15 feddans (15.57 acres) of valuable agricultural land in the eastern part had been eroded in recent decades. On the other hand, the western part has benefited from an increase in land area because of the deposit of silt carried by annual floods and the proliferation of *tarfa* (tamarisk) trees which slow the current and trap silt and sediment. A high earth embankment was built along the affected areas of the eastern coast in the early 1990's to protect the Island from high annual floodwater but the embankment is now suffering from erosion.

Without the timely intervention of the government authorities, more valuable agricultural and residential land will be lost and the seasonal flood waters may breach the embankment and flood the entire Island. Building a concrete embankment along the river bank in the eastern part of the Island is likely to prove the best solution (Ibrahim and El Borai 1990). A concrete embankment along the Blue Nile in the northern part of Khartoum has protected the city from river erosion and seasonal floods.

The residential area in Zone 4 experiences the seepage of floodwater across the sandy soil and causes saturation (*nuz*) of the foundation of buildings for three months each year. It is believed that a concrete embankment on the eastern side of the Island would put an end to this problem.

Lack of urban planning

One major challenge for both residents and planners is the lack of urban planning. In its absence, residents continue to build new houses in the same way as they did in the past, when the town was a village. As a result, new houses are built of durable materials (i.e. concrete) along the existing short, narrow, winding streets that are mostly one lane wide. These streets represent a challenge for residents who are not able to move things to or from their houses or park their cars in front of their houses. It will prove a

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challenge to re-plan the town along a grid system in the future, as now most of the houses are two or three storeys high and built of concrete.

Population density

The population continues to grow. Tuti Island is considered to be one of the most densely populated areas in the capital and the country in general. There are 6,000 people per sq. kilometre, while the population density of the Sudan is 21 people per sq. km. (World Bank 2015). At present, the increase is through natural increase or the settlement of new landowners. It is addressed by the vertical expansion of buildings, resulting in more two- and three-storey buildings. Since the second half of the 20th century, inhabitants have been aware of the problem of population density and have approached the authorities to allocate two areas as extensions: one as a new residential area and the other as an agricultural extension. The inhabitants argued that they should be treated similarly to the residents of the new extensions that were designated to settle the growing population of the old neighbourhoods of Burri in Khartoum and Shambat in Khartoum North. After the mid-1990's, a new agricultural area was allocated to the people of Tuti along the eastern part of Khartoum North, called the Soba East Project. The authorities also agreed to allocate a residential area to Tuti's inhabitants but the exact site has yet to be determined. It is likely to be south of Omdurman.

The Future of Tuti Island

Since the mid-1990's, as much as one-third of the Island's land has been bought by people who originate from elsewhere. This can be considered as one of the major steps towards the urbanisation and nationalisation of the private land of Tuti's inhabitants. Tuti is changing and becoming a town, and its society is on its way to becoming heterogeneous. Most of the land is on the banks of the river. This is suitable for clubs and recreational areas, and the process of development has already started, with the building a hall near the Bridge, where residents of Tuti and others can hold wedding parties and other social events. Some commentators foresee the future development of Tuti as a business and recreational area (Khalid 2013; Bahreldin and Eisa 2014) but this is not a matter of public policy.

Tuti's future has been visualised by its inhabitants and others to be similar to that of Gezira Island in Cairo and Manhattan in New York City. With the projected construction of a bridge between Tuti and Khartoum North, and the establishment of a proposed circular road around the Island that will connect it with Omdurman, the last stage of integrating Tuti with the

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Khartoum conurbation will be completed. This will transform Tuti's society from an isolated rural community into a fully urbanised society and the town will become one of the beautiful neighbourhoods of Greater Khartoum.

Conclusion

The construction of Tuti Bridge has had both advantages and disadvantages. It has increased the connectivity of Tuti Island with the outside world and transformed the society from a closed rural society into an urbanised open society. Unlike the older generation of the Island's inhabitants, the new generation accepts the idea of integrating their Island with the city across the bridge. As a result, land prices have increased which is reflected in an increase in landowners' income and an improvement in their life-style as well as an increase in building construction. As the beautiful 'green neighbourhood' of Greater Khartoum, Tuti Island is expected to play a significant role in the development of recreation, tourism and business in the future.

On a regional level, the development of Tuti Island is seen by urban planners as part of the Greater Khartoum urban plan that has integrated some urban villages into the city e.g. Burri and Al Gireif Gharb in Khartoum, Wadi Seidna and Al Huttana in Omdurman and Hilat Koko and Al Gireif Sharg in Khartoum North (Ibrahim and Omer 2014). At a national level, the Tuti Bridge and future Tuti-Khartoum North Bridge are expected by the Khartoum authorities to enhance the efficiency of the national transportation system through the connection of Jebel Awliya highway with Khartoum-Port Sudan highway (*Al Tahadi*). This will facilitate the speedy transportation of Sudanese exports such as sugar, agricultural crops and animal resources.

Construction of the bridge was accompanied by morphological and socio-economic problems that represent future challenges for the development of the Island. Morphologically, despite the modernised houses, the residential area retains its village like short, narrow, winding streets. It will take a considerable amount of time, effort and resources to change the street pattern to an urban grid system. Another major challenge is river erosion (*huddam*) in the eastern part of the island that needs to be addressed before more valuable land is eroded. In summary, the bridge and the resultant socio-economic changes have triggered the last stage of the natural development towards urbanisation of both Tuti and Greater Khartoum.

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Figure (1) Study Area: Tuti Island



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Preserving the Cultural Heritage of Sudan through Digitisation: Developing Digital Sudan[1]

Marilyn Deegan, Badreldin Elhag Musa and James Lowry

Documentary heritage reflects the diversity of languages, peoples and cultures. It is the mirror of the world and its memory. But this memory is fragile. Every day, irreplaceable parts of this memory disappear for ever.
UNESCO Memory of the World Programme.[2]

Abstract
Cultural heritage is one of the most significant goods that a country and a culture possesses. The Sudan is a country rich in artefacts that go back to the dawn of history: archaeological remains, art, manuscripts that date back to beginning of Islam, books, archival documents, documentary film, hundreds of thousands of hours of video, television and radio, millions of photographs. The National Archives alone hold twelve million photographic negatives. This rich heritage is at risk. At risk from the heat, dust and humidity, from obsolescence of media: the documentary film in the film archive, for instance, can only be accessed on ancient and deteriorating equipment, for which no spare parts for repair can be found. These materials record history and culture of the country that is fast disappearing in the modern world. If these artefacts themselves are lost, so too will be the knowledge of a way of life. Digital Sudan will transform Sudanese intellectual production to modern electronic and digital media, which will be safer to preserve and easier to retrieve.

A number of digitisation projects are being carried out in Sudan and spurred on to action by the news of the loss of vital parts of the cultural heritage in Timbuktu in Mali after the destruction of libraries, the Ministry of Information, the Sudanese Association for the Archiving of Knowledge (SUDAAK), and museums, libraries and archives throughout the country are collaborating to form the National Cultural Heritage Digitisation Team (NCHDT) to raise the level of activity significantly. Working with teams in Durham University and King's College London in the UK, and with other organisations throughout the world, the NCHDT is creating a collaborative infrastructure to integrate resources and facilitate usage. The partners have diverging needs but common purposes in terms of content and technology. This paper outlines these

[1] With thanks to Jane Hogan of Durham University for reading and commenting on a draft of the article and indeed for suggesting that we write the article in the first place.
[2] http://www.unesco.org/new/en/jakarta/communication-and-information/memory-of-the-world/

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ambitious plans for Digital Sudan, a country-wide project to transform access to cultural heritage.

Keywords: Sudan; cultural heritage; digitisation; libraries; archives; museums; collaboration.

Introduction

Sudan is one of the most diverse and culturally rich countries in the world. It is ethnically diverse: the Sudanese are divided among 19 major ethnic groups and about 597 subgroups and speak more than 100 languages and dialects. Sudan is also culturally diverse: tradition, ceremony, language, poetry, art, drama, music and dance, are all vital cultural practices, and Sudan is one of the richest countries in Africa in archaeological remains, given that it was home to the earliest kingdoms and civilisations south of the Sahara. As Claude Rilly, the director of the French Archaeological Unit in Sudan, remarked, 'Sudan is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa that has real archaeology and local teams working'.[3] Sudan was also one of the earliest countries to adopt Christianity: ancient Nubia was reached by Coptic Christianity in the 2nd century AD (CE).

Sudan's riches rival those of Egypt, Greece and Rome but war, famine, displacement and the ravages of time, climate and lack of funds means that the cultural heritage of the country is under severe threat. The preservation and recovery of cultural heritage through digitisation is well understood by the Sudanese and many outstanding projects exist throughout the world for Sudan to draw upon. The wider world knows much about other ancient civilisations but not much about Sudan. Digitisation will help show the riches of Sudan to the world and to itself. Many citizens are ignorant of the greatness of the history of their country, and schoolchildren and their elders can benefit greatly from access online to their rich heritage. There is a warning from history that we have to take heed of: 20 years ago the library in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, was burnt to the ground with the loss of three million books and hundreds of thousands of unique documents.[4] Much more recently, two libraries in Timbuktu, Mali, were set on fire by jihadist rebels.[5] Happily, in Mali, many of

[3] Ishma'il Kushkush, 'Ancient kingdoms in land of war', Khartoum Journal, Africa: *New York Times*, 31 March 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/world/africa/in-sudan-archaeologists-unearth-ancient-kingdoms.html?pagewanted=all.

[4] 20 years later: The national and university library of Bosnia and Herzegovina', *IFLA News*, 21 September 2012, http://www.ifla.org/news/20-years-later-the-national-and-university-library-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina.

[5] Simon Tanner, 'African manuscripts: a treasure in danger?', When the Data hits the Fan! The blog of Simon Tanner, Monday, 28 January 2013 http://simon-tannerblogspot.fr/2013/01/african-manuscripts-treasure-in-danger.html.

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the most precious manuscripts had been smuggled away but some loss occurred. If the world's cultural heritage can be digitised, the loss of the objects themselves, though deplorable, need not mean the loss of culture. In Sarajevo, the loss of culture has been severe. This must not be allowed to happen in Sudan.

As in many similar African countries, plans for the large-scale digitisation of cultural heritage in Sudan are still largely on paper. Though numerous initiatives have been carried out in recent years towards building a national digitisation infrastructure, no comprehensive overall national strategy yet exists for the digitisation of the country's most important cultural heritage assets. Sudan is not alone in this: few countries even in the developed world have a nation-wide strategy, so in creating its plans, Sudan, though seemingly less developed than other nations, is attempting something rare and difficult, with few models to follow. However, such is the overarching need for preservation of and access to the cultural heritage that institutions are making serious plans to collaborate in this significant endeavour.

The digitisation of selected material of cultural heritage is a national initiative coordinated by the Sudanese Association for the Archiving of Knowledge (SUDAAK), a Sudan-based non-governmental organisation, to guarantee the long-term preservation, integration, authenticity and accessibility of important cultural content in respective concerned national institutions. The project addresses some of the main issues related to digitisation networks and services in the cultural domain. It specifically aims at safeguarding and reinforcing Sudanese cultural heritage through new technologies. In its initial stage the project will aim at identifying and facilitating the urgent needs for the implementation of appropriate applications of digital technology in cultural content storage and sustainability.

SUDAAK is a cultural NGO, concerned with archiving Sudanese life in history, politics, folklore and culture. While the term archiving is mostly associated with records, the role envisioned for SUDAAK is organising the discovery, display, celebration and preservation of the traditional and modern Sudanese culture, together with the achievements attributable to the imagination and leadership of those who were pioneers in laying the foundations of the Sudan and its political, social, economical and cultural strengths. SUDAAK's current major programme is the *Archiving of 20th Century Sudanese Intellectual Heritage* but all other periods and all types of artefacts are within its scope.

Existing digitisation initiatives

There are substantial holdings of Sudanese material and documents relating to Sudan throughout the world, and there have been a number of initiatives to

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digitise these. Durham University has held the Sudan Archive[6] since 1957, the year after Independence. This archive was established to preserve the papers of administrators from the Sudan Political Service, missionaries, soldiers, businessmen, doctors, agriculturalists, teachers and others who had served or lived in the Sudan during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1898-1955). It continues to collect materials and now has holdings that reach to the present day. In addition to official and personal papers, collections also include a variety of records in other formats, such as photographic images (prints, lantern slides and 35 mm slides), cinefilms from the 1920s to the 1960s, sound recordings, maps, museum objects and a large amount of related printed material. Durham has digitised a substantial part of its rare printed materials and makes this freely available online: digitised materials include intelligence reports, annual reports of the governors general, staff lists, government gazettes, some Arabic material, maps and films. The *Sudan Government Gazette* from 1899 to 1975 is available digitally and the work of scanning this publication up to the present day is to be continued as part of Digital Sudan. Unfortunately, some of the visual and photographic materials can be consulted only on-site in Durham, because of copyright restrictions.

The Sudan Open Archive (SOA)[7] is hosted by the Kenyan and UK-based Rift Valley Institute[8] working with institutional partners in Sudan and South Sudan. The SOA is an expanding, word-searchable, full-text database of historical and contemporary books and documents on both countries. Many subjects are covered and a recent addition is the first 32 volumes of *Sudan Notes and Records*, Sudan's flagship scholarly journal.

In 2008, the British Library's Endangered Archives Programme funded a project to digitise the endangered archives of the Sudanese trades union movement. Approximately 10,000 digital images were captured and have been made available on a website.[9] The project also organised a successful training course for trades unionists about different aspects of digitisation. Most of the course was practical, where trainees practised with a digital camera and produced their own images and saved them to a computer. Some of the trainees assisted in copying some of the collection.

Digital Sudan

Digital Sudan is an international initiative to coordinate the various digital preservation initiatives currently under way in Sudan, with a view to collaborating on the creation of digital preservation infrastructure that would

[6] https://www.dur.ac.uk/library/asc/sudan/
[7] sudanarchive.net
[8] http://riftvalley.net
[9] http://sudaneseunionsdoccentre.net/j/.

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allow the government and people of Sudan to preserve digitised and born-digital artefacts and information in the long term. It is hoped that the passion for cultural heritage can be marshalled to create the capacity for digital preservation, which would create an environment in which digital information could be well-managed, which has ramifications for governance. If Digital Sudan can help to put in place a national framework for good digital information management and preservation, benefits, apart from those accruing from the preservation of Sudan's cultural heritage, could include good practice in digital records management, which underpins informed policy-making, professional, ethical public service, responsive services for citizens, the rule of law, transparent processes and access to reliable information. In many countries, frameworks for managing information on paper are either under-developed or have collapsed and often, no steps are being taken towards managing digital information. This situation slows information retrieval, undermines trust in the completeness and accuracy of information, exposes governments to legal and security risks, leaves citizens vulnerable to exploitation, enables fraud and other forms of corruption, and hinders information and communications technology (ICT) and open data projects. Through the Digital Sudan initiative, Sudan is taking steps towards ensuring that the necessary technical infrastructure and knowledge are being developed.

The overall goals of Digital Sudan are:

- Storage of selected recorded cultural material on Sudan within a well-designed selection policy;
- Digitisation of old and decaying books and pictures;
- The facilitation of access to Sudan folklore-related material preserved in prominent research institutions;
- Facilitation of access to National Library content needed for government processes and decision-making;
- Improvement and enhancement of digitisation facilities and services in Sudan;
- The creation of an online national digital resource to serve as a model for integrating multi-format and multi-lingual resources from museums, archives, libraries, and bibliographic and Web resources;
- Development of a collaborative infrastructure that can support an increasing number of contributing partners nationally;
- User provision of integrated digital materials that seamlessly link all types of resource.

The key stakeholders are currently:

- National Record Office/Ministry of Council of Ministers
- University of Khartoum/Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research
- National Corporation for Radio and Television/Ministry of Information

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- National Corporation for Archaeology & Museum/Ministry of Tourism
- DAL Group
- Photography Unit/Ministry of Culture
- Film Production Unit/Ministry of Information
- National Library of Sudan /Ministry of Culture
- Information and Documentation Unit/National Research Centre/Ministry of Science and Communication
- University of Nile Valley/Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research; Sudan Folklife Documentation Centre/Ministry of Culture
- Africa City of Technology/Ministry of Science and Communication
- Sudanese Association for Archiving Knowledge/Non-Profit Civil Society Organisation

SUDAAK is also working with institutions outside Sudan with expertise in digitisation and digital preservation development. Currently these include Durham University, the University of Bergen in Norway and the Department of Digital Humanities at King's College, London, where there is a great deal of expertise in all aspects of this area. In April 2013, the stakeholders listed above were formally constituted as the National Cultural Heritage Digitisation Team. The NCDHT is led by the National Library (under the direction of Dr. Nureldin Satti, a former diplomat, a UNESCO expert and Head of the National Library) and is coordinated by SUDAAK. This Team is responsible for the implementation of Digital Sudan.

In May 2013, Professor Marilyn Deegan of King's College, London, an expert in the digitisation of cultural heritage, made a visit to Sudan to examine many of the cultural materials *in situ* and to recommend a way forward.[10] She found much to celebrate and also much work to be done. While it was only possible to visit a small selection of institutions, she could already see the scale of the need for conservation of the analogue materials and their conversion to digital formats. In the National Archives alone, there are twelve million photographic negatives recording all aspects of life in Sudan over the past 100 years. The University of Khartoum library has priceless manuscripts from the beginning of Islam; there are nine museums throughout the country with artefacts from more than 4,000 years of history; film, radio tapes and video record major events in the country, as well as the music, dances and traditional practices. Traditional foods and medicine are of great importance too, and there are samples, photographs and documents concerning these in the archives.

An important scanning project has been under way for some years at the United

[10] Marilyn Deegan, 'Digital Sudan: cultural heritage revived & preserved', When the Data hits the Fan! The blog of Simon Tanner, Wednesday, 24 July 2013, http://simon-tanner.blogspot.fr/2013/07/digital-sudan-cultural-heritage-revived.html.

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Nations Environment Programme in Khartoum. Neil Murno of UNEP manages the Sudan Environmental Resources Scanning Project: this has scanned a very large UK-based Sudan archive of natural resource documents and maps, and additional archives are being captured in Sudan. Scanned data is made available to development workers in a variety of ways and historical data can be compared to current information to track changes in the environment over time.[11]

Sudan has a good education system overall, with a high level of participation in urban areas. Literacy rates are relatively high, though both participation and literacy rates are lower outside urban areas. The universities are excellent and there is a modern Open University, established in 2003, that has links to the UK's Open University and the University of Cambridge. The Open University uses all forms of modern technology to communicate with students: video conferencing, Skype, Facebook, websites, as well as radio, television and telephone.

In planning for Digital Sudan, the country has both advantages and challenges. In terms of advantages, there is an excellent telecommunications infrastructure. It is modern, well-designed, robust and capacious. Sudatel, the main telecommunications company, and the National Information Centre can provide some of the storage, connectivity and band-width that should be needed for Digital Sudan and, as the resource grows, the capacity can be increased. In the Ministry of Information and the cultural institutions, there is already some technical knowledge and more importantly, there is huge enthusiasm for the project and a willingness to make things happen. The National Library is one of the key players in Digital Sudan. It was initiated in 1999 and established in 2003 a library for the written heritage, based on Archives established by Britain in 1903. It is modelled on the famous libraries of the world: Alexandria, the British Library, the Library of Congress – and it hopes to play a significant role in cultural emancipation in Sudan. The Government of Sudan has allocated a plot of 11,000 square meters in Khartoum, next to the National Museum, for a new permanent library building. The design of the new building is intended to reflect the renewed role and status of the library as a means for socio-cultural and intellectual emancipation, and the intention is to allow the Library and the Museum to share infrastructure and resources, particularly in the areas of conservation and digitisation.

A Digital Library Project is proposed as a major component of the National Library in order to realise the specific functions of the library in preserving the national heritage and reflecting the nation's cultural and historical heritage. The

[11] http://www.unep.org/experts/Default.asp?Page=home&ExpertID=2656&SessionID=3142s

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digital library aims at transforming Sudanese intellectual productions, kept in traditional forms, to modern digital media, which will be safer to preserve and easier to retrieve. The digital library will also facilitate access to information across many public and commercial sectors, and it will undertake electronic treatment of old and decaying books, old manuscripts and pictures. It will also facilitate retrieval of information for researchers and prepare research kits on all aspects of Sudanese life.

Key activities for the digital library will include identifying content; conservation treatment for decayed and fragile materials; digitisation; metadata creation; uploading the digital materials into the system. Help is needed for all these activities, and a key area of need is in training and capacity building.

The National Library, National Archives, and the National Museums have good catalogues in place: these are the backbone of any digital collection. There are a number of digitisation projects already being undertaken in the cultural institutions and the universities: for example, the University of Khartoum holds the Electronic Sudan Library, which provides rare Sudanese materials of historic and cultural significance, with full text that can be searched in Arabic, English and other languages. Sudan Radio has already digitised 27,000 hours of historic radio tapes; the National Museum has digital images of artefacts attached to some catalogue records. However, there is much to do, and many challenges and risks. Digital preservation, for example, needs serious consideration. Here, though, Sudan can draw upon excellent work being done in this area by major institutions throughout the world: the US Library of Congress; Europeana; the British Library; the National Library of Wales; the National Library of Australia and many other institutions. Another problem is that though there are some trained staff, they are not sufficient for the scale of the task and a serious training programme needs to be undertaken. Funding is a long-standing issue, and difficulties of obtaining hardware and software can prove serious barriers to progress. Lack of coordination of effort is also a problem, and SUDAAK and the NCHDT are working hard to overcome this.

The condition of the analogue materials is also a serious consideration. An intense programme of physical conservation is needed alongside any digitisation activities and storage of the valuable original artefacts in better conditions than at present is an urgent need. Just to give one example of the urgency of the need for physical preservation, take the case of the cinema archive, housed in a building on the Sudan Radio and TV Corporation campus. The archive holds some 7,000 documentary films in different formats, including 16 mm and 35 mm. These are of vast importance for the history of Sudan as they record many different occasions and events in Sudanese public and private life. These are in a very poor state. The building is not air-conditioned and is very dusty; the film

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canisters are rusting and dirty; and the films are deteriorating badly; there is an overpowering smell of vinegar in the room, caused by the deterioration of the acetate film. There is equipment to project the films but it is very old and in constant need of repair. Finding parts for repair is increasingly difficult. If a film is needed for any purpose, it is projected on to a screen using the old projection equipment and then refilmed on to digital video.

In the last two years, Deegan and other consultants have made further visits to Khartoum and SUDAAK, the National Team and international partners have embarked upon a number of new projects. In collaboration with the University of Bergen, Sudan Radio and TV Corporation (SRTC) has begun a major project to digitise important television recordings.[12] This is a huge and expensive undertaking which has been funded by the Norwegian Government. At the time of writing, a media asset management system has been installed in Khartoum and local staff have been trained in its use. Tenders are being evaluated for the digitisation, and work on this will start in autumn 2015. SRTC has also built a new facility to house the cinema archive, funded by DAL Group, Sudan's largest company.

A pilot project to develop an archive of Sudan laws is also underway. The hardware technical requirements have been specified and the estimated cost of the project is $100,000 USD. This will prioritise safeguarding older versions of laws and their conversion into digital form. Also to be digitised is the *Sudan Government Gazette* from 1975 to the present date, to complete the work done in Durham. The necessary software has been installed and training for Ministry of Justice staff will begin soon, to be carried out by the University of Khartoum digital content department.

The NTDCH is also working on a project to commence digitisation of the twelve million photographs in the National Archives, with support from DAL Group.

Next Steps

At a workshop in Khartoum in February 2015, an Action Plan was developed for Digital Sudan and a number of key recommendations were made. In particular, plans need to be put in place for a national framework for digital information management and preservation. The national framework should include legislation or policy that provides clear mandates for all stakeholders and clarifies relationships and the division of responsibilities in the area of the management and preservation of digital information and cultural material. The framework should include standards, developed or adopted by a suitably

[12] http://www.uib.no/en/news/36409/preserving-sudan's-television-archive

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knowledgeable technical committee, that provide guidance on the creation, management, use and preservation of source material, digital surrogates and born-digital material, to establish a continuum of care. The framework should include procedures for all aspects of the work of digitisation and preservation, including for the care of source materials. The framework should also consider needs in the areas of infrastructure and facilities, staffing, training and education.

Digital Sudan has the potential to open up a great deal of rare material to the government and citizens of Sudan, unlocking the informational and cultural value of neglected and in some cases as yet unknown material. Digital Sudan has the potential to help to build national capacity in the area of digital archives. For instance, it might:

- Strengthen the national institutions;
- Use international technical standards and encourage their adoption and use in Sudan;
- Develop scanning and cataloguing procedures that can be usefully replicated elsewhere;
- Introduce technologies for ongoing use by the government and people of Sudan;
- Support the development of Africa's first Trusted Digital Repository;
- Develop technical expertise and become a training ground for new archivists. For example, a Masters degree in Archives Management/Digital Preservation could be set up with help from the international partners.

SUDAAK and the NCHDT, together with their international partners, are in discussion with the Ministry of Information and with other funders to identify possible sources of funding for the activity. They are also taking some steps towards training staff in digitisation skills and digital library development. Activities for the near future include:

- Lobbying of government about the importance of digitisation of cultural heritage;
- Establishment of further links with heritage institutions throughout Sudan;
- Identification of further international partnerships;
- Identification of possible funding streams;
- A national audit of materials to be digitised;
- An audit of materials already digitised or in progress, and record formats, standards, meta-data, etc;
- An audit of available expertise and resources;
- Creation of priority lists – endangered materials first;
- Development of national standards and formats for digitisation and meta-data creation;

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- Training and education about digitisation and digital life cycle management;
- Planning of pilot projects to test a range of materials from different institutions;
- Implementation of pilot delivery systems;
- Integration of digital materials across institutions for test purposes.

Digital Sudan will take many years and the work of many hands to achieve. The commitment and enthusiasm of the key stakeholders, participants and international partners is assured, and many of the activities listed above will take place in parallel in the very near future.

Conclusions

For a country to embark upon a programme as ambitious as this, is a huge challenge and will be costly. Even more costly would be the risk of doing nothing. Sudan is emerging from strife and division into the modern world, and is moulding its new identity by building on the strengths of its cultural memory. Digital Sudan has a huge role to play in this.

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Disasters Related to Heavy Rains in Parts of Khartoum Wilaya, Sudan, in 2013

Mustafa M. Khogali

Abstract
Heavy rains may cause floods and torrents and in turn, these may result in disasters that affect man, animals and plant life. Since ancient times, Sudan has suffered from disasters related to rainfall, despite the fact that the average annual rains in all parts of the country are not great in volume compared to many parts of the tropics. This makes it logical to ask: what are the main causes of this type of disaster in Sudan? This question is discussed in relation to Khartoum Wilaya (State) and with particular reference to the floods of 2013.

Introduction
This paper covers three main areas:

a) It provides a quick survey of the nature of rainfall in Khartoum Wilaya.
b) It discusses the disaster of 2013 in the Khartoum region, with examples from two villages (Marabie el Sharif, and El Fath Number Two), which are both on the outskirts of the Wilaya.
c) It addresses the question of which factors played a vital role in the disaster of 2013. The hypothesis here is that although rainfall was the basic cause of the disaster, it was human factors that determined what happened in some villages of Khartoum Wilaya, as well as in some other parts of the Sudan.

Rain and Floods
Rainfall in Sudan is seasonal. The average annual amount decreases towards the north i.e. 650-700 millimetres near Bahr el Arab to 100-125mm in Khartoum. Khartoum is considered by many authorities to be semi-desert (Barbour, 1961; Lebon, 1964; and others). Average rainfall fluctuates from one year to another and the fluctuation increases with decreases in the average annual fall the further north we go. Moreover, the distribution of rainfall is subject to great fluctuations from one day to another, especially in the semi-desert. Rainfall can vary even in neighbouring parts of the same village or town as can be seen in Table 1, below:

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Table No.1 Total rainfall in millimetres in different parts of Khartoum Wilaya, July 31st to August 9th 2013

Dates					
2013	31/7	1/8	2/8	9/8	Total
Airport 1	13.3	19.8	9	41.5	87.6
Airport 2	13.7	15.8	8.4	41.5	78.6
Africa University	59.1	7.0	4.1	40.6	111.1
Riyadh	12.3	22.3	16.5	-	95.1
Shambat	30.3	32.2	14.1	44	106.7
Gereif West	8.8	-	-	64.5	72.3
Soba Village	10.5	8.8	33.5	84.1	137.2
El Eilafoun	2.3	8.2	37	107	154.5
Hag Yousif	25	35	21.6	48.7	130.3
Soba East	13.6	61.1	-	55.7	130.3
Thawra	17.4	24.6	6.4	26.4	74.3
Wadi Seidna	18	20	11.1	80	129

Source: Data from a report by Khartoum Wilaya, 31st August

In 2013, the rains started in Khartoum at the end of July, continued on and off for ten days, and then stopped. The rest of the rainy season remained dry. The distribution of the rains was uneven and the total for these ten days varied from 72.3 mm in Gereif West (less than the annual average) to nearly 155 mm in El Eilafoun. Furthermore, the fall during the first three days was light but was heavy on the 9th August with a variation of from 26.4 mm in Thawra to about 107 mm in El Eilafoun.

People from the area reported that the rains on the last day continued, on and off, for seven hours and the size of the drops was quite big, resulting in the collapse of many buildings, especially in Karari and locations east of the main River Nile (see Map). In addition to the destruction of buildings, there were also serious environmental problems caused by the floods. Rainwater flooded the pit- latrines and some of them collapsed, while in all parts of the area, human waste floated on the water, creating a very unhealthy environment. Moreover, there was the problem of where people were to dispose off their usual daily waste.

The destruction of buildings occurred all over Khartoum Wilaya but with great variations from one locality to another, as the table below demonstrates:

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Table No. 2 Partial and total destruction of buildings in the different localities of Khartoum Wilaya

Locality	**Total Number of houses**	**No of houses destroyed**	
		Partially	Totally
Khartoum	67950	50	-
Jebel Awliya	318000	26	80
Omdurman	91312	673	84
Om Badda	380000	10490	1392
Karari	301664	4286	4705
Khartoum Bahri	130535	595	1476
East of the Nile	164000	12164	10978

Reference: Report by Khartoum Wilaya, 2013

We need to ask what the effects of this exceptional rainfall were in different areas and why these effects varied between and within localities. The evidence supports the hypothesis given at beginning of this paper, that although rainfall is the basic cause of the destruction of property, it is human factors which account for the devastation that occurred in some localities.

In what follows, Khartoum Wilaya is divided into three broad areas, reflecting the level of destruction that took place during these ten days in 2013 (see Map).

Khartoum and Jebel Awliya

Khartoum town is the capital of Sudan. It developed as a small European town and almost all the buildings were government offices, head offices of commercial firms and the residences of Sudanese and European officials and traders. At present, these buildings are occupied mainly by government and business offices. All the buildings, except a very few old unoccupied ones, are classified as first-class grade, with buildings that are made out of clay having rainwater drains; as a result, no building was severely affected by the rains.

Jebel Awliya locality is a very congested residential area and most of the buildings are new or continue to be renewed. It is here that a small number of buildings were destroyed. It may be that the damage was more than was reported in the Table above, possibly because it was minor and not considered worthy of being reported. The low land next to the Blue and the White Nile rivers is sometimes affected by flooding but this subject is outside the scope of this paper, as the floods discussed in this article arose from the White Nile.

Omdurman and Khartoum Bahri (Khartoum North).

Omdurman is the Sudanese commercial and residential centre. It is an old town which since the 1960s has been subjected to re-planning and renewal. Most of

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the buildings are in good condition and the small number of buildings damaged in the rains were on the outskirts of town, mainly in places occupied by displaced people.

Khartoum North developed as a residential area particularly after the construction of the Blue Nile Bridge in 1908. Lately, the town has developed some important industries. Most of the old buildings continue to be renewed and the destruction of a small number of the buildings was in the outer parts of town, mainly affecting displaced people.

East of the Nile, Karari and Om Badda.

It is here that many buildings were partially or wholly destroyed. However, the destruction was not even; in some parts, most of the buildings were destroyed while in others, the destruction was negligible. Three factors determined the level of destruction: the age of the settlement, the comparative economic situation of the people and adherence to traditional values with a view of fate that says that what is written in the Book will happen anyway.

Along the Blue Nile are old settlements, where most of the people are cultivators producing fruit and vegetables, while young educated people travel daily to work in Khartoum. Most of the people are comparatively well off and have continued to renew their houses, and so here the destruction was not great.

The new settlements are mostly occupied by displaced people. Marabie village (East of the Nile) is one of those settlements and El Fath Two (in Karari) is another. It is here that most of the destruction took place. In Marabie, 80-90 per cent of the buildings were partially or totally destroyed (see Table 3 below) and in El Fath, 90-95 per cent suffered a similar fate.

Table No. 3 The number of buildings partially or totally destroyed in Marabie

Number of Buildings Affected		
Partially	Totally	Total
2,166	10,969	13,143

Reference: figures from the files of Khartoum Wilaya, coupled with observations in the field.

The locality of Om Badda reveals the importance of economic factors in determining the levels of destruction that resulted from the rains. Om Badda is a very congested part of Omdurman, with a population of over two million people and approximately 360,000 houses. It is a comparatively new settlement and has been the home of displaced people since the early 1960s but despite this, the percentage of houses destroyed either totally (1,039) or partially (13,920) was

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approximately seven per cent, an unexpectedly low figure. This may be accounted for by the relative prosperity of the area, which benefits from being on important livestock routes from Kordofan and Darfur to Khartoum and is close to Muweilih livestock market and Khartoum's main slaughter house. Its prosperity is also due to it being at the end of the trade route from Libya to Khartoum and the site of an important and popular market, Souk Libya.

Many people in Om Badda have become involved in trade and other services, such as catering. Some people built nice houses, some with more than one storey. These houses were able to withstand the rains, torrents and sheet floods that came from the *Jebels* just south of Om Badda. However, some displaced people, old or new, remained poor and were unable to renew or improve their clay-built houses. Those houses remained vulnerable and it is here that most of the destruction in the area took place.

In the section below, we will examine in more detail the villages of Marabie and Al Fath where much of the destruction caused by the 2013 rains in Khartoum Wilaya took place and analyse the factors that contributed to this.

The villages of Marabie el Sharif and El Fath Number Two

Marabie el Sharif

This village is one of the new villages that was developed after the drought of 1970-1973, which swept over the entire Sahel region including Sudan. The village is located in East Nile (*Sharg el Niel*) an administrative area of Khartoum Wilaya. The village lies east of the Blue Nile, between the river and the extreme western side of the Butana plain. The area covered by the present village used to be a wide empty space, with two small settlements on it comprising huts built of clay. As the population increased after 1973, these two villages became joined together and formed the present village of Marabie.

This is a flat region that is slightly tilted westwards towards the Nile, causing small watercourses to run in a westerly direction. The soil of the plain is rich cracking clay capable of absorbing rain water to the depth of only a few inches and this results in a great deal of storm water running towards the river. The village itself is located in a very shallow depression between two raised banks, one to the south and the other to the east. Water runs to the village from these two small watercourses and in addition, some also comes from the Butana plain. West of the village is a major tarmac road that links the villages east of the Nile with the towns of Greater Khartoum. This road is built on a raised embankment, which obstructs the free flow of rainwater westwards to the Nile and this was one of the major causes of the destruction wrought by the floods.

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The population of Marabie came mainly from Kordofan and Darfur, leaving their home areas firstly, as a result of drought and, mainly, climate change, and later as a result of political tension and fighting in Darfur. When they first left their home areas, these displaced people settled on the outskirts of Khartoum, in Soba and Jebel Awliya, on land that was privately or governmentally owned. These types of settlement could be termed shanty villages.

The government decided to remove displaced people to new locations, for the following reasons:

a) The environment in their settlements was quite unhealthy;
b) The difficulty of controlling peace and security in the settlements;
c) To return the occupied land to its legal possessors;
d) To avoid the frequent criticism of some foreign voluntary organisations that the Government did not care about its own displaced people.

At first, Marabie accommodated about 5,000 people. It has continued to attract many displaced people from Kordofan, Darfur, Butana and even from the Red Sea State, both because it is near some modern and traditional irrigated schemes and because it is linked by a surfaced road to the urban centres, providing work opportunities for unskilled workers. The total number of residents now approaches 200,000 and some of these think that owning land in the area will bring them riches in the future.

When families were relocated to Marabie, they were granted a plot of land on which to build their homes and, being poor, used clay as a building material. Clay building materials can easily and quickly absorb rainwater and turn to mud.

The high levels of destruction in Marabie were mainly due to the vulnerability of the houses to the small floods from the watercourses and sheet-flow from the Butana plain, while the tarmac road blocked the flow of water and caused more destruction. The buildings collapsed quickly due to the poor materials of which they were constructed.

El Fath Number Two

The development of the village of El Fath was very similar to that of Marabie. Large waves of displaced people from Western Sudan went to an area on the western side of Omdurman and settled in shanties. The government, seeing the unhealthy environment in the settlements and in response to the criticism of the voluntary organisations, moved them to the empty spaces in the northern part of Omduman, between the Wadi Seidna and Khor Omer water courses.

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The village is poor in natural resources i.e. soil and water, but has a good location, as being on the outskirts of a large town, there are work opportunities for unskilled workers. It is also linked to Omdurman by a tarmac road that makes daily journeys to the urban areas relatively easy. As a result, the village has continued to attract many poor people and the population at present is almost 2,000.

The village lies on slightly raised ground (a plateau), where the surface is very flat. At the side of the plateau are a number of small hills or *Jebels*, including Jebel el Azrag and Jebel Abu Wilaidat. The plateau and the *Jebels* are composed of hard Nubian sandstone, and comprise a region of resistant relict hills. It is notable and this is supported by the official map (sheet 358-11-D, scale 1:250000), that there are no substantial watercourses on the plateau and thus the rain water flows in sheets rather than torrents or proper floods. The soil on the plateau is mostly coarse particles of denuded sandstone, which absorbs little rainwater and therefore it flows in sheets down the hills.

Before the transfer of displaced people from around Omdurman took place, the area was surveyed and planned with wide and regular streets. However, as in the case of the Marabie settlement, the people used weak materials to construct their houses and with the heavy rains of August 2013, nearly all the buildings except the medical centre collapsed, either partially or wholly, mainly because of the effect of the rains rather than the floods.

Conclusion

Disasters related to heavy rains and floods have occurred in many parts of Sudan over many decades but with varied degrees of severity depending on the physical nature of each region and human awareness of the environment. For example, the people in Kordofan build their houses in the sandy hills, where rainwater is quickly absorbed and never on the clay depression where rainwater accumulates. Furthermore, most of the houses are made of straw and wood, and therefore did not absorb a great deal of water and collapse as is the case with clay-houses.

Disasters related to rainfall are frequent on the clay plain of central Sudan that lies east of the White Nile. The region is mostly flat and the slope is slight and therefore when there are heavy rains, sheet floods develop, bringing water from far away. Where people are unaware of the possibility of sheet floods, they have built their villages on low-lying land or in a way that obstructs the free flow to the Nile or other watercourses. There are many examples of floods that were caused in this way and here, it is sufficient to mention a few examples.

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The first example concerns a flood in the El Giteina region in 1996. Heavy rains fell on the Gezira clay plain and sheet-floods developed; the natural flow was westwards but buildings parallel to the White Nile obstructed the flow. As a result, there was great destruction including houses, schools, hospitals and other buildings. It is notable that the destruction was caused by the force of the running water rather than rains that were not heavier than the annual average. Similar events occurred in the Rabak region of the White Nile in 2010. In both El Giteina and the Rabak region, water invaded the pit latrines and human waste came to the surface and spread into the vicinity of the houses. The force of the sheet floods also destroyed parts of the roads in both places.

The role played by a lack of awareness of the dangers of building on low-lying areas is illustrated by the flood at Om Dhawan-ban in 2007. The village is an old settlement and is usually not affected by heavy rains. However, some displaced people from the Butana settled in the area in 2007. To them, the area looked like an open space but it was part of a wide watercourse that was buried by sand. Being unaware of this fact and given their great need for land, the newcomers built on the plain: lack of choice led them to build in the wrong location.

The settlements of Marabie and El Fath provide a good example of what may happen in semi-desert and in parts of the desert area as far north as Dongola, where a large number of buildings are made out of clay.

In Fath Number Two, the people are poor and have weak buildings, and their awareness of the possibility of disaster is also weak; they see any disaster in terms of Fate that cannot be resisted by man. Poor people who believe in Fate see no choices or possibilities. This is the same logic as that of people who build their houses in low areas subject to flooding. This human factor is seen clearly when one compares the extent of destruction in different localities and in different parts of each locality, e.g. the contrast between Marabie and Khartoum.

The consequences of flooding are not confined to the destruction of buildings; there are other problems that are not mentioned in many of the reports or research. These include damage to dirt track roads that makes them impassable. Rainwater often stays on the surface of the roads for many days because of the inefficiency of drainage systems and provides an opportunity for mosquitoes and other insects to breed.

It should be repeated here that heavy rains and floods occur in different parts of the world, rich and poor. The Sudan and the United States of America are examples of poor and rich countries respectively and in both cases, great loss of life and destruction of buildings and property takes place. For example, in 2002

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rains and floods in Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania, caused death and destruction. Very recently, on May 30th 2015, a hurricane hit the southern part of the USA, killing 21 people and damaging many buildings and properties. Annual hurricanes are frequent and for that reason, are recognised as the most common, costly and deadly natural disasters in the USA (RMC, 2010, pp. 19-20).

It was reported by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (2002) that floods accounted for about 63 per cent of the total natural disasters in the world. Yet it is usual that the damage caused by rain and floods is greater in poor countries such as the Sudan because of the various vulnerabilities of the people. Rainfall and the topography are the basic causes of disasters but it is man with his activities and somewhat irrational behavior that is the principal factor behind most disasters.

It is my contention that the incidence of rain-related disasters has increased since 1950 for a variety of reasons, including population increase; urbanisation; the migration and displacement of people into new areas where they don't know the traditional ways of managing environmental hazards; and insufficient attention by town planners and road builders to the possibility of rain-related disasters being caused by badly sited roads and buildings.

The problem of heavy rains and torrents is not taken seriously in Sudan. This is because the average annual rainfall in the semi-desert areas such as Khartoum is very low and not enough consideration is given to the possibility of heavy rains in some years. The logic of some bodies in the government is, 'Why spend large amounts of money when the risk of heavy rains is slight?' This is weak logic because when a disaster happens, it causes huge loss of property and possibly human life as well. It was estimated that the value of the property lost in the area east of the Nile in 2013 amounted to over 198,551,962 Sudanese pounds. In addition, there was a deterioration in public health and other human suffering (Francis Vorhies, 2012). Floodwater may contain raw sewage and often becomes the breeding ground for different kinds of insect, causing malaria, diarrhoea and other health problems (Michael Wallace, 2007, pp. 39-43). In turn, these diseases reduce the productivity of the labour force. The question of investing in disaster risk reduction has recently become one of the main issues in the field of risk reduction and attracted the attention of many organisations in the United Nations.

Recommendations

An important development in the study of disasters is the realisation that it is not enough to study them in terms of risk reduction alone but also to analyse them in terms of the rational use of the resources that contribute to sustainable development. It is therefore recommended:

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a) To raise the awareness of people and planners to the hazards caused by rains. It is important to view the rains not only from the perspective of the annual average but more in terms of its distribution. The disasters in Marabie and in El Fath were due to the comparatively heavy rains in the ten days from 31st July to 9th August, while the rest of the rainy season remained dry. Moreover, the rains of 2013 were in some places below average and in others slightly above average but the disaster occurred because of heavy rain falling in a very short time.
b) To strictly apply the laws forbidding building in low-lying areas. This means that in the first place, there should be proper contouring based on an understanding of tropical rains that fluctuate from very light to extremely heavy.
c) It is not possible to ask poor people not to use clay as their main building material but it is important to plaster walls made of clay. This can be done by using a small amount of cement, limestone or gypsum and mixing it with sand or clay. Clay can be pressurised into clay blocks that can be used for building.
d) To introduce a building code for the shape of roofs and the height of buildings in relation to the street, and to strengthen the outer walls of rooms and enclosures with terraces, to about 25 centimetres in height and about 20-25 cm in width. The terraces should absorb the 'shock' of the water, rather than it affecting the walls of the building.
e) In many countries, the Sudan is an example, women are not actively involved in risk reduction activities. An exception to this is the women of Tuti Island, threatened every year by the strong floods of the Blue Nile. The Hyogo Framework For Action, 2005, argues that disasters are development issues and that gender analysis and action should be integrated into disaster risk reduction.

Note: This paper discusses the rains of 2013. The rains of 2014 were different, as at the beginning of the season, rainfall was high and caused destruction in parts of Khartoum Wilaya, as well as in some other parts of Sudan. In Sennar, sheet-flows destroyed large areas in 150 villages. The rain continued until October, giving good harvests of *dura* (sorghum) and other crops: the area under rain fed irrigation increased from 37 mn *feddans* to over 50 mn *feddans*.

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Khartoum State; The Location of Marabie and Fath2 Villages



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Why did South Sudan blow up in December 2013 and what is likely to happen as a result?[1]

Gérard Prunier*

Introduction

In the preceding article, we analysed the deep historical causes of events that, over half a century, have led to the present state of anarchy in South Sudan. We will now try to understand how that time bomb blew up in December 2013, focusing on events between March and December that year. However, in some ways, there is a gap in my approach as in neither article do I offer an analysis of the political texture of the southern war of 1983-2002 against Khartoum. During that war, many of the structural contradictions that were present in Sudanese geopolitics were deepened, reset, actualised and ended up as tactical inserts. Dealing with this period would take more space than we have here and I shall keep this subject for a future book. In some ways, following my argument involves performing an epistemological split, as I fast-forward this narrative to the post-Independence situation, while still trying to show how this period did not represent a break with the structures I outlined in my previous article.

The Events of March to December 2013

The Independence referendum of 2011 was seen by most observers and actors as a break in Sudanese history. A new era was supposedly opening but unfortunately the 'new era' was built with salvage material from the 'old era'. The first clear sign of that recycling was the signature of the Oil Agreement of September 27th 2012 between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). This Agreement was the meeting point of two policies. Firstly, for the North, which was hard-pressed in Kordofan by both Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and SPLM-North (SPLM-N) forces,[2] the aim was to stop the SPLM-South from helping the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), whether directly or by helping to channel Ugandan aid to the Northern rebels. As Brigadier General Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein told President Omer el Beshir, "We should not be helping them sell their oil so that they can use their money to keep supporting their accomplices here". Secondly, there was a technical and financial need to settle the question of oil-revenue sharing. This meant that the oil shut-down that Juba decided in

[1]This is the second of two articles. The first one (see *Sudan Studies* Issue 51, January 2015) was devoted to the deep causes of the situation in South Sudan of December 2013, while this one deals with the immediate events that resulted from the structural factors I outlined in the first part.

[2] Loosely federated under the umbrella of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF)

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January 2012 could not end simply with a return to the status quo but that a 'security-oil agreement' was required.

An agreement wasn't easy to achieve because in spite of Washington's pressure, a number of top SPLM worthies, such as Deng Alor, Oyai Deng Ajak, Pagan Amum or James Hoth Mai, continued to help the SRF because they were convinced that regime change in Khartoum was a pre-condition of any durable peace. They had Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni's support, since he shared their views. Furthermore, Khartoum's secret services, which were well informed about the SPLM's internal contradictions, knew that many of the beneficiaries of the oil-stealing system in Juba[3] were frustrated by the loss of their cash cow and that this would put President Salva Kiir on the defensive. Production had restarted by April 2013 but at a low level (120,000 barrels per day) and when the first batch arrived in Port Sudan on June 30th, President El Beshir threatened to close down the pipeline. On July 7th, he tactically gave Juba a small reprieve until July 22nd and production hiccupped up to 200,000 bpd, thus whetting the beneficiaries' appetite as they experienced a limited return to their former beneficiary position.

A small group of Southern politicians close to Khartoum and led by Telar Ring Deng got to work. Their aim was to informally structure the Southern 'oil lobby' (which was *de facto* a pro-Khartoum lobby) and turn it into a 're-election lobby'. Telar cleverly managed to inter-mesh the North-South oil negotiations with the internal problems raised by the planned 2015 elections in South Sudan, in order to use the oil lobby's leverage to attack the pro-SRF forces in the cabinet. They quickly managed to persuade President Salva Kiir that his re-election depended on his capacity to satisfy Sudanese demands. The crisis then started to build up from the beginning of July:

- 170 Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) senior officers were forcibly retired as they were seen to be "unreliable" and linked to the SRF support network.
- Vice-President Riek Machar (a Nuer) was deprived of his constitutional authority, preventing him from exercising power in the event that President Salva was not capable of carrying out his duties.
- Pagan Amum (Shilluk), SPLM Secretary General, was 'temporarily suspended'.
- Two government ministers: Deng Alor (a Ngok Dinka) who was Garang's former right hand man during the entire war and later Minister for the Presidency, and Kosti Manibe (a Moro) and Finance Minister, were fired and

[3] The siphoning off of oil revenue by members of the Juba government was organised on a grand scale, which later prompted President Salva Kiir to publicly ask his own ministers to give back the stolen monies to the public Treasury. He estimated the amount to be $4 billion (my own estimate is closer to $7 bn) but he got only a meagre $20 million back.

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subsequently arrested. As an Ngok, Deng Alor was a 'Northern' problem for the President i.e. he was keen on obtaining a fair settlement on Abyei for his people, a demand that disturbed the working of a discreet North-South Agreement, while Kosti had no tribal axe to grind.

- The firing of two state governors, Chuol Tong Mayay (Lakes) and Taban Deng Gai (Unity) was a major development. The financial accusations used to target them were imprecise but the real reasons were clear: both had made it known that they would vote for Riek Machar in the coming presidential election. All the people mentioned so far, whether guilty of financial mismanagement or not, were critics of Salva Kiir.

On July 22nd, Riek Machar announced that the South Sudanese government had decided to organise a referendum on the Abyei question, whether Khartoum or the international community approved or not. This was essential because Abyei represented, together with the question of South Sudanese support for the SRF, the red line that if crossed, would trigger the blocking of oil exports. These had already resumed and Juba had paid $236 mn in transit-fees. This did not stop the Secretary of Sudan's Parliamentary Energy Commission declaring that it would stop the transit of crude oil if security negotiations failed 'in spite of the difficult economic situation our country is going through at present'. On July 23rd, Salva took a sudden drastic measure: he fired Riek Machar and the whole cabinet. Events started to accelerate:

- On August 1st, President Salva named an entirely new cabinet;
- On the 2nd, he solemnly offered Khartoum to end any support for the SPLM-N, a paradoxical announcement since he had always denied there was any.
- On August 7th, the Juba Parliament's Vetting Committee refused the nomination of Telar Ring Deng as Minister of Justice, an unprecedented step for this body.
- On August 23rd, James Wani Igga, the President of the Parliament, was made Vice-President in place of Riek Machar.

What did this mean? First of all, this represented a 'night of the long knives' for all the historically important top leaders of the SPLM. Those that survived the purge, such as Barnaba Marial Benjamin (Nuer, Foreign Affairs) or Oil Minister Stephen Dhieu Dau (Dinka) were second-tier figures and this trend was confirmed by the composition of the new cabinet, which was mostly made up of lesser-known figures[4] and even of former Khartoum collaborators. The latter included Riek Gok (Akobo MP and still an NCP member), Abdallah Deng Nhial (a Dinka, Muslim, NCP member and former SPLM foe during the war), and Telar Ring Deng, who even though he was not officially NCP, was known for his close links to Khartoum. During the whole of the second half of August, a

[4] The only important exception was the Minister of Defence Kuol Manyang Juuk but his nomination was probably linked to his tough image and his strong ethnic (Dinka) positioning.

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series of joint meetings took place in the Sudanese capital between the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and the Juba secret service, to unravel support for the SPLM-N and the SRF in South Sudan. For Khartoum, the situation was clear: if Juba wanted to continue exporting its oil, it had to dismantle its entire support system for Sudanese rebels and refugees. The new South Sudanese government was heading in a new direction, whose playing field had been laid out by the President or rather by Telar Ring Deng. The last phalanx of *Awlad Garang* (Garang's boys) was fighting with its back to the wall and obtaining the rejection of Telar Ring as Justice Minister was to be their swan song.

On September 3rd, Salva Kiir flew to Khartoum to sign a new agreement, which basically confirmed the terms of the one made on September 27th 2012 but this time, the agreement had the approval of the Sudanese political establishment. This was a triumph for the NCP because it had finally obtained, through its handling of the technical and financial aspects of the oil situation, success in isolating and undermining the Sudanese rebellion: Salva wanted to abandon the rebels so as to obtain Khartoum's support. As a result of this triumph, Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Karti flew directly (September 6th) to New York to ask for the immediate abrogation of the international sanctions against Khartoum. Two days later, he announced that, 'in no case would there be the least dialogue with SPLM-North.' In Juba, the 'new political line' adopted by Salva Kiir met with total success.[5] On the 11th of September, the Director of the National Statistics Bureau, Isaiah Chuol Aruai, declared that as long as there was not going to be a census (and he added that his office had no money to organise one), there would be no elections in 2015. Two days later, Salva Kiir reinstated Telar Ring Deng as Justice Minister, by decree. For good measure, he added that he was ready to dissolve Parliament "and to send the MPs who did not like that hang around in the streets until at least 2015". When he was asked what the judicial authority was that he was planning to use to support such a drastic measure, he answered flippantly, "article AK-47 of the constitution". This was the end of the beginning.

From crisis to explosion: September 15th-December 16th 2013

October was marked by a lull in the unfolding events. The 'internal coup' attempted by Salva Kiir seemed to be working. South Sudan had stopped supporting the Sudanese guerrillas, the new Khartoum-oriented SPLM cabinet was in place and oil was flowing. However, it was this very success that led to Beshir stumbling. He went to Juba in November, officially to 're-launch North-South cooperation', when in fact he wanted not only to finalise the implementation of the 'updated' September 27th 2012 Agreement but to ask for

[5] Which (in a private telephone conversation on September 9th) the suspended Pagan Amum qualified as the "final setting up of a dictatorship"

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even more. In the 'updated' agreement, on top of the provision that stipulated a $10.40 per barrel transit fee for Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) and a fee of $8.50 for Petrodar barrels, there was also a section in the document that provided for $3.028 bn to be paid to Khartoum. This money was described as compensation for the expenses borne by Khartoum in setting up oil production between 1997 and 2005. Articles 5 and 6 of the document dealt with the arbitration procedure that would be followed if Juba did not accept making this payment or, indeed, failed to do so.

Beshir was confident that the new 'updated' Agreement would hold no matter what, given the existence of a pro-Khartoum cabinet in Juba and the reliance of Salva on his support for clamping down on the possible challenge to his re-election. Beshir had come to Juba to ask for the **immediate** payment of the three billion dollars that he badly needed, given the slowly collapsing state of the Sudanese economy, but Juba did not have that amount available. Therefore, in an apparent show of generosity, he accepted payment by instalments, which was something that could be done only by raising the transit fee to around $30 a barrel![6] We were back to the sum that Pagan Amum had staunchly refused to pay during the 2011 negotiations and which had led to the production stoppage of January 2012. Meanwhile, Articles 5 and 6 of the 'updated' 2012 Agreement were quietly dropped.

This was the last lull before the storm that blew up on November 25th, when Salva announced the dissolution of the ruling institutions of the SPLM i.e. the Political Bureau (or Executive) and the Liberation Council (or 'Internal Parliament' of the Movement). Why did he do it? Given the slow slippage in the situation (the last few moves had deeply antagonised many people), the President knew that he was by then in a minority within all the party institutions and that he would have to resign if they were allowed to meet and debate freely. However, this was one step too far. The outcry was such that he had to go back on his decision 24 hours later, leaving the institutional blockage complete. The situation was unworkable, given the existing embryonic SPLM institutions, and it was frozen in a state of 'we-should-reform-but-we-won't-because-it-could-land-us-in-deep-trouble': the result was a total stoppage.

On December 6th, the whole opposition, deeply revolted (even if only superficially united), met for a common press conference, where they announced that they would request an emergency meeting of the Liberation Council to evaluate the whole of the present political situation and that they would hold a big united public rally to support their demands on December 14th. In the overheated political climate of the time, a large public gathering could easily

[6] After some haggling, the fee was settled at $32 per barrel.

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have degenerated into violence and the various churches immediately conferred with the main opposition leaders (Deng Alor, Pagan Amun, Rebecca Garang, former VP Riek Machar), begging them to desist; on December 13th, the opposition gave in to these demands, at least temporarily,[7] and tried to negotiate with the President. The next day, Salva had to allow a meeting of the (preserved) Liberation Council but he railroaded it with the help of his right-hand man, Paul Malong: neither Riek nor Rebecca Garang was allowed to speak, except on some procedural matters, and a secret vote was not allowed.[8]

On December 15th at around 10.00 p.m., groups of Republican Guards attempted to disarm members of the Presidential Guard.[9] Salva had ordered the head of one of the Republican Guard battalions, the Tiger Battalion, to return to the barracks at Bilpam with an official order to disarm the Presidential Guard but with a secret instruction to secretly rearm the Dinka soldiers and not the others. While the officer in charge was trying to comply with his orders, he was observed by his Nuer second-in-command, who physically assaulted him and seeing this, the Nuer soldiers broke into the armory and rearmed themselves. Shooting started and the Nuer soldiers, at first somewhat surprised, fought back energetically. During the previous two to three weeks, Riek, who felt that violence could break out at any time, had contacted all the key Nuer SPLA commanders to put them on military standby. Hence, the *coup d'état* attempt that Salva claimed later had taken place. There was no *coup* but Riek had definitely taken pre-*coup* defensive measures during the course of November and this explains why the Nuer military counter-punch could take place so quickly after the explosion of December 16th. During the night, the fighting stopped at around 2.00 a.m. and re-started at 6.00a.m, after Salva's forces had arrested a number of 'suspect' politicians. It was the end of the political process, the point of no-return had been reached and developments were from then on essentially military ones.

An attempt to take a panoramic view

What were the strategies of the two camps and how can they be understood? The central core of the discord between the two groups was the move towards the 2015 elections. A segment of the SPLM's organisational bureaucracy, regrouped around Salva Kiir, had resolutely attempted to keep power for three reasons:

[7] A new date for the rally was set for December 20th.

[8] Salva knew he would lose a secret ballot. Malong's goons were in evidence and the atmosphere was electric.

[9] The Presidential Guard was an older unit that had been created at Independence in 2011. It was multi-ethnic but with a majority of both Nuer and Dinka. The Republican Guard was created in November 2013, put together by Paul Malong and made up entirely of Bahr el Ghazal Dinka, that were soon to become known as *Dot Beny* ('Honour your leader').

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- It was made up of a majority of Dinka tribalists who equated the history of the SPLA/M with a glorious epic of Dinka heroism coinciding with the anti-Arab nationalist struggle.
- This group, which comprised a number of non-Dinka fellow travelers, had carried out a huge *ghazzia* (in modern English, we might call it a successful heist) of the theoretical national resources of South Sudan (essentially oil) and stolen most of the budget money since 2002.
- In line with the *hukum* view of political power that they had inherited from the Ottomans and through the agency of the Khartoum authorities, this group felt that its victory entitled it to benefit from the oil money that destiny and their own military prowess had strewn on the battlefield as their God-given reward. Their 'legitimacy' had nothing to do with democracy or even revolutionary power, and everything to do with a *de facto* winner-takes-all military victory: no holds barred and no moral limits considered.

Their feeling of legitimate entitlement was boundless. Their view of the world was rough-hewn and simplistic.[10] The extent of their triumph (hadn't they challenged, broken down and eventually destroyed the political order that the black South Sudanese populations had suffered under for the last century?) made them naively persuaded that their crude understanding of the world could impose itself no matter what its brutality and 'kleptocratic order'[11] entailed. So-called 'institutions', i.e. tailor-made 'right-wing Leninist' organisational patterns inherited from Stalinist Ethiopia, were seen as simple tools to be manipulated in order to further extend their power. The 'liberation movement', which even in the best of its times had been a rather rough, highly militarised one, had persevered beyond its useful shelf-life and turned into a predatory machine feeding on the very populations it had pretended to 'liberate'. The whole creaky archaic edifice had become more and more dysfunctional during the CPA years (2006-2011), without the international community (in practice the US alone, with other countries being content to play the role of discreetly cheering bystanders), even vaguely beginning to address the growth of a dangerous form of political gangrene. The mostly Democrat SPLM lobby in Washington had won its proxy war only to see President George W. Bush steal its victory. The problem of what to do with an unreconstructed Communist/tribalist guerrilla government was never seriously discussed. Nobody had the least idea. Victory

[10] The 2008 SPLM Congress had been a monument of irrelevance, with Luka Biong Deng and Pagan Amum telling me with a straight face that there would be no need for Independence because in the coming elections (2010) the SPLM was going to win the polls, "both in the North and in the South and would, as a consequence, find itself in power both in Juba and in Khartoum!" The naivety of the analysis was dumbfounding.

[11] Alex de Waal describes the South Sudan regime as a 'kleptocracy' i.e. "a militarized, corrupt and neo-patrimonial system of governance" in his article 'When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: brute causes of the civil war in South Sudan' *African Affairs*, July 2014

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had been won, the evil Muslim fundamentalists were in disarray and everybody would live happily for ever after.

Facing the mostly Dinka hard-core of the SPLA was a motley opposition in which counter-tribalism (mostly Nuer), blended with a large variety of embryonic reformist views. Everybody in opposition was united in their resentment of the Dinka but the next step was less clear.[12] The reformist camp was far from being united, even intellectually. It ranged from those who dreamed of a new fully-fledged multi-party democratic dispensation to those who wanted a clean and reformed SPLM; it went from pragmatists eager to slaughter the SPLM sacred cow to manipulative SPLM worthies who dreamed of mediating between the two camps and picking up the political meat without burning their fingers (i.e. the so-called 'detainees'); it comprised genuine moralists and thieves hoping to restore their political virginity; and finally there were the Pagak Federalists who saw a vaguely inspirational territorial reform as a concrete way out of the mess. The opposition had a short-term advantage in gaining sympathy over the solid block of Dinka kleptocrats but personalities were not a good indication of the virtue of either camp. Men like Paul Malong or Kuol Manyang Juuk embodied the worst of the Juba crowd but the SPLM-IO had its load of skeletons in the cupboard too, with people such as Taban Deng Gai or Peter Gatdet very far from being democratic politicians. The honest Peter Adwok Nyaba was a 'rebel', while the gentle Jok Madut Jok remained in Juba by default, as a prisoner of the Dinka tribal label he did not even like. This has always been a feature of any deep historical crisis, from the US Confederacy to the French Gaullist movement, when rivers carry both muddy criminals and struggling swimmers hoping to reach a distant shore. However, beyond this facile overview, we should realise that the best and the worst actors in both camps **all stumbled through the same political landscape, the one we outlined in the first part of this essay** (see *Sudan Studies* Issue 51, January 2015)**.**

The problem South Sudan faces is a paradigm shift. Today the enemy is not a cartoon Arab slaver anymore, it is his mirror-image, the SPLA freedom fighter now in power as a *hukum* minister; their common point is of course the model of power structures that they share. Does this mean that South Sudanese politicians were especially evil or more corrupt than the African average? Not really but they were largely incompetent due to the British Colonial policy of benign neglect, followed later by an Arab policy of keeping Southerners at a low level of decision-making. Garang's policy of keeping at arm's length those few heroes who had managed to clear the educational hurdle and get educated was

[12] Even if the marginalisation of the *Awlad Garang* by the mostly Bahr el Ghazal Dinka hard-core and the resulting oppositionist stance of Garang's own family and Bor Dinka group compelled non-Dinka opponents to mute their public criticism of "Dinkacracy".

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an added disaster. Caught by the absence of any alternative model (the SPLA's 'right-wing Leninism' was not a model applicable in peacetime), the South's political elite unconsciously stuck to the model that had been traditional in the Sudan, i.e. *al hukum*, the old Ottoman governance model that has also survived in Khartoum right up to the present. Those Southerners who had had experience in politics or administration in the Khartoum system could not help but be familiar with the *hukum* model and so they carbon-copied it in the South and paradoxically put into practice the deeply dysfunctional Ottoman system which they, their fathers and even their grandfathers, had spent their lives fighting.[13]

The man who came to embody the hope of a political *aggiornamento,* Riek Machar, was in many ways Garang's paradoxical *Doppelganger*. Riek is a living paradox: on the positive side, he was the first one to challenge both the authoritarian SPLA structure and Dinka tribalism, and after secession he still embodied the desire to democratise the post-independence SPLM. On the negative side, he was the man who took up arms against the rebellion during the war, who had not been able to stop his men from carrying out the Bor massacre in 1991, who had accepted membership of Khartoum's bogus *as Salaam min ad Dakhil* (peace from within) process, and who was tainted by Nuer tribalism. Yet, apart from him, there was no other politician of comparable stature in the Movement. The problem was that Riek was still working within the implicit *hukum* system, trying to reach another political world while still mired in the old one. It resembled Lenin's attempt at creating a 'socialist democracy' by applying obsolete Tsarist authoritarian "solutions" to the building of his "new" system.

The South Sudanese struggle, like many others before it (Cuba, Vietnam, Eritrea and even Museveni's Uganda), has been lionised and over-rated on the basis that not only must the enemy of an evil regime be good but that courage and energy can transcend history and culture. The link between the weight of the past and the failures of the present has been, as is often the case, geopolitical, and this is perfectly embodied in the Janus-like face of President Museveni. We saw above that the mechanics of the SPLM coup led by Salva Kiir were grounded in an attempt at recycling the political link with Khartoum centred on the oil issue; with Khartoum hoping to strangle SPLM-North (or the SRF, the organisational divides have limited relevance) in exchange for backing the crudest wing of its CPA partner and keeping it in power, NCP-fashion. The *hukum* ghost was not even a ghost, it was an active actor. The target of the operation was Museveni's

[13] This is a perfect illustration of Karl Marx's quip (in *Class Struggles in France*) that "*in history, often what is dead reaches out and grabs what is alive*". The dead weight of past systems has been visible in many other situations and geopolitical settings, ranging from Russia to the Arab world. China's present attempt at emancipating itself from the weight of the past is both fraught with danger and hope.

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Uganda and its support for the anti-Khartoum rebels. However, in a turnaround that is seen frequently in history, the whole scheme backfired and ended up operating at a 180° angle from its planned course. Museveni rushed to support Juba, the anti-NCP rebels rushed to secure their supply line by adhering to their Godfather's line,[14] while JEM and assorted northern insurgents ended up as a pro-Juba militia, actually fighting, by proxy, for the system they were supposed to destroy.

Another *hukum* paradox was that the Ottoman style of governance had always used tribal contradictions to further divide-and-rule. In 1683, when the Ottomans tried to storm Vienna, many of their troops, the Moldo-Wallachian contingents and Serb and Magyar regiments, were Christians, as were their main enemies, the Poles of Jan Sobieski. The Ottomans came close to success and President Omer el Beshir is their distant heir. Neither JEM, fighting against/for him nor SPLM-IO, which accepts Khartoum's help, represent breaks in that continuity. However, the central problem of a despotic centralised authority based on a motley band of tribal supporters, a fact that is true of **both** Khartoum and Juba, is that it cannot escape constant instability and the need to rule by violence; there is no break-even point beyond the application of dominant force. Consensus building and management, essential in any form of democratic process, is in this case a structural impossibility. Democratic institution building is but a faint hope on the political horizons of both Sudans and the road towards that distant goal has to start by recognising where we are now. This means that the various forms of Sudanese 'peace negotiations' are, at present at least, a Pollyannaish pretence, unsupported by any reality.

The political paradigmatic shift that will take the region away from the grip of its past has to start with the acknowledgement that this past does indeed exist. Barring that, the ghosts will keep ruling the living. Concretely, it means that General Dau Aturjong's grim prophecy of ten months ago, "if we do not achieve a radically new form of government, the country will dissolve", is now a distinct possibility. Small local insurgencies are boiling up all over the place, with only weak organisational links to SPLM-IO: their political agendas are local and so are their military means. Since the progressive closure of the oil fields will cut Juba off from any sustainable means of financial existence, a certain form of 'Somali-isation' or 'Darfur-isation' is probably on the way. The international community will play in South Sudan the same role that it did in Somalia and Darfur, i.e. try to 'restore' something that has never existed, a 'state' on the bureaucratic Weberian model. Evans-Pritchard seems to have temporarily left the room.

[14] Museveni has been the Godfather of any and all forms of opposition in Khartoum as far back as early 1986; he does not trust Muslim regimes, even the non-fundamentalist ones.

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** Gérard Prunier has been in constant contact with the SPLA since he tried, rather confusedly, to foster negotiations aimed at freeing the hostages from the Grands-Travaux de Marseille (GTM) company captured on the Jonglei Canal building site in 1984. Over the course of thirty years, he has met most of the chief actors in the SPLA as well as many of its foot soldiers. He has been sympathetic to the SPLA cause but never blindly supportive.*

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Sudan Verse

Peter Woodward*

The British officials of the Sudan Political Service sometimes whiled away their time writing verse. Initially some of it was passed round among friends, but with the coming of independence in 1956 a small collection was put together for limited circulation, a copy of which is in the Sudan Archive in Durham University. The following is a small sample on various topics.

On arrival as probationers they would be posted to their districts where conditions were generally very basic, as described here by a new arrival in Nimule, on the border with Uganda

A REST HOUSE DITTY
The roof is too low to stand up in.
The door will admit a small sheep.
There's a "bottomless pit" in the middle
Of one and a half meters deep.
There are clusters of bats in the rafters
And scorpions adhere to the wall.
It's dark- there's a scurry of geckos
And the damp, heavy plop as they fall
(The most horrible sound of them all).
The torch will not work,
Bats pour from the pit. You start striking matches,
Jump, fumble near quit.
There's a sizzle- a flash,
And there at the door,
Hood erect, where you stood
Just a moment before
Is a SNAKE.

For some it didn't get much better

REFLECTIONS ON THE SOUTHERN SUIDAN
This is a bloody country,
This is a blood-stained land;
It's miles of desolation And red-hot burning sand,
And swarms of bleeding sand-flies
And leagues of steaming mud;
And the sanguinary prefix

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Is best applied to *Sudd*.

When God in all His mercy
Let loose the winding Nile,
He winked a knowing optic,
He smiled a knowing smile.
He said "I've done it this time,
I never did create
Such a dismal panorama
To add to man's estate."

Amongst the many things one could catch was the following infection, which will be instantly recognised by many *khawajahs* in SSSUK- or we wouldn't be members.

SUDANITIS
(Can be sung to the tune of *Clementine*)

Curse the sunshine in the day time
Curse your lukewarm glass of beer,
Curse the band tunes, curse the sand dunes
Curse the fate that brought you here
Sudanitis, Sudanitis
You may not get hold of me:
Pass the whisky; let's be frisky,
And pretend we're rich and free

After several similar verses:

Curse the country, curse the people,
Curse the climate and their ways:
But forget them, don't regret them,
And enjoy your Sudan days.

And many did, often looking back nostalgically on days trekking in rural areas:

Year-long the Baggara are ranging
Throughout Kordofan and Darfur;
In the midst of a continent changing,
Unchanged their tried habits endure.

Forever for pasturage looking
They live on the whole on the hoof,

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With primitive gourds for their cooking
And primitive rugs for their roof.

And another wrote:

Say not the trekking nought availeth,
Long trials, town rides, assessing rates:
Though limbs grow tired and visage paleth,
Yet is there that which compensates.

Administration was usually reported in prose but perhaps due to wartime isolation, one monthly report from the Eastern Jebels was returned in verse:

EDUCATION
We've got sixty Nuba boys, by using force and reason,
(We had to press our gentry
To get a decent entry)
For Abri and for Kauda in the 1940 season;
It needs a pair of tweezers
To extract the little cheesers;
But we've got 'em and we'll keep 'em and we'll make 'em decent lads,
So pass the torch and flaunt the tie and play the game you cads.

While life could be quite isolated, there was always the possibility of a grand visitation. One such was the arrival of the Governor General, Sir Reginald Wingate (generally known as 'The Master' and seen by some as very self-important), to open Kosti bridge in 1910.

Stand still police: for God's sake people cheer!
And do look pleased: that's why I brought you here.
Form up in line, and let you clean *dammour*
Attest the zeal of *Hadarat el Mamur*.

Are all the *omdas*' robes of honour clean?
And have they practiced saying '*mabsutin*'?
See that sufficient people stand about
To hide the corner where the flags ran out.

Is anyone with any just complaint
Out of the way and under safe restraint?
Where is the plaintiff as to whom I say
'I settled in your favour yesterday'.

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General Salute: now all that man can do
Is done, and only luck can pull us through;
Surely the trouble of the last few days
Will gain the *merkaz* credit,
Win us praise.

Wingate replies:

'*Sheikhs*, *omdas*, notables, officials both
Civil and military. I am nothing loath
To say that I am very pleased to see
So many flags, such signs of loyalty,
Such progress, such advancement, such content,
So few who languish in imprisonment,
So marked an increase in the public pelf.
Chiefly I'm *mabsut khalas* with MYSELF.'

And even if not being visited, there were complaints about Khartoum. One lengthy piece defending the Hadendowa was penned by Douglas Newbold (who himself went on to become Civil Secretary). It began:

THE RULERS
No doubt but ye are the rulers, and your spoken word is law
As ye sit at the Council Table, and your wisdom hath no flaw:
Fed with each others' favours, fenced from the heat of things,
Cushioned on thrones of papers, sprouting seraphic wings,
"We have the honour to state; we are all of one mind,
That we are building the best of all worlds for the lowest of all mankind."

After a meeting of governors in Khartoum, another wrote:

RECESSIONAL
The speeches and the cars are sped,
The Governors and wives take flight;
Returns to each official bed
The old impermeable night
"Gods of the East, our meeting bless!
Lest we progress, lest we progress".

New recruits had to be single and were not allowed wives until they were established.

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A WARNING TO YOUNG WOMEN
When a maiden comes to the Sudan
T'is plain for all to see
That what she's really come for
Is to marry a D.C.
But has the poor girl thought about
The awful penalty?

If you want to see the world from a scorching lorry seat,
It's just the life.
If you don't mind beetles in the soup, but say "It's only meat",
If you can sit and take your ease
With the local ladies under the trees,
All saying "*tap*" and "*girish please*",
It's a wizard life.

("*tap*" is Dinka for tobacco)

In contrast Khartoum was often seen as another world, not really a part of Sudan:

PRETTY LITTLE LADIES
Pretty little houses: pretty little street,
Pretty little ladies: pretty little feet,
Prancing on the tennis court, dangling in the bath.
Pretty little garden: pretty little path.

Pretty little babies: pretty little prams,:
Pretty little motor cars: pretty little trams,
Pretty little work: pretty little cash,
But cutting very prettily a pretty little dash.

Pretty little ladies, have you ever read
Of pretty little Gordon's pretty little head?
Pretty little Mahdi's pretty little smile?
Pretty little corpses rotting by the Nile?

But British rule did not last long: the 1953 self-governing elections arrived much earlier than most officials expected and brought some cynicism. One verse from Dongala summed it up:

Oh they had an election; it nearly was a tie;
But the pro-Egyptian party brought in money on the sly;

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Owz fulus, owz fulusya sa'at el Bey
Owz fulus for the shouting and the voting and turn-coating,
Owz fulus, owz fulus all the day.

It was swiftly followed by Sudanisation to 'cleanse' Sudan of British influence, bringing bitterness to some at least, as well as new international influences to Sudan:

SUDANISATION BLUES
We're public servants old and bleary,
We've spent a very long time here.
But now the prospect is more cheery
Because our final leave is near.
And when we think of compensation
And multiply at Schedule One,
We sack the cook
We start to pack,
We start to book
Our journey back
And then we feel our duty's done.

This is a country topsy-turvy,
As everybody will agree, but here's a situation scurvy
That isn't very hard to see.
The Politicians say the old regime
Was dark and barren, lacking light:
What do they do?
We get the sack,
Our cadre blue
Is turning black
And dark as Egypt's darkest night.

And so we end our term imperial
A trifle sooner than we thought before,
So Hail! The Independent Free Sudan,
And to its rulers' grateful thanks,
Let Sudanising be our boast,
De-Anglicise each British post,
And bring the Wops and Huns and Yanks.

** Peter Woodward suffered a severe attack of Sudanitis many years ago while teaching in Kosti Boys School and then the University of Khartoum. He is now recovering in retirement from Reading University*

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Book Review

Iain Darbyshire, Maha Kordofani, Imadeldin Farag, Ruby Candiga and Helen Pickering, **The Plants of Sudan and South Sudan: an annotated checklist,** Kew Publishing, London, 2015, ISBN 978-1-84246-473-1 paperback £75

Although called a checklist, this is a substantial 400-page book, and an impressive piece of scholarship. The authors, who are from Kew Gardens and the Universities of Khartoum and Juba, bring together all the work that has been done over the past 180 years on identifying what grows in Sudan and South Sudan. That is important, as there are already modern floras for all the surrounding countries. Now anyone who wants to trace the distribution of a particular species over the whole of north-east Africa can do so.

There are about seventy introductory pages. The first section provides useful general information on the geography, climate and vegetation zones in Sudan and South Sudan. That is followed by detailed notes on most of the botanists and others who have collected in the region since the 1830s. There is also information on conservation priority species, biodiversity hotspots in the area and a statistical summary, including comparisons with the flora of neighbouring countries. Sudan, Egypt, Chad and South Sudan each have between two and three thousand species (rather more than the UK). Unsurprisingly, they are dwarfed by tropical East Africa, which is wetter, with more diverse habitats, and has nearly twelve thousand species.

The checklist itself is set out clearly and comprises some 320 pages. It provides alternative scientific names and a list of citations. Each entry then describes the relevant plant, together with its habitat and distribution, but there are no distribution maps. The book is entirely in English and the authors do not list local names. That may have been too complex and controversial an area for a concise work like this but it does suggest that there will be scope to extend the entries in the future. At the end of the book there is a very valuable bibliography, showing the wide variety of work that has been done and is being done on the flora. From the past, the names are mainly European but now a number of Sudanese postgraduates at the University of Khartoum are making valuable contributions.

The book is well produced and laid out, with a clear font and evocative cover illustrations. It is aimed at botanists and is not a field guide but will still be useful to anyone with a serious interest in the flora of the two Sudans: not only does it provide very useful information in the introduction but it also offers a means of confirming whether a plant that has been provisionally identified actually grows in the study area.

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Publication was made possible by a variety of sponsors, including Kew's Bentham-Moxon Trust, and the UK's Departments for Culture, Media and Sport and for International Development. Putting all the information together and organising publication must have been a formidable task and the authors are to be congratulated for producing such a valuable volume. It is likely to remain the standard reference work for a long time.

Adrian Thomas

Adrian Thomas is a former British Council officer who worked in Sudan from 1991 to 1995. He has since been actively involved in the work of SSSUK and has been the Treasurer since 2007.

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Book Review

Luke Patey, **The New Kings of Crude. China, India, and the Global Struggle for Oil in Sudan and South Sudan,** Hurst and Company, London, 2014, ISBN 9781849042949 paperback, £25.

Alsir Sidahmed, **The Oil Years in Sudan: the Quest for Political Power and Economic Breakthrough,** The Key Publishing House Inc., 2014, Kindle Edition, £4.30.

In August 1998, Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) Commander Salva Mathoc told the *Toronto Star*, "The oil is taken from here and the cash goes to Khartoum to buy bombs that then kill our people. (…) They are our next target". That same month, the Government-supported forces of Paulino Matip burned down the villages of Duar, Koch and Leer after they had dislodged Riek Machar's forces. In the following years, Sudan's civil war centered on the oil fields of Unity State, with devastating consequences for the local population. By the time the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed the Machakos Protocol in 2002, which foreshadowed the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), a 1,610 kilometre pipeline was already transporting 200,000 barrels of crude oil each day from Unity State to Port Sudan and from there to the highest bidder. By late 2002, at the peak of the oil war, US$6 billion had been invested in Sudan's oil industry, an amount unheard of in the country's economic history, and the main actors, notably politicians and oil companies, were about to relish a sensational but short-lived bonanza of tens of billions of dollars.

In a perfect echo of Commander Mathoc's threat 17 years later, James Gatdet, spokesman for the SPLM- in Opposition, warned on the 19th of May this year that South Sudan's armed opposition intended to capture the oil fields of Paloich in order to deny the government revenues that it has used, "for waging war against its own people". The list of leading figures in today's SPLM-IO (which is fighting the SPLM/A) is full of South Sudan Defence Forces' (SSDF) commanders who fought against the SPLM/A over the oil fields during the 1999-2003 oil war, and all the places that were burned down and depopulated then are again being destroyed and depopulated today. However, the differences between 2002 and 2015 are far more important than the eye-catching similarities.

In 2002, the future was full of promise, probably peace, possibly prosperity, and some even dared dream that oil money would create the conditions for equitable and capable governance. Today, the oil industry in South Sudan is in steep decline and its outlook in Sudan is mediocre. Instead of one, there are now two

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corrupt and exceptionally dysfunctional governments, which are governing over two impoverished countries torn apart by multiple civil wars. The defining question is no longer how power is going to be divided in South Sudan once the politicians have sorted out their differences but whether the oil industry will survive the war and there will be any money left to govern with.

In themselves, oil industries are rather prosaic subjects that rarely make exciting books. Even the excellent four-volume history of Shell from 2006 requires quite a lot of perseverance. Not so with the two books that appeared last year about Sudan's and South Sudan's oil industry and are reviewed here. Having played a prominent role in the bewildering recent history of Sudan and South Sudan's politics, economy, and warfare, the story of oil exploitation offers ample material for two captivating and well written books.

Both authors, **Alsir Sidahmed** and **Luke Patey**, have been closely following Sudan's oil industry for many years, the former as a journalist and writer, and the latter as an academic. Alsir Sidahmed is an independent observer and analyst, with a strong base in Khartoum, where he can draw on a wealth of insider sources. While no stranger to Southern or international perspectives, his greatest strength lies in his understanding of Sudan's inner corridors of power. **Luke Patey** studied Sudan's oil industry for his thesis, which focuses on its importance for Asian companies. They both held dozens of conversations with key actors and their findings are by and large complimentary.

The key motif of **Luke Patey's** *The New Kings of Crude* is how the building of Sudan's oil industry has changed Asia's oil giants. It is not so much China and India's influence on Sudan and South Sudan that he describes, as Sudan's influence on the two Asian giants. If one takes an historical helicopter view, the global expansion of Asia's oil giants may seem predictable but when the careers, decisions, and relationships that determined the process are dissected, as Patey does, it becomes an animated saga of ambitions, mistakes, manipulation and a lot of hard work. Patey's account of Chevron's $1 billion Sudanese exploration feat is highly entertaining. He convincingly argues that, rather than the decisions of their governments, the driving force behind the eagerness of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and India's ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL)'s to profit from Sudan's civil war and supplant Chevron, was corporate thirst for profit. The support that CNPC and later OVL received from their governments was motivated by the false assumption that this would help their home countries to access oil. Patey explains how both governments were slow to understand that, once unchained to conquer global markets, state-owned companies would obey global market rules just like listed companies do. Sudan's oil was eventually sold to the highest bidder instead of building national energy security; and because the global oil market is remarkably successful in

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delivering a steady flow of crude for everybody who can pay for it, from an energy security perspective it doesn't really matter who is pumping it out.

Sudan jump-started the Asian oil companies' launch into the international oil business. Here, they learned what it takes to be internationally active and competitive. Sudan with its large oil deposits, low exploitation costs, obsolete regulatory regime and desperately cash-hungry government was an ideal playground. Partly thanks to the United States' boycott of Sudan, very little work was outsourced to experienced international companies, offering Asian contracting companies a chance to learn how to operate abroad. Thanks to Sudan's sweet contracts and the skyrocketing international oil prices, the companies made insane amounts of money.

There was a downside, too. The war in Darfur triggered a massive public outcry in the US, culminating in a poorly contemplated but hugely successful campaign to boycott companies that did business with Khartoum. This did not bring any relief to the people of Darfur but it did eventually frustrate attempts by Chinese and Indian companies to acquire advanced technology in Western markets and operate the world's most challenging and rewarding oil fields. Patey argues convincingly that the Darfur campaign taught them to restrain their appetite for political risk and to balance their exposure to instability and insecurity, just like large, listed oil companies do.

Building on their Sudan experiences, Chinese, and to a lesser extent Indian, companies are nowadays partnering with the world's major oil companies and successfully bidding for concessions and subcontracts all over the world. Sudan has been a piece of good fortune for them. The Western oil companies that entered Sudan in the late 1990's had to abandon the country in 2003, because of a pubic outcry against their involvement in war crimes but they didn't have to pay for their role as they all sold their assets with quite handsome profits.

However, for most people in Sudan and South Sudan, it has been a complete disaster. Oil has been lavishly bankrolling their inept governments without creating incentives for peace and economic investment. All the words of oil companies about contributing to peace and development have been hollow. For those interested in the finer details of the way some companies manage 'political risk', it could be interesting to keep an eye on Sweden's public prosecutor for international crimes, who is expected next year to indict half a dozen former executives of Lundin Petroleum for aiding and abetting war crimes in South Sudan.

Alsir Sidahmed looks at the same story from a Sudanese perspective. He describes convincingly how President Nimeiry's failure to utilise oil discoveries

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accelerated his downfall and how oil production gave the current *Ingaz* (Salvation) regime a new lease of life through an economic boom and the signing of the CPA. It is hard to imagine how any Sudanese government would have survived oil prices above $100 a barrel if the country was not producing oil itself. Sidahmed carefully chronicles the building of Sudan's oil industry and how oil has altered Sudan's internal landscape, external relations and economic fortunes. His fine descriptions of key meetings and decisions are mostly based on first-hand witnesses.

Acknowledging that oil has helped grow Sudan's gross domestic product from $10 billion in 1999 to $53 billion in 2008, Sidahmed argues that that it has done nothing to resolve the country's chronic lack of political legitimacy. In addition, because of the governing party's need to consolidate its grip on power and inability to develop a sustainable vision for the country's future, the money has mostly been squandered. The promise of billions of dollars gave *Ingaz* the necessary confidence to engage in serious peace negotiations with the SPLM in 2004 and it also gave it the helicopter gunships that helped push the SPLM to the negotiating table. Not unlike the SPLM, *Ingaz* has misspent its short-lived wealth on the security sector and political patronage. The independence of the South in 2011 brought a rude awakening. Oil revenues plummeted as quickly as they had climbed, while the Government was fighting three internal wars without any hope of being able to win them.

Sidahmed explains how crucial it is at present for the Government of Sudan to boost oil revenues but it has failed to attract investors that are capable of pulling off a second oil bonanza. Meanwhile, the leading Asian companies have been conspicuously absent during the latest bidding for oil concessions. That may be because they believe that there is not much oil left to be found but it may also be because they have learned about the risks of dealing with violent and precarious political regimes.

The main focus of both books is on decision-makers in government and business. This leaves ample space for another study into Sudan's oil industry that focuses on South Sudan. From the early 1980's to today, oil has brought only unspeakable misery to the Nuer and Dinka villagers under whose land it was found, much of it brought about by Southern armed forces. Their plight remains to be described, as well as the wicked logic that drove their multiple predators. Southern politicians have sometimes played a bigger role than has been apparent. During the war, Western companies such as Lundin Oil and Total balanced their relations with Khartoum, the SPLA and local militias. A former senior Total official once mentioned his annual visits to Nairobi to pay John Garang $1 million in cash and a minister in the Government of National Unity once described how Adolf Lundin promised Garang $6 million if he would leave

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his company unharmed, adding that, had Garang not died in 2005, Lundin Petroleum would not have survived in the South because Mr Lundin never paid up. The mind-boggling manner in which the SPLM has destroyed itself and its country will certainly find its authors, who will hopefully complete Patey's and Sidahmed's fine accounts about the decisive role of oil in that.

Egbert Wesselink

*Egbert Wesselink works for Pax, a Dutch movement for peace and human rights. Between 2001 and 2011, he managed the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (*www.ecosonline.org*), a research and lobbying vehicle for a large group of European non-governmental organisations that worked in close cooperation with the churches of Sudan and South Sudan.*

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Book Review

James Copnall, **A Poisonous Thorn in our Hearts. Sudan and South Sudan's Bitter and Incomplete Divorce,** Hurst and Company, London, 2014, ISBN 978-1-84904-330-4 paperback £19.99

This is like going on a long, interesting and often very enjoyable ramble through Sudan and South Sudan. It is clear that James Copnall has talked to many, many people – he himself says 'hundreds' in his Introduction – and their lives reach out to us across the miles and the pages. Those lives are often full of pain, particularly the pain of war, poverty and oppression, and his empathy with his interviewees is unmistakable.

The book is also often very moving, though the writer manages to avoid the trap of being ever present in his own narrative. Indeed, sometimes, the reader might wish that he were more present, as it is unclear without referring to the endnotes whether a public figure is talking to him, or made his or her remark in public or in print. To a reader trying to build up a picture of the country, that can matter.

One major difficulty with such an ambitious book or any book on the two Sudans is that there is not one single readership. Some readers will learn little from the work, while for others, virtually their entire knowledge of the subject may come from such a book. That is a big responsibility and a big challenge.

Another challenge is the sheer volume of material Copnall has mastered and marshalled in a short space of time. He must have typed up an awful lot of notes! It took him less than two years after his three-year stint as BBC correspondent in Khartoum to organise and write up 260 pages of text, not to mention 38 pages of often very detailed notes. This in itself is a mammoth task and he is to be congratulated for his effort and his visible commitment to the people of the two countries which, when he began in 2009, were still united – officially, at least, if not in fact or in spirit.

The book is readably well written, sometimes beautifully written, and full of insights. Copnall often gives time and attention to aspects that most writers, including journalists, do not. For example, in the chapter, 'Development: where does the money go?' (Page 130), he takes the trouble to reflect on mental health, not something often deemed worthy of attention in either Sudan.

"If physical problems test the creaking health system, mental problems simply aren't dealt with at all", he writes of South Sudan. "On one trip to Bentiu in Unity state, I saw a naked man with unkempt hair wandering through the town, muttering and then shouting to himself. The sight is relatively common

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throughout South Sudan, although this man was unusual. He was once, I was told, a powerful minister, before he went mad. After decades of war, a high proportion of South Sudanese suffer from depression or Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder", he notes, quoting the South Sudan medical journal. This can lead to heavy drinking or violence, including by soldiers, he adds, quoting the former administrative director of Juba Teaching Hospital.

These are useful observations of the sort that both South Sudanese officials and international non-governmental organisations need to think about more often when talking about war, politics and aid. The tome regularly demonstrates such understanding of the problems facing 'ordinary' people in each country, especially South Sudan, which the writer appears to have found particularly appealing. Notwithstanding the constraints of conflict and government clamp-downs, the citizens of South Sudan are certainly more accessible to foreigners than those of 'North Sudan', which was by no means the case in the free-speaking days before the National Islamic Front (NIF) coup in 1989.

The use of individuals to illustrate wider and deeper points is a standard journalistic practice and one that can be very effective when trying to convey, say, cultural or economic intricacies to a non-specialist audience. The thoughts and travails of, for instance, the tea seller or the bead-stringer can effectively give the reader an admission ticket to a bewilderingly complex crisis. By relating to the Dinka-Missiriya cattle herder, the reader may get a glimpse of how border politics and conflict affect the lives of real people and therefore, of the countries concerned.

The problem here is the expected one: the danger of generalising from the specific. The way of mitigating this is perhaps to have an overall thesis or at least theme, around which the writer makes his/her argument. The subtitle of the book is 'Sudan and South Sudan's bitter and incomplete divorce' and illustration of that uneasy situation abounds.

It would be nice, though, to see more discussion about the failure of the marriage. The anger was, and often still is on the South Sudanese side, as far as the general public is concerned. On the Sudanese side, the problem is more about widespread prejudice and discrimination. The chapter 'People and Identity' does not delve sufficiently into the damage to people of both countries caused by slavery or the assumptions of superiority built, some would say, into Sudan's Arab-Islamic culture. There is reference to race and ethnicity in the notes, too, some of which might have been included in the main text – the constant dilemma of footnotes.

Ethnicity is obviously a major theme in talking about the people of the

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'peripheries' of both countries or, to use the phrase that the late Sudan People's Liberation Movement Chairman, Colonel John Garang de Mabior, carved into Sudanese consciousness, the 'marginalised areas'. The reader travels to the Nuba Mountains and braves the bombing by the Sudan Air Force of Yida refugee camp in South Sudan. Peoples widely defined as 'marginalised' in Sudan are usually darker-skinned than others and speak a language other than Arabic as their mother tongue. They therefore included the South Sudanese.

Copnall is careful to point out that in Darfur and Kordofan, the marginalised can also often be native Arabic-speakers. This would have provided an opportunity to mention the fact that marginalisation in the Sudans is also about class, in two countries where social mobility is also strongly defined by education. Educational opportunity is closely linked to geographical marginalisation historically, as well as to ethnicity. In Darfur in 1975, an area famously the size of France, there were only two boys' higher secondary schools (El Fasher and Nyala) and none for girls, if my memory serves me well. This of course is a vicious circle when it comes to inherited disadvantage and one by no means restricted to the Sudans.

The importance of this is that marginalisation has come to dominate the discourse on conflict, especially with regard to Darfur. The almost universal journalistic shorthand for the Darfur crisis is that 'marginalised people rebelled against the government'. This greatly affects how the wider world sees a brutal war which, to the world's shame, continues. Copnall tries to avoid this stereotype by writing about the emergence of an Arab supremacist movement' in the late 1980s but rather cancels out this useful observation by adding 'partly stirred up by Libya' (page 153). That is true but readers would get a better understanding if he explained that after the 1989 coup, it was systematically organised by the NIF (now the National Congress Party, NCP) regime.

Yes, there was sporadic local conflict, usually between farmers and pastoralists and especially since the devastating famine of the early-mid-1980s. However, it was not this which killed 3-500,000 people or drove millions to struggle in camps in Darfur and Chad or in exile in Khartoum or Britain. The 'Arab supremacists' (*Janjaweed*) attacked villages and residents formed self-defence groups on the late 1980s, sending out pleas for help to journalists and human rights bodies, pleas which already used the word 'genocide'. As the attacks became more organised and better armed, the Darfur Liberation Front was formed. It later became the Sudan Liberation Movement, was joined by the Justice and Equality Movement and, while both were largely ethnically based, they focused on challenging the NCP regime, both politically and militarily. The attack on El Fasher airport in 2003 is routinely taken as the start of the war but all the above happened in the preceding decade or more.

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Poisonous Thorn in our Hearts gives the reader no sense that the core of the war in Darfur was and is ethnic cleansing by the Khartoum regime. The systematic attempt to wipe out the 'non-Arab' population (and latterly, some of the 'Arab' population, as well) is the reason that President Omer Hassan Ahmed el Beshir was indicted for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2008 and 2009. "The indictment has harmed Sudan's image, particularly in the West, and made it impossible for Sudan to get debt relief, or normalise relations with America", writes Copnall (P. 154). Some might prefer to say 'The reasons for the indictment have harmed Sudan's image...'. The atrocities are well documented and that is why Omer el Beshir is a wanted man.

Yet Copnall readily acknowledges, in relation to similar abuses in the Nuba Mountains, that the regime was in charge: "As with Darfur, this was not a case of a local response to a problem spinning out of control, Khartoum was fully in charge...". (P.146). However, he calls the regime's response 'counter-insurgency on the cheap', again reinforcing the idea that the rebels began the trouble. You have to look up the footnote to discover that this clever phrase was used, in 2004 and of Darfur, by Alex de Waal, who was soon to be playing an inside role in the regime's multiple 'peace processes'.

All this points to what is, to my mind, the book's greatest weakness: it treats the Sudanese regime as if it were a simple military dictatorship rather than one run by a highly organised, financed and committed Islamist party aspiring to its version of the 'Caliphate', even if it prefers the term 'Salvation' or 'Civilisation Project'. It is a regime that in 1990-1996 hosted Usama bin Laden and was the practical and ideological cradle of Al Qaida. Copnall rarely comments on the government as such but occasionally, an opinion shines through. Of President Omer, he says, "His long period in charge has been perhaps the most catastrophic in the country's history: there has not been a single day of peace since he launched his coup in 1989".

However, it was not Omer el Beshir's coup. It was a coup not by a bunch of discontented army officers but an NIF takeover bid that had been some 13 years in the planning and executed largely by the same civilians who are still in charge. Omer and his close military henchman were there to keep the historically anti-Islamist armed forces on board. The NIF-NCP ruled and still rules through the multiple security organs, though since the party split in 1999-2000, Omer el Beshir has gained more power, as has the army, whose officer corps is now Islamist.

Those security and other party structures have kept the party in power for a startling 26 years and that has to be a fundamental consideration when

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discussing future relations between the two Sudans. Copnall writes engagingly and informatively about South Sudanese politics, where the focus is largely on individuals and the factions or militias they represent. When it comes to Sudan, though, the constraints imposed on writer and Sudanese alike by an oppressive regime sometimes show through.

Gill Lusk

Gill Lusk went to Sudan in 1975 and worked there for twelve years, first as a teacher and then, a journalist. She joined Africa Confidential in 1987 and is now Associate Editor. She is Chairperson of SSSUK.

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Book Review

John Ashworth, Haruun Lual Ruun, Emmanuel LoWilla & Maura Ryan, **The Voice of the Voiceless: The Role of the Church in the Sudanese Civil War 1983-2005,** Paulines Publications Africa, 2014, ISBN 9966-08-836-9 paperback, £14.99

The opening words of the Introduction to this book, written by the four authors, accurately sum up the great importance of the story that it tells:

> The Church played a unique role in Sudan, far beyond its "religious" calling. It was the only institution that retained its infrastructure and was present on the ground amongst the people everywhere throughout the war in southern Sudan, Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile. (p.11)

The social, humanitarian and reconciling role of the Church during Sudan's civil wars has been frequently underestimated or even ignored, quite apart from the strength, comfort and inspiration that its message and witness have imparted to the people. This book adds a much needed dimension and perspective to a story that has been extensively examined from other angles.

Three of the four authors of *Voice of the Voiceless* have been at the heart of the struggle over many years, actors in the story, shapers of the course of events and observers of many of the key twists and turns that they record. John Ashworth came to Sudan in 1983 and has been a member of the Sudanese Church for many years, serving in many roles, especially in church-led aid and development programmes. Dr Haruun Lual Ruun is a South Sudanese who has served the people as a senior church pastor and most significantly, as Executive Secretary of the New Sudan Council of Churches, through many years of war. Emmanuel LoWilla has also been a staff member of NSCC, had a distinguished diplomatic career and been involved in many of the reconciliation programmes described here. Maura Ryan is a theologian from Notre Dame University in the USA and contributes valuable theological reflections on the unfolding narrative. We are in good hands.

Chapter One is unusual and valuable. Even for many of us who are Southern Sudanese or have lived in Sudan, the story that the book tells will be complex, with a great spread of historical and geographical references and a huge cast of players. The opening chapter is an extended sequence of vignettes, personal stories and testimonies that captures powerfully the emotional and personal cost and challenge of living and working in Southern Sudan through these years. Do not hurry over it. It gives the personal impact of the great events that follow.

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Chapter Two, "Country Context: The Sudan and the Church in Sudan", also serves a valuable introductory purpose. It is well researched and surveys the history of Sudan, especially since the outbreak of the first hostilities in August 1955, but usefully does so from a religious and Church perspective, outlining for us the shifting place and role that the Church has had in social and political affairs.

Thereafter, the narrative mainly follows on from the foundation of the New Sudan Council of Churches at Torit in Eastern Equatoria in 1991. I had the privilege of being present at this key event at which the Churches of the South banded together (including the Catholic Church, which at that time was very unusual, and ground-breaking), for the purpose of speaking with one voice – indeed "A Voice for the Voiceless" – for the people, for their desperate need in the midst of a bloody and destructive war, for the unity of the people of the South, for reconciliation between the factions fighting in the South, as well as peace with the northern government. It was a bold and courageous programme, embraced with hope and trepidation as we sat round desks in a deserted school. The book chronicles, with detailed anecdote, personal observation and perceptive insight, the long and devoted efforts of the NSCC to serve the people and to promote justice and peace through to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005.

The story that is told is thus mainly at the institutional and political level although aid, development, peace-making, education programmes, theological education and other initiatives always reach down to the grassroots level. Despite the subtitle, "The Role of the Church in the Sudanese Civil War", this account concerns mainly the crucial activities of the NSCC and its associated partners. Accounts of church life and growth during the war, evangelism and the developments of churches at the grassroots level are to be found elsewhere (e.g. *Day of Devastation, Day of Contentment: A History of the Sudanese Church Across 2000 years¨* by Werner, Anderson and Wheeler, 2000, in the Faith in Sudan series). However, the story told in this book is of the highest importance, making it clear that, despite its frailty and lack of resources, the Church in Southern Sudan played an influential role in reconciliation in the fractured societies of the South and in fostering a movement towards peace.

Successive chapters describe the decisive meeting at Kajiko, south of Yei, in 1997, when key agreements were reached between the Churches and the Sudan People's Liberation Army that identified the common calling of both to the liberation of the people. The agreements nonetheless recognised the different roles of each and the responsibility of the Churches in particular to speak for and to defend the people, and to struggle for justice and peace amongst all people and in all circumstances.

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The narrative moves on to cover the extensive aid and development that NSCC either sponsored or provided oversight for (prepare yourself for an avalanche of acronyms) and the extension of the Council's work into the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and Blue Nile, all areas that are politically in Sudan. Of special significance is the chapter on peace making. Despite the fact that the peace process in south Sudan was largely uninformed by the wisdom and experience of the wider world, it proved to be very influential and in due time South Sudan became regarded as "a laboratory for those who study peace". 'The People to People Peace Process' had its first major expression and success at Wunlit in 1999, bringing together grassroots leaders of the Dinka and Nuer people and using traditional as well as Christian communal reconciliation processes to bring healing and forgiveness and build trust. The initial thrust was very much at the grassroots level but its influence spread to other levels of southern civil and military society. As the title of the concluding chapter says, the Sudanese Church has become "A Peace Bearing Church".

Subsequent chapters cover the development of an international advocacy programme on behalf of the people of Southern Sudan, the Churches' involvement in the long road to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 and the multitude of other programmes that NSCC and the individual churches pioneered at this time – trauma counselling, civic empowerment, capacity building of many kinds, theological education by extension, etc.

This book is not only about programmes and institutions. On every page, courage and faith are displayed as men and women, against all the odds, live lives of hope and faith, and are enabled to do extraordinary things. Some figures of true and abiding stature appear and reappear – Bishop Paride Taban, Bishop Nathaniel Garang, Bishop Seme Solomona – and not only bishops, clergy and evangelists but nurses, administrators, entrepreneurs, teachers, aid workers, farmers and pastoralists. Our authors, John Ashworth, Haruun Ruun and Emmanuel LoWilla, are eye witnesses to much of what they describe, which they do vividly and passionately, and self-effacingly.

This book is a remarkable testimony to a phase in southern Sudanese history when brutality, destruction, fear and hopelessness were matched by courage and faith, by imagination and sacrifice, such that peace, and hope and justice could become rooted in the most unpromising soil.

Sadly, the task is not yet complete and the Churches continue to offer themselves to the work of reconciliation and peace building, as conflict continues in South Sudan. In due time, a further volume will be required.

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Andrew Wheeler.

Andrew Wheeler served with the Sudanese Church in southern Sudan and in exile, from 1977 until 2000. He is the senior editor of, and a major contributor to, the 'Faith in Sudan' series of books, covering many aspects of the history and spirituality of Sudanese Christianity.

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Book Review

Edward Thomas, **South Sudan: A Slow Liberation,** Zed Books, London, 2015, ISBN 978-1-78360-404-3 paperback, £18.99

This is the latest book by the well-known writer on Sudan and South Sudan, Dr. Edward Thomas. It gives new insights into the challenges facing South Sudan and raises hopes that practical solutions can be found, without in any way underrating the difficulty of the task.

The sub-title of the book refers to a 'slow liberation' because the liberation of the country is not merely about attaining sovereignty but also about settling the host of internal conflicts the country continues to face, and providing tangible and equitable services to all.

What makes the book interesting and important to me is the set of novel ideas it puts forward about the nature of South Sudan's internal conflicts and how sharply these ideas go against conventional wisdom. Rather than conjuring with familiar and vague concepts about the ancient nature of warfare in South Sudan to explain the intractability of conflict, Thomas instead puts it down to tangible and relatively recent factors. In doing so, he puts the responsibility of addressing them primarily on the shoulders of the South Sudanese leaders and their development partners.

First among the causes of South Sudan's ills is the manner in which the country was exposed to modernity: the brutalising slave trade and the toll this took on its socio-economic status and the subsequent experience of colonial rule that did little to redress it. The country, Thomas pointedly observes, was the first in Africa's interior to be exposed to modernity; that notwithstanding, it remains today far less developed than other countries in the region.

There is a widespread belief that violence took root among certain South Sudanese communities in times immemorial – with pastoralism and the harsh environment being suggested as principal causes. Yet Thomas argues that the real causes of continued violence could be found in more recent changes. The uneven fashion in which money and services have been introduced to certain communities, giving them an advantage over their neighbours, lies behind some of the more recent conflicts. The brutalisation of the general population during the first and the second Sudanese civil wars is another. A third element is the inconsistency of the government's disarmament policy, which often removes weapons from one community while allowing their traditional rivals to hold on to theirs.

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The book tackles several other policy muddles but perhaps the most important is how little or no attempt has been made throughout its history to ensure that South Sudan lives from its own labour. The tendency has been to import the resources for operationalising the government: from Khartoum in the case of past colonial and Sudanese governments, and from oil revenue, as is the practice of the current South Sudan government. Governments have therefore felt little commitment to serve the population adequately. Likewise, many remote and marginal communities continue to perceive the government as a malign, remote entity worthy of fighting. On the other hand, the government is also seen as a source of community enrichment which shares out wealth through jobs and services.

If I have any misgivings about the book, it would be its lack of a proper account, however brief, of the collective struggle for the liberation of South Sudan.

This book is a significant contribution to the growing body of literature about South Sudan. It will add to the debates about the country's past and future. It is a must read for students and academics interested in the politics of South Sudan as well as for non-South Sudanese working or planning to work in South Sudan; and of course, for every South Sudanese who can get hold of it. It is a unique input from someone who, having lived among ordinary South Sudanese, often in remote regions, has come to appreciate their importance in forging the future of the country.

Mawan Muortat

Mawan Muortat is a South Sudan commentator and IT analyst based in London. He can be reached at mawan.muortat@hotmail.com

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Book Review

Naseem Badiey, **The State of Post-conflict Reconstruction. Land, Urban Development and State-building in Juba, Southern Sudan,** 2014, James Currey, ISBN 9781847010940 hardback, £50

'State-building' has become something of a business. Consultancies advertise their state-building 'expertise' to the national and multinational development organisations that are their financial bread and butter. Developing nations, on the other hand, such as South Sudan, participate in 'dialogues' and 'consultations' about state-building 'processes', ostensibly in exchange for aid money.

Initially, 'building the state' might have seemed a beneficial way to 'bring the state back in' to international, largely Western-driven, development efforts, rather than vilifying it, as was frequently the case in sub-Saharan Africa. After all, so the thinking goes, the state ought to be providing public services rather than the United Nations, international aid agencies and non-governmental organisations, which broadly define Western development initiatives. Yet it has never been all that clear what constitutes the state and how citizens relate to it nor what it means to 'build' such a nebulous entity in any nation.

For example, is the state simply a series of laws, legitimated by elected officials and implemented by government ministries that are then embodied by civil servants such as tax collectors and police officers? Can state-building processes really be 'sequenced' as so many experts led us to believe in Afghanistan and Iraq, where Western-led state-building efforts have apparently failed? And what do any of these lessons mean in the world's newest country, which so many 'technical experts' seem to think of as being an ahistorical 'blank slate' upon which a new state can be forged? Moreover, might there actually be something scholars and practitioners can learn from the endogenous and externally-led state-building processes that are presently under way in South Sudan?

Naseem Badiey's *The State of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Land, Urban Development and State-Building in Juba Southern Sudan* valuably contributes to these debates. Using Juba as her case study, Badiey, an Assistant Professor of International Development and Humanitarian Action at California State University, Monterey Bay, provides a detailed historical and political analysis of the gritty accumulations of daily interactions among actors such as state officials, politicians and returnees that are forging today's South Sudanese state. Juba makes for a compelling case study, in part because of what some scholars have noted is the most rapid urbanisation that the world has ever seen, which has in turn contributed to conflicts over land ownership and community identity, but

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also because of its recent history of hosting a roving cast of international development actors that are now seemingly integral to Western-led state-building efforts.

Badiey's account weaves observations from five years of research with field studies that took place in post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement(CPA), pre-Independence Juba in 2006 and 2008, with an overview of the literature on: international state-building theory and practice; state-formation in, and the politics of, sub-Saharan Africa; and the emerging work on how people consciously evade the state that the scholar James C. Scott has in many ways pioneered. Her central premise counters the prevailing policy-oriented narrative that the state is a top-down 'high modernist' entity that loftily legislates and enforces its will on a compliant populace. Instead, "national-level initiatives are interpreted, contested, and adapted at the local level" and they are critically "contingent on local dynamics".

The book opens with an overview of the history of the city of Juba, starting with Turco-Egyptian rule in 1840 through to the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium and the civil war periods. In so doing, Badiey paints a picture of Juba as a hub where early ideas about the state have become etched into the fabric of the nation. This story begins with the deeply extractive slave and ivory trades and continues with the city's history as a northern-held garrison town during the second civil war. Various descriptions of how members within local communities have consciously negotiated these shifting power relations "in their roles, their social and economic positions, and their relationship to the state and its various local arms" all while typically capitalising on the economic and social changes underfoot, in turn takes shape. Badiey drills home the sheer inertia of history in these passages, demonstrating that no state-building enterprise to date has been able to establish a presence powerful enough to subvert these tendencies. In fact, resistance might actually be an "expectable, and perhaps even functional part of the construction and consolidation of the state", without which the state cannot become "locally rooted".

The second and third chapters examine how and why the CPA's decentralisation framework failed to resolve local-level power imbalances in the capital. Interestingly, Badiey argues that leaders in the government of Central Equatoria State, where Juba is located, perceived the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) leadership to have talked about power devolution in the form of administrative decentralisation but instead acted more like centralisers. What also emerges in this chapter is how the systems of the previous regime had actually protected certain local interests, particularly over rights to generate revenue, some of which clashed with the SPLM's reconstruction agenda. More locally, competing interpretations over the CPA's land tenure articles

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contributed to political clashes among the SPLM, Equatorians in the Central Equatorian State Government and Bari leaders in which largely self-interested identity claims, particularly in the form of 'community' rights, were wielded to justify land rights, all while engaging various strategies to play by the state's formal rules of the game and simultaneously evading its remit.

The book's final chapters reveal how the international aid community's focus on processes and technological efficiency sometimes unwittingly clashed with local power dynamics, as aspects of these technocratic processes threatened the very politics that some local actors were seeking to preserve. Moreover, despite their good intentions, donors and aid agencies overwhelmingly overlooked the land struggles that were rumbling underneath their compounds and offices. These chapters also demonstrate how varying historical interpretations, which draw on different notions of citizenship, have been wielded by local actors to legitimate and preserve the "privileged political and economic status of local elites" and also assert the central government's power in the face of the rapid sprouting of informal settlements populated by non-elite internal returnees and refugees.

Naseem Badiey's analysis will be of strong interest to Sudan scholars as well as academic and policy-oriented students of contemporary state-building efforts. From a state formation perspective, the text is ripe with invaluable insights into the logic of local and national contestations over power and legitimate authority that are likely to define the lasting ways in which citizens relate to the state in South Sudan and perhaps other post-conflict societies. There are also glimpses of the emergent character of the South Sudanese state, such as whether national patterns of authority and control are likely to remain oriented towards the political centre, with Juba as its nexus, or whether the country's ten states might be able eventually to wrestle more power for themselves and hold the centre politically accountable. From a comparative politics perspective, the text also provides further food for thought for other scholars to bite into, such as how and why citizens of post-conflict countries relate to their state, which as much of Scott's work argues, can be brutal albeit seemingly inexorable in its national and global grasp and domination.

However, the text might have benefited from a more comparative analysis of the competing histories of state-building and state-evasion employed by communities in other cities and towns in South Sudan with those in Juba. For example Yei, which came under early rebel administration, or Bentiu, which has fought to increase its share of the oil rents in Unity State, might have made compelling case-studies that could have yielded further insights into local state-building dynamics. Despite this potential shortcoming, development consultants and other members of the aid community might nevertheless take heed from Badiey that there is no quick fix to building a 'state' and that their seemingly

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neat and prescriptive programmes are likely to be anything but ahistorical and apolitical.

Matthew S. Benson

Matthew Sterling Benson has recently been awarded an Economic and Social Research Council PhD-studentship to research the history of taxation and state-formation in South Sudan in Durham University's History Department. He has worked in South Sudan with Crown Agents and Sudan with Doctors Without Borders and conducted research in Juba with the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex.

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SSSUK

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Sudan Studies Society of the UK

29th Annual General Meeting and Symposium

**will be held at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)*
in association with the Centre of African Studies, SOAS**

on Saturday 24th October 2015

in the Khalili Lecture Theatre: registration from 09.30. The meeting will end by 16.30

Members are strongly urged to attend, particularly as we will vote on a name change for the Society at the AGM (please see below for details). Non-members are also invited to attend.

Suggestions and offers for speakers are very welcome. Please email Gill Lusk at Chair@sssuk.org

Further details will be posted on our website http://www.sssuk.org and you can reserve your place and pay online there too. Please try and book as soon as possible as advance booking helps us to organise catering.

* The School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) is located in Thornhaugh Street just off Russell Square and near to Russell Square and Holborn tube stations.

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SSSUK Name Change

At its meeting in May, the SSSUK Committee decided that the name of the Society should more accurately reflect the division of Sudan into two states in July 2011. Constitutionally, a name change requires a vote by members. This will take place at the Annual General Meeting on 24 October 2015. Members not attending will be able to vote by post or, preferably, by email and nearer to the time, details of this will be made available on our website, www.sssuk.org

After lengthy discussion over several meetings, the Committee decided that the name to be put to the vote was: Society for the Study of the Sudans (UK). Our acronym, SSSUK, therefore remains the same, which is of great benefit to the Society. The name of the journal, *Sudan Studies*, will also remain the same, as its sub-title already accommodates the new states.

Gill Lusk

Chairperson

Subscriptions

Thanks to all those who have paid their subscriptions for 2015. If you have not yet done so, please see the website for rates. Payment can be made via the PayPal button on the website, or by cheque payable to *Sudan Studies Society of the UK* and sent to the Hon Treasurer, 30 Warner Road, London N8 7HD, UK.

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SSSUK Committee for 2014/2015

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Seminar Series on Sudan and South Sudan

SSSUK Committee members have been working with the Centre of African Studies (CAS) at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), to plan a seminar series about contemporary issues in Sudan and South Sudan.

The first series of four seminars will be held on Monday evenings in the CAS seminar room at SOAS, starting in November 2015 and ending in February 2016. The draft topics and dates are as follows:

16th November: 'Agriculture and environment'

7th December: 'Arms flows'

25th January 2016 'Theatre for development'

22nd February 2016: 'The use of law as an instrument of power'

There will be a range of speakers on each topic and plenty of time for discussion. Further details of the seminar topics, speakers, how to register etc. will be posted on our website www.sssuk.org as soon as they become available

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