SUDAN STUDIES

for

South Sudan and Sudan

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EDITORIAL

Many of us who have lived and worked in Sudan or South Sudan have a great fondness for the peoples of both and are dismayed at what has been going on in recent months. All the hopes for the emergence of two new vibrant nations in Africa, who could still co-operate together in spite of the bitterness of civil war, based upon the many links of long standing between the two and the obvious economic advantages of working together in harmony, have been dashed. For how long must the present civil strife in both countries and between them continue to their mutual detriment?

Welcome to this the 50th edition of *Sudan Studies*. We have to thank **Douglas Johnson**, who was until 2013 Chair of SSSUK, for the timely appearance of this issue. We were anticipating an article from **Gerard Prunier** on the present political situation in South Sudan, where he has been acting as part of the conciliation group trying to broker an agreement to end the chaotic situation there. Gerard had nearly completed his article but was struck by illness emanating from his time there and had to return to Paris for treatment. We send him our best wishes for a prompt recovery. We plan to have his article in the January 2015 issue, assuming that he has recovered by then. Douglas had written a long article of considerable interest to Sudan history during the Condominium, but covering too limited a field for other less specialist African serials. In the early days of the Condominium there were two 'incidents'; the first was the 'Fashoda Incident' and the second, less well-known, was the 'Jackson Incident'. This is the subject of Douglas's very long article, rather longer than we would normally accept.

The second article by **Mohamed Babiker Ibrahim**, Lecturer in Geography at Hunter College, City University of New York, is concerned with rapid urban growth in Sudan, where some authorities estimate the population of Greater Khartoum (Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman) to have been 8 million in 2008.

This issue also contains a list of recent books on Sudan and South Sudan compiled mainly by **Jane Hogan** of the Sudan Archive at Durham University.

Some time ago we invited members of SSSUK to contribute their descriptions of monuments, memorials and locations that commemorate Sudan/South Sudan in the U.K.

This issue includes the last example received. This has been provided by **Douglas Johnson** and concerns the remarkable display of Mahdist memorabilia in the Regimental Museum of the Queen's Own Highlands at Fort George, near Inverness.

Can members please provide some further examples?

We also have a review by **Alhaj Salim Mustafa**, working in UAE, of a recent book by SSSUK Council member Cherry Leonardi about Chiefship in South Sudan.

SSSUK MATTERS

The SSSUK Annual Symposium and AGM will take place at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London on Saturday, 13 September 2014. Further details can be found under SSSUK Notices and in the flyer sent with this issue. Do make every effort to attend. It is a wonderful opportunity to learn something of recent happenings in both countries, to meet old friends and others fascinated by these two new countries.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: I am sure that you do not need reminding that subscriptions were due on 1 January 2014. You know what you have to do if you have not yet paid!!

NEW EDITOR:

Lastly, I have to report that this is my last issue as Editor of 'Sudan Studies'. My successor is Charlotte Martin and her contact details are to be found on the inside of the back cover of the journal. Please give her all the support that you can.

I have enjoyed my spell as Editor, but feel that it is time for a younger person to take over, whose experience of actual life in the Sudans is more recent than mine. I would like to thank the various members of SSSUK, and non-members, for their willingness to contribute articles. I would like to thank members of the SSSUK Committee for their encouragement and wish to take this opportunity in particular to record my thanks to Jane Hogan for her work as proof reader, for arranging the printing and generally keeping me on track.

Jack Davies.

THE JACKSON INCIDENT

Douglas Johnson

In the history of the Sudan there are two famous "incidents": one memorable (according to Sellar and Yeatman) and the other wholly mysterious. The first was, of course, the Fashoda incident of 1898. The second, involving many of the same British personnel who played prominent parts in the first, was the "Jackson incident" of 1902. It has been speculatively treated, but never fully explained, in the histories of the formative years of Condominium administration under Wingate's Governor Generalship.[1] Among the papers relating to security and intelligence affairs before 1909, so 'graciously released' by the Public Records Office for the first time in July 1993, is Wingate's full report on the matter and Cromer's personal comments.[2] Though some questions remain unresolved, it is now possible to reconstruct the incident and its causes and relate it to broader issues in the history of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium of the Sudan, in particular the transition from military to civil government and the reasons for the retarded development of the office of Civil Secretary before the 1920s. The new papers also reveal why no official report of the incident was ever published, and why it has remained a mystery for so long.

The general outlines of the incident are known. In most previous studies the confrontation between Major General F. R. Wingate and his Civil Secretary and deputy Governor General, Colonel H. W. Jackson is explained by reference to Wingate's friend and inspector general, the Austrian Rudolf Slatin. Jackson, according to Slatin's first biographer, Richard Hill, resented the influence that Slatin—a foreigner—had over Wingate, his former commander and companion

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1 The most notable exception being Ronald Wingate's uncritical biography of his father, *Wingate of the Sudan* (London, 1955), which makes absolutely no reference to the incident whatsoever.

2 HD 3/123 Part I. These contain miscellaneous correspondence sent to Sir Thomas Sanderson, permanent under secretary of state at the Foreign Office (1894-1906), mainly during 1900-02, relating to various minor confidential matters. Lord Cromer had requested that Sanderson not allow the Jackson papers to leave the Foreign Office.

in the Egyptian army intelligence department. In sending 'a ribald, humorous, telegram' about Slatin *en clair* to B. T. Mahon Pasha, Governor of Kordofan Province, he mortally offended Wingate, who denounced Jackson as disloyal. The intervention of both Lord Cromer and Slatin himself saved Jackson's career; his main offence being *'an unguarded pen, a constitutional malady of soldiers'*. Wingate, Hill concluded, was *'too balanced a man to pursue vendettas against his own officers'*. Jackson went off to become Governor of Dongola, and Wingate took the opportunity to regularize Slatin's anomalous and undefined position in the administration by issuing a written set of his duties.[3] This is largely the interpretation which Warburg also places on the incident, though he notes that Jackson was not alone among senior administrative officers in distrusting or resenting Slatin's influence over the Governor General.[4] Another of Slatin's biographers, Brook-Shepherd, downplays the incident, saying merely that Jackson *'had been poking fun, in club armchairs and even in official telegrams, about the Austrian Inspector-General'*, and that it was Cromer's personal intervention which repaired the damage.[5] Martin Daly is the only historian to comment on Wingate's conduct. Again, it is a disparaging telegram about Slatin which triggered Wingate's anger, leading him to banish Jackson to the governorship of Berber, before transferring him to Dongola (Cromer's intervention possibly saving Jackson from a worse fate). The trivial nature of the *casus belli* leads Daly to suggest that Wingate may have deliberately inflated Jackson's offence as an excuse to remove him from Khartoum, where his prestige and popularity in the army made him a potential rival to Wingate's own power.[6]

We can now say that there was more to the incident than mere disparagement of Slatin. Jackson's transfer to Berber preceded, rather than resulted from the discovery of his telegram, and the punishment

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3 R. Hill, *Slatin Pasha* (London, 1965), 78-9.

4 G. Warburg, *The Sudan under Wingate. Administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1899-1916)* (London, 1971), 56.

5 G. Brook-Shepherd, *Between Two Flags. The Life of Baron Sir Rudolf von Slatin Pasha, GCVO, KCMG, CB* (New York, 1973), 198.

6 M.W. Daly, *Empire on the Nile. The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1934* (Cambridge, 1986), 58-9.

Wingate threatened was far more damaging to Jackson's career than mere demotion. Wingate's reaction, as Daly has already deduced, did involve the protection of his own position, but it had far more serious repercussions within the Egyptian army than has hitherto been recognised. In fact, Jackson's *reinstatement* as a provincial governor was probably necessary to avert large-scale resignations from the army by many of Wingate's most senior and experienced British officers. Much of the seriousness of the incident followed from the Governor General's dual role as head of the government of the Sudan and *Sirdar* (commander-in-chief) of the Egyptian army.

The Sudan in 1902 was effectively still under military rule. Almost all administrative officials, from the most senior in Khartoum, down through the provincial governors to the most junior Egyptian and Sudanese *mamurs*, were officers seconded from the Egyptian army for service in the Sudan Government. A civil administration independent of the army was being created, but both British and native officers in government service retained their ranks in the Egyptian army, and promotion in the Egyptian army kept pace with seniority of service in the Sudan civil administration.[7] A confusion of civil and military roles continued for many years at different levels. Not only were the provincial governors also the commanders of the province garrisons, more junior army officers in remoter posts were often *de facto* government representatives in the absence of any clearly defined civil authority.

The deficiencies of military government had in fact been recognized by some senior officers shortly after the defeat of the Mahdist state in 1898. As J. G. Maxwell, one of Kitchener's brigade commanders throughout the Reconquest, wrote to Wingate as early as November 1898,

> *'I think there is a tendency to use an expression which is misleading, I mean 'military government'. I may be*

[7] There was, in fact, a double-ranking system for British officers, who retained a separate rank in the British army list that was usually two steps below their rank in the Egyptian army list. On leaving the Egyptian army British officers reverted to their British army ranks.

difficult to please but I ask you where does it exist in the Soudan....Where is the governing authority South of Assouan. Look at Nubia, at Dongola and Berber what form of government exists where is there any control? beyond putting, often an indifferent officer, as either mamur or police officer & then leaving him severely alone to do what he likes, what have we done. What means of inspection have we established? What control have we over the tribes in the desert? What steps are we taking to effect anything at all durable?'

The answer, he suggested, lay not only in more administrative officers, but in an altogether different type of officer:

'We want men who will try at least to understand the people study their habits and customs, get to know about the tenure of land and the various questions connected with land and tribal feuds. Knock out the old idea encourage work and substitute good new ideas gradually but firmly. Tell the people what to grow and what will pay them best. The days of active service in the soldier sense are past but there is lots of very active service before those who wish to get on in the Sudan and who wish it to get on'.[8]

The problem lay in finding such officers. With no more Mahdist armies to defeat after 1899 many of the most experienced British officers in the Egyptian army transferred back to their home regiments or to service in South Africa—a move encouraged by the uncongenial conditions of work under Lord Kitchener, Commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army and the Sudan's first Governor General until he, too, transferred to the new battle fields of the South African war. Those remaining officers, with a good knowledge of Arabic and an interest in the peoples of the Sudan, were equally essential to the army as to the civil administration. In fact, disciplinary problems among

8 Maxwell to Wingate, Omdurman, 5 November '98, Sudan Archive, University of Durham [SAD] 266/11/7-8.

Sudanese soldiers in the Egyptian army during the first couple of years of the Condominium were directly attributed to the loss of the old campaigners among the British officers, who knew their men and had gained their confidence and respect.[9] Wingate, as Kitchener's successor at the head of the army and administration, had to juggle these twin problems. The solution ultimately came with the creation of a core of professional civilian administrators, whose recruitment began in 1901, but who did not come fully into their own until the 1920s when the last of the soldier-governors were replaced by career administrators, and soldiers serving on contract with the Sudan Government were thereafter excluded from the most senior positions. Throughout Wingate's tenure, administration remained very much dominated by the Egyptian army and its affairs. But over and above him, pushing for more regularized civilian structures of administration was Lord Cromer, H.B.M.'s agent and consul-general in Egypt, a man of considerable power and influence.

The main actors in the "Jackson incident" were all old campaigners. H.W. Jackson had been seconded to the Egyptian gendarmerie as early as 1886 and was absorbed into the Egyptian army in 1888. By 1894 Wingate considered him *'one of the best all round officers'* in the army.[10] He served in the 11th Sudanese battalion throughout his military career in Egypt, becoming its commander during the Reconquest. After Omdurman he was appointed officer commanding Fashoda District, before being transferred to permanent Sudan Government service, as a brevet colonel in the British army, in 1899. He served as Governor of Berber until Wingate appointed him Civil Secretary and deputy governor general in 1901. Major (local rank of colonel) B.T. Mahon was another officer who won Wingate's approval prior to the Reconquest. He served in the Egyptian cavalry during the Dongola expedition of 1896 and was transferred to civil administration as Governor of Kordofan in 1901. F.J. Nason, DSO, joined the Egyptian army as a brigade major in time for the Dongola Expedition but soon rose to the command of the 10th Sudanese battalion, from which position he was transferred (with the local rank

9 Daly, 33

10 Wingate to Kitchener, September 1894, SAD 258/1/64

of colonel) to government service as Governor of Berber in 1900. These were all men of roughly comparable rank, though Jackson was the most senior. One aspect of their service in the Egyptian army that set them apart from Wingate was their combined regimental experience. Wingate had, of course, commanded troops in the field, especially in the final campaign that ended with the death of the Khalifa Abdallahi in 1899. But these three men, and many others like them, had all served with their regiments during the arduous campaigns where Wingate's chief experience was on the staff as director of intelligence.

There was also one anomaly: Rudolf Slatin. Slatin, an Austrian, had been recruited into the multi-national officer corps of the old Turco-Egyptian army in the 1870s. He had been Governor of Darfur at the outbreak of the Mahdiyya, had surrendered to the Mahdists before the arrival of General Gordon in Khartoum, and had spent twelve years in the Mahdist camp, most of that time ostensibly as a loyal bodyguard of the Khalifa Abdallahi. During his semi-captivity he had remained in surreptitious contact with the Egyptian authorities, and his escape to Egypt in 1895 provided Wingate's intelligence department with its most important source of military information. Though the new Egyptian army was now staffed only by British and Egyptian officers, Slatin was taken on by Wingate's department at a military rank commensurate with his service and status, though not his duties, and he remained a valuable part of Wingate's spy and disinformation network until after the battle of Omdurman. With the overthrow of the Mahdist state Kitchener had no further use for him and Slatin left the army. When Wingate was appointed Governor General he brought his friend back, at the exalted rank of major general in the Egyptian army (far senior to his British colleagues), to fit the entirely invented post of 'inspector general'.

The duties of that position were vague. Essentially Slatin was to continue to make use of his knowledge of the Sudan and his personal contacts with various tribal notables to assist Wingate in re-establishing government control over the rural areas. In practice, with civil administration in such an embryonic stage, this could mean

many things. Slatin's rank in the army added to the ambiguity. As a non-British officer, he was never, in fact, given direct command of troops in the field. He was, just the same, senior to all British battalion commanders and provincial governors in the Sudan. It was not clear, at least in the first two years of his tenure, whether he could countermand orders of local commanders and governors. The post of 'inspector general' had no clear position in the command structure of the administration. Was he a superior officer and a senior administrator whose orders had to be obeyed, or was he just the unofficial eyes and ears of the Governor General?[11] In many ways Slatin was Wingate's perfect unofficial deputy: as a foreigner he could rise no further—could not in fact survive—in Egyptian service without a patron, and Wingate had long been his patron. In practice he was answerable to Wingate and to Wingate alone.

The post of inspector general, which was created specially for Slatin and vanished when he left the Sudan for good in 1914,[12] was not the only civil post whose powers and functions remained vague. The post of Civil Secretary, potentially of far greater importance, was similarly ill-defined. Kitchener, when setting up the first structures of civil administration, had appointed a junior officer to the position as a counterpart to his military secretary, to deal exclusively with the army's duties in civil administration.[13] When Wingate became Governor General he found that one of his main tasks was to regularize an administration that had grown up almost entirely *ad hoc*. The civil duties of the officers under his command grew; for it must be re-emphasised that as Wingate was both Governor General and commander-in-chief the officers in the Egyptian army served him in one of two capacities, military or civil depending on their posting, but all were ultimately answerable to him.[14]

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11 The ambiguities of Slatin's position are discussed in Hill, chapter 7; Warburg, 56; Brook-Shepherd, 195-7; and Daly, 62-6.

12 Ironically, it was recreated for Jackson in 1922-3, filling in the final year between his retirement as governor of Dongola and his retirement from government service.

13 Daly, 58.

14 One officer in the Camel Corps recalled how on returning to the Sudan from home leave to rejoin his regiment he learned 'that the Sirdar had selected me for the Civil Administration' (D. C. E. ff. Comyn, *Service & Sport in the Sudan* (London, 1911), 70). Officers who performed a dual military/civil role in their outposts were paid £5 extra a month for taking on civil duties (see Wingate to Matthews, 12 May 1903, SAD 273/5/23).

Civil administration had to be more clearly defined. The post of Civil Secretary, perforce, had to become more important. This Wingate clearly realised, and his choice of Jackson, a man of long military experience and great popularity within the army, signaled the new importance of the post. The prospect of the Civil Secretary becoming the most important administrative position after that of the Governor General was further indicated by the fact that Jackson was subsequently made deputy governor general. Strictly speaking there was no such position as deputy governor general, as the Governor General himself was appointed by the Khedive of Egypt, on the advice of the British government. In choosing his own deputy (as opposed to appointing an official to act only in his absence) Wingate was making innovations in the administrative structure. The first deputy governor general, Maxwell, had combined that position with a purely military post ('Commandant of Khartoum'), and he had been made Wingate's deputy mainly to reconcile him to having been passed over in promotion, since he had been Wingate's nearest rival in the succession to Kitchener.[15] That Wingate felt he could (and in fact had every right) to influence the choice of his successor is suggested by his own explanation given to Cromer for giving Jackson the title: *'I felt it incumbent on me that—should anything occur to me—it was important that there should be a good man at hand to take my place'*.[16]

Jackson was made Civil Secretary in January 1901. Wingate's explanation of the significance of this appointment was made about a year later, when difficulties between Wingate and Jackson had already arisen. He intended that Jackson should '*make the Civil office the head office of the Civil Administration'*, just as the adjutant general was the head of the military administration. In making Jackson deputy governor general as well, Wingate wished *'to mark the fact that he was the admitted head of the civil administration'*, but

15 Daly, 41.

16 Wingate to Cromer, 9 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

in fact he was really to be 'par excellence' Civil Secretary.[17] In the military hierarchy which still governed the Sudan administration at this time the question inevitably arose: did the deputy governor general exist independently of the civil secretaryship, and what power did the Civil Secretary have which the deputy governor general did not also have? Was the deputy governor general really second-in-command in the administrative hierarchy, or did that position come with being Civil Secretary? It was over this question that Wingate and Jackson had their first confrontation, which ultimately led to a diminishing of the Civil Secretary's potential influence in shaping administration under Wingate.

The account that follows is taken from Wingate's full report to Cromer, a report which presented Wingate's case against his subordinate, and where trivial complaints were mixed with more serious ones. We still do not have on record Jackson's version of events, or the testimony of any independent witness. Since all other records of this episode seem to have been dispersed or disappeared, we must make of it what we can.

Wingate gave Jackson as his main assistant Captain (local rank of colonel) G.E. Matthews. Matthews was a relative newcomer to the Egyptian army. He had joined a Sudanese battalion in 1897 in time for the Nile Expedition and rose to take command of the 11th Sudanese battalion at Kassala in 1899. Maxwell had thought Matthews *'just a bit too fussy'* to be a good battalion commander, unable to delegate and taking far too much on himself. For all that he was *'very painstaking & conscientious and has acquired a better knowledge of the language than most.'*[18]

Problems arose between Jackson and Matthews that seem to have stemmed entirely from the ill-defined spheres of the positions of deputy governor general and Civil Secretary. Jackson apparently

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17 Wingate to Cromer, 9 January 1902; Wingate to Gleichen, 31 December 1901 and 3 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I. In the last letter Wingate wrote, 'his position as DGG is merely to show that he is the recognized Head of the Civil, but he has no office as such, as I look on my Headquarters Civil office as his Office (i.e. Civil Secretary's Office)'.

18 Maxwell to Wingate, Omdurman, 10 January 1900, SAD 270/1/42.

offered Matthews the post of Civil Secretary, and Matthews was ultimately disappointed in this offer and continued very much as Jackson's subordinate.[19] Matthews, a somewhat pessimistic man at the best of times who drove himself hard in all that he did, chaffed under the restrictions and tried to resign until Wingate, aware of Jackson's attempt to dispense with the job of Civil Secretary, transferred Matthews to a rural command. Jackson was given two more junior assistants, with which he was satisfied; Matthews ultimately went on to be Governor of Upper Nile Province, in which position he overworked himself but showed an acute understanding of the requirements of civil administration as opposed to military government.[20]

Wingate interpreted Jackson's attempt to separate the post of Civil Secretary from that of deputy governor general as an indication *'that Jackson was anxious to run his position as D.G.G. and drop out of his real position as C.S.'*, an act suggesting personal disloyalty to Wingate himself.[21] It is, of course, possible to interpret Jackson's actions less as an indication of disloyalty to his superior, and more as an attempt to define his position and secure for himself unambiguously the higher rank associated with his new duties. The previous Civil Secretary had, after all, been only a junior officer from the army. The previous deputy governor general had been Wingate's main rival for command of the Egyptian army. To a soldier imbued with notions of military hierarchy it would have been quite natural to equate the *post* of deputy governor general with the *rank* of second-in-command. The fact that Wingate himself wrote of Jackson as his 'second' only confirms how the position could look to a soldier.

Once having suspected Jackson of disloyal manoeuvering Wingate soon found other reasons for doubting Jackson's character. There were some of a purely personal nature, and others connected with his working relations with other senior officials. Since the only record

19 Wingate to Cromer, 9 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

20 In his correspondence with Wingate now in the Sudan Archive at Durham he reveals himself as conscious that rural administration in his unsettled province required the authority of military officers without a corresponding authoritarianism.

21 Wingate to Cromer, 9 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

we have of these personal failings is Wingate's report, we have little way of knowing how accurate the complaints, or even how unique these defects were to Jackson.

Jackson's personal failings were those of an old soldier who continued habits formed in a life of close service with the Sudanese (black African) soldiers in the Egyptian army. Jackson, Wingate complained, not only had a *'habit of excessive beer-drinking'* (a complaint also frequently made of Sudanese soldiers and their wives), but *'he was addicted to intercourse with Black women—indeed that fact is known far & wide & there is little doubt that he has practically a harem'*. For this Wingate condemned Jackson as *'morally a weak man...and his sedentary & solitary mode of life made me realize that he failed in many of the essentials required for the position I now hold.'* Wingate further complained that *'I had hoped that when he rose to the position of my 2nd he would drop all this objectionable mode of life but I have every reason to believe that he did not do so. However I have never mentioned this subject to him, though I regret to say the knowledge of it has been a source of considerable worry to me—as it tended to lower the prestige of a high official like himself—both in my eyes and in the eyes of the natives amongst whom it is naturally common talk.'*[22]

Whether Jackson's personal life was really the foundation of Wingate's feeling of Jackson's unsuitability or merely the excuse for it, we may never really know—Wingate had shown considerable sophistical skills while head of the intelligence department and could deploy 'evidence' which he did not really believe in order to carry his point. Jackson's working relations with the other two highest officials in the administration—the financial secretary and the inspector general—were of more legitimate concern.

The Sudan's first Financial Secretary was a Maltese, E.E. Bernard. Because he was not British (though a British subject), and because of

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22 Ibid. Jackson's 'harem' was apparently legendary in the Sudan and is mentioned in an otherwise entirely fictitious account of the incident given to Richard Hill by James Marsden, who served with Jackson in Dongola in the 1920s (SAD 294/18/53-54). In this version it was Lady Wingate, renowned for her strictness in matters of sexual probity, who took offence at Jackson's conduct and had him exiled to Berber.

his control over the government's finances, he was not a popular man. No one likes an accountant, but he had Cromer's backing. Wingate assured Cromer that he was 'almost' Bernard's only supporter, but he, too, distrusted the Financial Secretary and his '*somewhat Levantine methods*'.[23] Throughout 1901 Jackson and Bernard were increasingly on bad terms, until towards the end of the year Jackson refused to speak to Bernard at all, instructing him in future to confine all communication between their two offices in writing. In reporting this to Cromer, some time after the event, Wingate professed that *'in many instances I considered Bernard was right & Jackson was wrong'*, but he was reluctant to take the matter up directly with Jackson, who was in poor health at the time.[24] Jackson himself later claimed that his shortness with Bernard arose from resentment at the tone Bernard adopted towards him while he was feeling 'seedy'.[25]

Also towards the end of 1901 Wingate discovered *'that there was a very strong feeling against Slatin; many little incidents occurred, the talk about his land, the objection to his being a foreigner; &c'*. These, he concluded, emanated from Jackson, as Slatin *'more or less lived with Jackson & although to me the latter had nothing but good to say of Slatin, I had evidence that he was really working against him, but I could not get at anything tangible.'*[26] In this comment we get a glimpse of Wingate's personal sensitivity about the general discontent among his officers with Slatin, and perhaps an indication of his need to identify a 'ringleader' as the source of that discontent. Throughout it all Slatin, he claimed, *'behaved with excellent tact'*, a surprising assertion given Slatin's eventual reputation of tactlessness in dealing with provincial governors and other high British officials.

Clearly, to have the deputy governor general apparently at loggerheads with two senior officials—Bernard and Slatin—was an

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23 Daly, 57.

24 Wingate to Cromer, 9 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I. Bernard being Cromer's man, Wingate may have consciously emphasized Jackson's difficulties with Bernard in order to win Cromer's support.

25 Jackson to Wingate, 3 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I. Jackson had earlier lost an eye in battle, and his remaining eye frequently gave him trouble.

26 Wingate to Cromer, 9 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I. Before being made inspector general by Wingate, Slatin had joined a speculative venture in the Nuba Mountains; this may explain the reference to 'his land'.

undesirable situation and Wingate was disturbed: *'he knew that both these officials were holding high positions and instead of supporting them as he should as my second, he did what he could to belittle them and undermine their authority. All this I knew & felt keenly and I longed to have a fair and square talk with him, but his wretched health made me refrain.'*[27]

It was when further confusion arose over whether to list the director of Intelligence (Count Gleichen) under the civil or the army staff list that Wingate decided to act to clarify further the separation between the military and civil spheres. In writing to Gleichen he touched indirectly *'on the general question of the civil administrative organization'*, and then read the letter individually to both Jackson and Bernard. With Jackson Wingate *'still refrained from touching on the personal matter & kept to generalities—impressing upon him that he, as my second, must work properly with Bernard, I regretted the feeling against Slatin & we parted quite amicably, he agreeing to lead a more regular life, take more exercise &c.'* With Bernard Wingate merely *'urged him to bury the hatchet'*.[28]

It was after this that Jackson expressed the desire to return to provincial administration, a suggestion that Wingate seized upon eagerly, and he offered Jackson a province the very next day. In offering Jackson this transfer he implied that it would not be a demotion when he suggested that Jackson's successor as Civil Secretary would not be called deputy governor general, and that the title, no longer being necessary, would be dropped.[29] On receiving Wingate's note Jackson came to see him

> *'and we had another long talk in which he showed the greatest regret that he had failed—in fact he made the admission (almost with tears) that he had not acted well by me...I spoke most kindly to him, assured him of my*

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[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Jackson to Wingate, 3 January 1902, and Wingate to Jackson, 4 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

great gratitude for all his good & hard work & told him to cheer up & that everything would be all right'...[30]

It was Jackson who proposed a return to Berber Province, where he had been Governor before becoming Civil Secretary, requesting at the same time that he be considered for Kordofan should the then governor, Mahon, leave. Mahon had let it be known to several persons that he was thinking of leaving, but Wingate was most anxious that he stay. Wingate told Jackson that he did not wish Mahon 'disturbed', but that he should certainly get Kordofan should Mahon eventually leave. The governor at Berber, F.J. Nason, was wired and agreed to swap posts with Jackson. Wingate drafted a notice of the exchange for the Sudan Government Gazette, in which Jackson's past services were listed and fulsomely praised. Jackson, perhaps conscious that this read like an obituary, requested a more modest notice, stressing that his posting should be considered as an exchange between governors of the same rank.[31]

In the two days before Jackson left Khartoum for Berber he sent a number of telegrams to his friends and fellow officers concerning his new posting, an action which Wingate later acknowledged he was perfectly entitled to do, but which was to cause the explosive confrontation between the two men. On the day that Wingate and Jackson agreed he was to take a governorship (4 January) Jackson wired Mahon, saying *'If at any time you intend giving up Kordofan Mudiria [Province] will you let me know as I have asked for a Mudiria',* to which Mahon replied, *'I understand and will let you know when I decide anything.'* The next day Jackson wired Mahon the news that he was going to Berber, and wired Nason at Berber, *'I am better but still seedy. I hope later to get Kordofan.'* He then wired Gleichen in Cairo requesting the discharge from the intelligence department of Saad Awad, *moawin* (government agent) of the Dinka, as *'he has been with me since 1886 and I am anxious to take him with me can provide substitute'.* His final telegram to Mahon (on 5 January) read*: 'Private and decipher yourself. As letter*

30 Wingate to Cromer, 9 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

31 Ibid; Wingate to Jackson, 4 January 1902 and Jackson to Sirdar, Sunday, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

will not catch you. Following is cause:—obstruction—Slatin says you are run by Mamur—I will work your case and get same sanctioned. Tear up when read.' Mahon's reply, on the following day, read, *'Thanks for information. It is what I would expect from the damned spy but I don't care a curse what he says. The reason is that I have stopped Beshir Bey Kambul [a mamur on the Darfur frontier] and others taking orders from him and not treated his friends differently from others.'*[32]

The offending telegram therefore turns out not to be humorous, and the real slight on Slatin comes not from Jackson, but from Mahon. In the construction Wingate placed on this series of telegrams we learn rather more about Wingate than about either Jackson or Mahon.

In their last conversation on the matter before Jackson left for Berber on 8 January, Wingate had reiterated his assurance that Jackson should have Kordofan if the governorship fell vacant. Jackson informed Wingate that Mahon had recently repeated his intention of leaving in a private letter. After Jackson left, Wingate wrote to Mahon urging him to stay on. On being informed by a subordinate that Jackson had in fact telegraphed Mahon on the subject, Wingate sent a staff officer to the telegraph office to search for the offending telegram, in the course of which the series cited above was found. The 'case' to which Jackson referred (and with which Wingate was to take such exception) was the matter of the promotion of the *mamur* of El Obeid, Mahmud Hussein, from *saghkolaghasi* (adjutant-major) to *bimbashi* (major). Mahmud Hussein was well-regarded in the army (Wingate approved of him as a 'fire-eater'), and while Slatin liked him, he also brought to Wingate's attention rumours that the *mamur* took bribes. The main obstacle to his promotion, however, seemed to have been financial, and it was for this reason, or so Wingate later claimed to Cromer, that Wingate delayed the promotion.[33] At the

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32 Jackson to Mahon (cypher telegram 111) 4 January 1902; Mahon to Jackson (cypher telegram 529-111) 4 January 1902; Jackson to Mahon (cypher telegram 113) 5 January 1902; Jackson to Nason (telegram 115) 5 January 1902; Jackson to Mukhabarat Cairo (telegram 116), 5 January 1902; Jackson to Mahon (cypher telegram 119) 5 January 1902; Mahon to Jackson (cypher telegram 534-119) 6 January 1902, all in PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

33 Wingate to Cromer, 9 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

heart of the issue was not Mahmud Hussein's suitability, but the authority of governors in their own provinces in relation to Slatin's nebulous influence with local notables, Egyptian officers, and the Governor General himself. It raised questions about Wingate's judgment in appearing to place so much reliance on Slatin, as well as his commitment to the administrative structures he was supposed to be building. Otherwise Wingate's furious reaction makes little sense.

On reading Jackson's and Mahon's telegrams Wingate immediately dispatched three of his own: one to Mahon defending Slatin; one to Cromer informing him of Jackson's dismissal following *'unpleasant disclosures...which are of a scandalous nature'*, but giving no details of the scandal; and one to Jackson dismissing him from the army. Wingate denounced Jackson in similar terms in all three, accusing him of disloyalty and asserting that his own confidence in Jackson could no longer be restored.

To Mahon he expressed great shock at Jackson's cables, saying that he could understand how Jackson's statement about Slatin would have irritated and angered Mahon into replying as he did. *'That Jackson should have turned on a man who is holding a high official position & who is absolutely one-hearted in his desire for the welfare of the country and the success of our rule, into a spy, and my Spy, is beyond belief and utterly beneath contempt—a most foul lie and unworthy altogether of a man calling himself a Britisher.'*[34] This may have been a deliberate warning to Mahon, for it was he, rather than Jackson, who called Slatin a spy. Neither one of them had called him Wingate's spy, and it is significant of a widely known discontent within the administration that Wingate should have placed that construction on Mahon's use of the word. Slatin, after all, had been a spy during his captivity in Omdurman, and as a senior officer in the intelligence department had run many spies of his own.[35]

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34 Wingate to Mahon, 9 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

35 The discrete use of less-than-respectful nicknames for exalted personages was not uncommon in the Sudan. Slatin used to refer to Bernard as 'the Maltese Cross', while Wingate even joked about Cromer as the 'Lord of the Norfolk seaside resort'.

In his telegram to Cromer informing him of the state of affairs Wingate condemned Jackson of *'disloyalty to me and an entire abuse of his position as my Senior Staff Officer in the civil administration....An official disclosure of these telegrams would ruin his career in the British service...it would not be in the interests of the service to allow him to remain in the country.'* The text of his dismissal of Jackson (which was contained in this telegram to Cromer) offered no hope of reinstatement:

> *'I consider your procedure certainly disloyal to me, your chief, and most detrimental to the public service. You have completely forfeited my confidence. You will proceed at once to Cairo, where you will be settled up, and you will quit Egypt without delay. In consideration of your past good services and your present state of health, I am prepared to accept your immediate resignation on the grounds of ill-health, and to refrain from making an official report of your conduct to the Government. Should you not desire to accept this decision, I shall officially disclose everything, and this course can only mean the ruin of your career in the British service, with a serious stain on your honour as an officer and a gentleman, and, above all, as my trusted and confidential Senior Staff Officer'.*[36]

Cromer was left completely in the dark as to the nature of these scandalous disclosures, and why such extraordinary steps were being taken to keep them undisclosed, and could only ask Wingate to give a full report, *'either in official or unofficial form'*. This was sent in a twenty-seven page handwritten confidential report, which gave full expression to Wingate's fury, but to little more. Of Jackson's cypher telegram to Mahon he asked, in a rapid series of breathless rhetorical questions:

> *'Can you conceive a more cruel & malicious statement or measure calculated to rouse Mahon's fury against*

36 Sirdar's telegram No. 8 to Lord Cromer, 9 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

Slatin—against a man in a high position who has a difficult task to perform & who has done it with the greatest tact and honesty—and who by all the official rules Jackson, as my second, ought to have helped & supported—but instead of this what does he do—he maliciously maligns Slatin who has been away from Khartoum for more than a month & who is quite out of reach of telegram—he deliberately puts Mahon against him and casts an insinuation on Mahon's government which he knows he will resent & which he hopes will make him resign & yet he knows that I am most anxious to keep Mahon—& then he poses as the good Samaritan who is going to put everything right...Can you conceive a more mean & despicable action....The whole procedure is thoroughly un-British, besides it is not the conduct of an officer or a gentleman'.

Even the telegram to Gleichen requesting the transfer of the Dinka *moawin* was presented as *'a somewhat unpleasant item'* in further evidence against Jackson's character, as *'this man is attached to the Intelligence, but has been for long in [Jackson's] personal service and is generally credited with looking after the harem.'*

Jackson's professional and personal character was completely discredited, and Wingate proposed that the full force of authority be employed to expel him from his service:

'...it is the old story of 'vaulting ambition' & that coupled with a thoroughly unhealthy mode of life, has ruined & distorted all his moral fibre. If he attempts to show fight, I must ask for the whole of his proceedings to be exposed & it will mean official ruin for him—on the other hand if he takes the wise course and clears out as quickly & quietly as possible, he should be told that the smallest complaint regarding his treatment will mean an official disclosure—he must go tongue-tied and if he will not, then the full official action must take its course—but under any

circumstances I refuse to have anything more to say to him as regards both the Egyptian Army and the Sudan'.[37]

Wingate had in fact stirred up such a storm that no one, Jackson least of all, could be expected to be tongue-tied. While Wingate denounced Jackson in the strongest terms for 'disloyalty' and un-gentlemanly conduct, Jackson's friends were concerned that his very sense of loyalty and honour would prevent him from stating his own defence. Captain A.M. McMurdo, DSO, another Egyptian army veteran and then the director of the Egyptian Slave Trade Department stationed at Berber took the precaution to write directly to Harry Boyle, consul and oriental secretary in the British embassy in Cairo:

'Jackson was here and left for Cairo he told me all about his row which I knew had practically been going on for 2 years now, I only hope to goodness or rather for the sake of other English officers and the country that he will tell the Lord [Cromer] everything, but I am afraid he will out of a sense of loyalty conceal a good deal. I do not believe there is a contented English officer or native for that matter and there is a good deal of trouble ahead. You will find that if Jackson has to go he will be followed by several others, but what form it will take among the natives against Slatin no one can predict but trouble there will be unless this weak minded Sirdar is banished as a G.G. of some colony or a war office intelligence 'Katib' [clerk]. Make Jackson speak about the whole thing, he won[']t unless pressed'.[38]

Jackson was too stunned to give Wingate the immediate reply demanded, and Nason tried to mediate, wiring Wingate that *'Jackson told me his relative position with Slatin made his position impossible.*

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37 Wingate to Cromer, 9 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

38 A. M. McMurdo to Boyle, 10 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I. McMurdo had served in the Egyptian army in 1886-94, winning his DSO at the battle of Toski. As director of the Slavery Department he was under the authority of the Egyptian government and outside the control of the Sudan government. He was often in conflict with both Wingate and Slatin, who saw economic and political benefits to allowing slavery to continue in the Sudan, while the whole purpose of McMurdo's department was to eradicate it.

His feelings appeared much hurt, I think, at your telegram, and he considers that he is unfairly treated.'[39]

Wingate would have none of this, claiming that *'If Jackson had those feelings against Slatin, it was his duty to inform me of them, and this he has never done....[His] attitude...is most dishonest to Slatin, and subversive of his, and therefore of my, authority...'* In two separate telegrams sent to Cromer on the same day he appeared to threaten blackmail of his own to ensure Cromer's complete acquiescence in the harsh measures proposed to expel and silence Jackson. He defended his absolute right, as *sirdar*, to dispense with Jackson's services without appeal, and should Jackson not go quietly he would be tried for a breach of discipline, *'but this course'*, he warned Cromer, *'will cause unpleasant scandal and disagreeable disclosures, which would delight both European and Egyptian Anglophobes.'* When the question of Jackson's relative position with Slatin was raised Wingate was quick to remind Cromer that it was he who decided that Slatin should be called inspector general; thus implying that it was Cromer's authority, too, which Jackson was challenging, and Cromer's judgment (as much as Wingate's) which would be called into question.[40]

The threat of unwanted publicity seemed to recede when Jackson wired his resignation from Wadi Halfa, on his journey back to Egypt: *'I am writing official report on conduct, which I regret extremely. I withdraw words of telegrams, which can only be accounted for by the state of my health, my head at times being near bursting, leaving me most irritable and barely responsible for actions. Nobody to blame but myself. Good-bye, and may the Soudan prosper under your rule.'* Wingate immediately accepted his *'resignation on the ground of ill-health'*, but repeated his warning that 'in the interests of maintenance of discipline' the matter would take its official course should Jackson try to prove that his resignation had been forced upon him. Already accepting the fiction that Jackson's health was the real cause of the problem, Wingate closed by saying, *'I sympathize most deeply with*

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39 Quoted in Sirdar's telegram No. 18 to Lord Cromer, 11 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

40 Sirdar's telegrams No. 15 and No. 18 to Lord Cromer, 11 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

you in your state, and wish you a speedy and complete recovery.' He then urged Cromer to place an official notice in the Egyptian Gazette explaining Jackson's departure on grounds of health.[41]

If the matter was now satisfactorily concluded as far as Wingate was concerned, Cromer was not so certain. He wired Wingate that he could form no opinion nor take a final decision until he received Wingate's full report, *and* had heard what Jackson had to say. *'In any case, I do not think it will be possible to keep a matter of this sort wholly secret. The Khedive appears to be well-informed of all that passes at Khartoum.'* To Sir Thomas Sanderson, permanent under secretary of state at the Foreign Office, Cromer gave a brief resumé of what he could deduce from Wingate's hasty telegrams. Noting that it was apparently a matter of friction between Slatin and the English officers, and that the Khedive already seemed to know a good deal about the (still undisclosed) affair, he drew some conclusions that were far from those Wingate intended:

> *'It is a very unpleasant and serious business—for, in the first place, it shows, I fear, that Wingate has but little real control over the administrative machine, and, in the second place, if, as is not unlikely, Jackson's departure is the signal for other officers to go, the machine itself will be dislocated'...*[42]

Jackson made one last attempt to appeal to Wingate's sympathies by wiring him an outline of his family's difficulties: a ruined father (recently deceased), an elderly aunt and two middle-aged maiden sisters financially dependent on him, his own need to save money (and therefore never taking leave in England). But Wingate, while expressing sympathy, was adamant. He assured Jackson that Cromer would help him find a good posting in South or West Africa, financially commensurate with the one he was now leaving. To Cromer he urged that, *'for the good of the service'*, Jackson not be

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41 Sirdar's telegrams Nos. 19, 20, and 21 to Lord Cromer, 12 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

42 Lord Cromer's telegram No. 18 to the Sirdar, 12 January 1902; Cromer to Sanderson, 12 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

given a post either in Egypt or in Uganda (which employed many ex-Egyptian army officers to command the protectorate's own Sudanese troops). Jackson submitted, wiring his farewell to Wingate, *'God bless you. I am nearly broken-hearted at leaving and grief I have caused you. I had hoped to have lived and died in the Soudan.'*[43]

While Wingate was satisfied that all that need be done to reassert discipline in the administration and the army was being done, Cromer was convinced that the incident, if not properly handled, could lead to the collapse of the Sudan administration. This was foremost in his correspondence with his superiors in the Foreign Office. In forwarding to Sanderson Wingate's long report and attendant telegrams, a copy of his own reply to Wingate, and McMurdo's *'very frank'* letter *('which had better be torn up')*, he noted:

> *'I need add nothing. The papers explain themselves. I should prefer them not to go out of the F.O. I must get something for Jackson to do in Egypt. He is too good a man to lose. I wish I had a big Civilian at the head of affairs in the Soudan. The soldiers are excellent labour but seem to break down when it comes to exercising general control. The sympathies of the army—British & Egyptian—will be wholly with Jackson'.*[44]

To Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, he was more explicit:

> *'Sanderson will show you the Jackson papers. It is a very awkward business, and I am not free from anxiety as to the consequences. Wingate, I fear, has not got his army in hand. There can be no manner of doubt that great discontent exists amongst both the British and native officers. It is largely due to the injudicious manner in which Slatin's services have been utilized. Jackson had greater influence than any other man with the native troops, particularly with the blacks. It was he in reality*

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43 Sirdar's telegrams Nos. 25 and 26 to Lord Cromer, 14 and 15 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

44 Cromer to Sanderson, 18 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123/ Part I.

who got us out of the very serious Omdurman mutiny some two years ago. It was not wise of Wingate to quarrel with him. I hear of other English officers who want to go. There can, in fact, be no doubt that the sympathies of all the army, British and Egyptian, will be with Jackson; that service under Wingate is unpopular with the British officers; that it is in many respects a more objectionable form of unpopularity than that which Kitchener excited, for they were all afraid of Kitchener and respected him; and that if a very few of the best and most experienced British officers were to go now, we might, and probably should, have serious difficulties both in connection with civil and military officers in the Soudan. All this makes me more than ever desirous that the War Office should help me to keep my best officers. Pray do whatever you can in this direction.

The matter is really too serious to allow any ordinary regulations to apply....You might also ask Lord Salisbury what his son writes to him. He naturally does not say much to me, as he cannot speak out without appearing to criticise his chief, but I can see that he is rather uneasy. I have a high opinion of his judgment'.[45]

Wingate, did he but know it, was being outflanked. Lord Lansdowne had only recently been Secretary for War (1895-1900) and still had some personal influence in the War Office; Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister, was being drawn in through his son, then serving in the Egyptian army.

These letters help to explain Cromer's oblique approach to Wingate which, while outwardly agreeing that Jackson's reinstatement in the Sudan was out of the question, tended to point to that reinstatement as the first step towards a solution to a difficulty entirely of Wingate's

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45 Cromer to Lord Lansdowne, 19 January 1902, *Letters to Secretaries of State. 1883-1905*, No. 336, pp.323-4, PRO FO 633/6. Up until now this was the most detailed contemporary account of the 'Jackson incident' publicly available.

own making. Cromer made it clear that there were limits to the support he could give to Wingate in this crisis, and Wingate, faced with growing discontent within the army in the Sudan, may well have realised that he could not survive the crisis without Cromer's full support.

After *'a painful interview with Jackson'* Cromer wired Wingate on 17 January that Jackson's *'conduct has been blameworthy, but he does not seem to me to have been guilty of anything worse than want of judgment and indiscretion. However, after all that has occurred, it is undesirable that he should remain in the Egyptian army.'* Cromer proposed that Jackson be treated with indulgence and be given four months ordinary leave, *after* which he would resign, with whatever gratuity was owed to him. Thus Jackson's dismissal from the Egyptian army was deferred, and Wingate was being given time to contemplate the likely consequences of his act, without being explicitly advised to reconsider. Cromer wrote a longer letter of advice that same day'.[46]

Wingate was at first relieved by the telegram, which indicated that Cromer was taking care of this painful matter himself, but he was soon troubled by worries concerning the natural curiosity aroused in the Sudan by Jackson's departure, and about his own inability *'to keep it dark here'* should Jackson talk. He began pressing Cromer to issue an official statement giving the cause as ill-health, but it was here that Cromer declined to come to Wingate's aid. Giving Wingate an avuncular assurance that he could *'leave the arrangement of all these details in my hands'*, he then revealed to Wingate the limits of his support:

> *'I do not think it necessary or at all desirable to make any public announcement at present about his resignation. I shall give out that, owing to the state of his health, he is going on leave, and nothing more.*
>
> *I have advised Jackson not to talk, but a matter of this sort must be left to his judgment and sense of honour.*

46 Lord Cromer's telegram No.25 to the Sirdar, 17th January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

It will, of course, be almost impossible to stop a certain amount of gossip'.[47]

With that threat hanging in the air Wingate was left to face the 'gossip' of his officers on his own. By 21 January he was desperate for a stronger intervention from Cromer, saying that there was '*considerable talk*' now about Jackson, and that it was generally believed that Wingate had sacrificed a British officer to a foreigner—Slatin.

> *'After careful consideration, I strongly recommend you to authorize me to make a verbal confidential statement to some of the senior British officers here, to the effect that Jackson...has committed an act which, from a discipline point of view, was a serious breach of faith in one holding the position of a Chief Staff Officer, which conduct it was impossible for me to overlook; that his resignation does not result from any disagreement with Slatin or any other official, as has been generally reported, and that your approval justifies my action. This represents the true facts. I do not propose to offer any further explanation or to go into any details, but unless some such statement is made it is very probable that the British officers will lose confidence in me. I attach no personal importance to this, but for the proper maintenance of discipline and in the interests of justice, I hope you will concur with me in my suggestions. I should warn those I see that they are authorized confidentially to inform British officers serving under them. If you concur, I hope you will allow Fergusson [the adjutant general] to take an opportunity for similar action as regards British officers in Cairo. Nason and other officers, who know the facts and are in touch with popular feelings, strongly urge that some such action is immediately necessary'.*[48]

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47 Sirdar's telegrams Nos. 33 and 34 to Lord Cromer, 17 and 18 January 1902; Lord Cromer's telegram No. 27 to Sirdar, 18 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

48 Sirdar's telegram No. 43 to Lord Cromer, 21 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

Wingate had begun by insisting that Jackson be tongue-tied but was now regretting the consequences of the knot that Cromer had firmly tied in his own tongue. Certain that the 'facts' of the case would be injurious to Jackson, he had thought to buy Jackson's silence by threat of disclosure. He now found that Jackson's reputation was only enhanced by the very silence Wingate wanted imposed on him. Cromer, for his part, refused to be implicated in the surreptitious official slander that Wingate now proposed in order to regain the loyalty of his officers. Cromer's telegraphed confidential reply gave Wingate his first true sense of the disaster Cromer foresaw:

> *'I fully anticipated all this, and, had I been consulted at an earlier stage of the proceedings, I should have been strongly in favour of retaining Jackson in the army. By the time the matter reached me, the breach was evidently irreparable. I think his departure may have a serious effect both on the British and Egyptian portions of the army. I do not agree that the question of whether the British officers have confidence in you is unimportant. On the contrary, I consider it a matter of great importance.*
>
> *Make any announcement you think fit to the officers in the Soudan. As regards myself, you can say that, on your reporting the whole of the circumstances to me, I was of the opinion that a situation had been created which rendered it desirable that Jackson should resign the position he has hitherto held in the army. I am not prepared to go further than this. I have written my views fully to you in a private letter.*
>
> *As regards Cairo, the less said the better; and as regards the Soudan, though you must judge for yourself what to do, I cannot help thinking that you will not mend matters much by speaking. If you say anything, I should advise you not to speak of any 'breach of faith', or generally to say anything which might be considered injurious to Jackson's character. Cannot you confine yourself to the mere statement that there had been a*

disagreement with Jackson which, coupled with the state of his health, rendered his resignation desirable? I should advise you to say as little as possible about Slatin, but point out the very desirability of avoiding any dissensions among British officers, and appeal to their honour and sense of duty to use their best endeavours to make the whole machine work well.

If any particular officer resigns, or otherwise behaves in a manner calculated to render the position more difficult, let me know before taking action. The matter is so serious that I may have to make a personal appeal to the loyalty and public spirit of some individual officers. I do not doubt that this would produce the desired effect. If any of your principal officers resign, I should much fear that the discontent would, sooner or later, extend downwards to the natives'.[49]

This was a chill wind of little comfort. Cromer was putting Wingate on notice that he was in imminent danger of a comprehensive collapse in confidence in him by his officers in the Egyptian army and the Sudan, that such a collapse could lead to disorder in the Sudan, that the only person who stood between Wingate and that collapse was Cromer, and that Cromer, judging by the tone of the telegram, was willing to let Wingate twist in the wind a little longer. The origin of the problem had been Wingate's dismissal of Jackson, of which Cromer did not approve, but with which he agreed only because the breach was *evidently* irreparable. Jackson's resignation had not yet come into effect. Perhaps it was time for Wingate to reconsider whether the breach could be repaired.

Cromer's long letter of 17 January arrived in Khartoum after this telegraphic exchange. Written before the new chill between Wingate and Cromer, its tone was altogether warmer, friendlier, and more encouraging; yet the criticisms it contained were more of Wingate's behaviour rather than Jackson's. Coming as it did at a time when Wingate now had to contemplate seriously the ruin of his own career,

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49 Lord Cromer to the Sirdar (Telegram), 22 January 1902, PRO HD 3/123 Part I.

it contained timely advice on how to avoid the ultimate humiliation of losing the respect of his service.

It began with Cromer's own analysis of the triviality of Jackson's offence (blameworthy though he was); the high probability that Slatin did, in fact, say something to the effect that Mahon's *mamur* exerted too much influence (and even the likelihood that Slatin was correct); and Cromer's surprise at Jackson's apology and 'excessive deference' after Wingate's extreme language to him. *'In my opinion'*, Cromer stated in the first paragraph of this letter, *'he should have asked for an enquiry at the hands of the superior military authorities, and should have stood by the result.'*

This led Cromer to an important question of principle on which, however politely phrased, he felt *'obliged to insist somewhat strongly'*. Wingate erred, he informed him, in thinking that he had the right to dismiss any of his officers without appeal. It was the Khedive of Egypt who dismissed officers from his army, on the recommendation of the *sirdar*. Not only did the officer have a technical right of appeal to the Khedive, but *'any one in this country, or in the Soudan—British or Egyptian, official or unofficial, civil or military—'* had the right of appeal to Cromer, and if not satisfied could appeal to the Home Government in the person of the relevant minister.

Wingate, thus being reminded of his subordinate status in relation to Cromer, was immediately reassured that Cromer had *'very little difficulty'* in making a decision in the Jackson case, a decision which was not based on the offences committed, but on *'my earnest wish to support you. (I hope, by the way, that, if anything of the kind occurs again, you will give me an opportunity of expressing an opinion at an earlier stage of the proceedings).'* It being obvious that, as Jackson could no longer work satisfactorily under Wingate, he had to go.

This was very tepid support for the Governor General hinting, as it did, that Jackson could have had Wingate's actions overturned by appeal to the Khedive, the Foreign Secretary or the Secretary for War.

Cromer now turned on all his charm. Prefacing his remarks with *'my dear Wingate, we are such old friends, and I am, as you must be well aware, so sincerely desirous that your administration of the Soudan should be a success'*, he begged Wingate *'not to think that any of your officers have been complaining to me, or that they have been telling tales out of school. Such is not at all the case.'* His impressions were derived from observing all that had been going on during the last two years. *'I should indeed be blind if I did not see the state of things which now exists.'* He then delivered himself of some devastating observations, in the most diplomatic language, worth quoting at length.

> *'There can be no manner of doubt that there is much discontent amongst the British officers in the Egyptian army. A good deal of this does not count for much. Englishmen love to grumble. At the same time, there is more discontent than there ought to be. How is it to be removed?*
>
> *In the first place, I strongly recommend you to write and telegraph less to your officers. They have not all got your superhuman powers of throwing off long telegrams and letters. Is it not possible to leave them a little more alone? They are all over-worked, and I cannot help seeing that they groan under the number and length of your communications.*
>
> *In the second place, cannot you establish a little more confidence between you and them? All the present friction arises from want of confidence. As I have often told you, you must, in order to run an affair like the Soudan, civilianize your mind and modes of procedure to a certain extent. Now, all your ideas and methods are essentially military, not civil. It is impossible for me not to see that your relations with your subordinates, who are mostly military, are wholly different from mine with my subordinates, who are mostly civilians. This is perhaps natural, for civil discipline is much more lax than military. But cannot you encourage your officers to discuss matters*

with you freely, and to disagree with you, as my subordinates often disagree with me? I do not doubt that you think you do this, but let me assure you that, for some reason or another, you have not succeeded. I cannot help seeing that the general impression is that you will not brook contradiction, and that you look on disagreement as 'disloyalty' to yourself—a fatal error. I cannot help thinking that all this episode with Jackson might have been avoided. You were evidently suspicious of him. He resented this and did not like to speak frankly to you. I quite endorse all you say as to the value of Slatin's services, but there are various ways of utilising his services. You have rather let the officers understand that you would always support Slatin, that you resented criticisms on him, and that you thought his views much more valuable than any of theirs. It is not unnatural that they should dislike this.

In the third place, pray get the 'disloyalty' idea out of your head. A more loyal body of men than your officers never existed, but you can't prevent any body of Englishmen having their opinions, and occasionally expressing them. If your rather extreme views of official loyalty were adopted elsewhere—say, in Pall-Mall—some very strange results would, unless I am much mistaken, ensue....

I have said all this both because I think it is my duty to do so, and because I consider that I am doing a friendly act to yourself. But you have always had my support in the past, and you may rely on it for the future. Only, I would beg of you to pay attention to my advice. It is certainly well-intentioned. I am confident that it is sound'.

Thus did Cromer almost effortlessly reassert his authority over Wingate, reminding him of his subordination, while urging him to be more mindful of his own subordinates.

Wingate's reaction to this letter and the telegram which preceded it either has not survived or still has not surfaced (it is not in his papers in Durham), but we can now guess what effect Cromer's timely warnings had. Wingate could not be ordered, but he could take a hint. Jackson's resignation at the end of his four months' leave was unnecessary, because it was no longer demanded; he was appointed governor of Dongola almost as soon as he returned, a post he held for twenty years. We do not know the timing of this reversal, but by the end of February, matters seemed resolved, although Wingate, apparently encouraged by Slatin, still nursed a grievance, as this entry in his diary for 27 February (the only surviving reference to the Jackson incident in Wingate's personal papers) shows:

> *'Long talk with Slatin yesterday re the Jackson affair in which he is of course much mixed up—thought it better to tell him exactly how matters stand. He took it all in very good part & told me many other unpleasant episodes which—whilst J. was C.S.—he had most carefully kept from me & that is the way J. repaid him! It only makes me feel more keenly how disloyal he was to me'.*[50]

Certainly by early March Jackson anticipated being able to see Wingate and 'explain all', as he put it in this friendly personal letter to Slatin:

> *'To my great regret a disagreement has occurred between the Sirdar & myself, which I know has been a severe blow to both of us, as our friendship, has lasted for many years. However, I hope to explain all frankly to the Sirdar when we next meet. Of one thing I can assure you, & that is, that the Sirdar's idea that I am suspicious of you, is not the case. We have always been the best of friends, since our meeting at Assouan, & will always remain so. However,*

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[50] Sudan Archive, University of Durham [SAD] 272/1/39-49, Wingate 1902 diary (Daly, p.58 n 97, dates this entry as 27 March, but in this I believe he is mistaken, as this diary was for Wingate's tour of the Upper Nile in February. He was back in Khartoum before 27 March). The possibility that the correspondence concerning the Jackson incident was destroyed by Wingate, or held back by his family from the deposit of papers to Durham, is suggested by the fact that there are no documents among his papers from the same period as his correspondence with Cromer, and that the earliest document for 1902 is a letter (to Gleichen) dated 31 January.

old chap, I will tell you all about it when we meet, as letters often convey ideas which were never meant by the writer, & half an hour[']s discussion is worth pages of pen ink & paper'.[51]

Jackson was gazetted governor of Dongola on 1 June 1902. This appointment was announced on the same page of the *Gazette* as Wingate's departure six days later for two month's leave, and of the confirmation of the promotion of Mahmud Hussein to *Bimbashi*.[52]

It is possible that Slatin had something to do with mollifying Wingate (though Wingate's diary entry argues against that), and that Wingate was too balanced a man to pursue this vendetta further, as Richard Hill suggests. Yet if common sense prevailed, it may be too much to attribute this to Wingate's innate good sense. Wingate had been put on notice (and Slatin, too, for that matter) that civil administration would have to be run along more systematic, rather than personal lines, and that civil ideas, rather than military formalities, would have to inform administrative actions. Together with Nason, the new Civil Secretary, Wingate drafted a specific list of Slatin's duties, which was then circulated to all governors for comment.[53] The ambiguity of Slatin's powers, which had irritated numerous provincial governors, and which Jackson complained had inhibited his function as Civil Secretary, could no longer be ignored. Though it was some years before the post of Civil Secretary would acquire the prominence it obtained in the last half of the Condominium, the clipping of Slatin's wings and the strengthening of direct lines of responsibility between senior staff and the Governor General, as part of the resolution to the Jackson incident, was a significant start.

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51 Jackson to Slatin, 5 March 1902, SAD 452/276.

52 *Sudan Government Gazette* No. 36 (June 1902), p.33.

53 Hill, 79. One thing that historians of this period may have misunderstood is that it was not so much Slatin's personality which officers like Jackson resented, as the irregularity of his position and influence, which intruded an element of uncertainty in their dealings with other officials, both junior and senior. Once that was resolved far more workmanlike relations resumed. Jackson had been among the small group of officers at Aswan who received Slatin on his escape from the Khalifa in 1895, he had welcomed Slatin's appointment as inspector general, and he continued to address Slatin as his 'dear old friend' into the 1920s. Wingate's insensitivity to his staff may have been as much at fault for creating a general antagonism towards Slatin as anything Slatin himself did.

The tendency in Condominium history has been to focus on the personalities of a few main actors, and to explain events and major developments through the agency of personality. Certainly the recently-released documents do throw some new light on the character of Wingate, Jackson and Cromer. Daly's judgment of Wingate's ambition cannot be dismissed, even if the new sources do not directly confirm it. It is certainly possible to suggest that Wingate's own strong ambition led him to see 'vaulting ambition' elsewhere, and attribute to others motives he may have recognized in himself. Jackson's meek appeals and final submission certainly do not bear out Wingate's evaluation of his character. Yet there is another aspect to this affair, and similar explosive encounters, which historians have been reluctant to recognize, and that is the irrationality of Wingate's own behaviour. It may have been true, as Wingate observed to Cromer, that Jackson was '*on the verge of a serious breakdown*',[54] but Cromer might have wondered the same of Wingate. Historians tend to try to find a coherent and rational pattern in the actions of those they study, but it is difficult to give an entirely rational explanation to Wingate's extreme rejection of Jackson. Wingate's defence of Slatin was, of course, a defence of himself and his own methods of control, but on current evidence it is difficult to understand why he was driven to such a pitch of fury over so small a matter. Perhaps a 'tropical irrationality' element should henceforth be built into the analysis of imperial servants, giving due consideration to heat, discomfort, illness, over-medication, excess, deprivation or cumulative stress in accounting for irregular behaviour, however rationally accounted for at the time.[55]

The personalities of Cromer, Wingate, Slatin and Jackson are certainly important—perhaps nearly as important in understanding the Jackson incident as the positions they held—but some modification of the emphasis on personality is required if one is to extract the fullest

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54 Sirdar's telegram No. 25 to Lord Cromer, 14 January 1902.

55 Biographers of General Gordon have had much difficulty in explaining his dramatic mood-swings and have often struggled to find a consistent policy behind his many contradictory statements and actions. There are other events in Sudan's imperial past that might be better understood by accepting some element of irrationality on the part of British officials. See for instance, D. H. Johnson: 'Criminal Secrecy: The Case of the Zande "Secret Societies"', *Past and Present*, 130 (1991), 180, and *Nuer Prophets. A History of Prophecy from the Upper Nile in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Oxford, 1994), chs. 1 and 5.

meaning from these sources. The broader structure of administration, which informed the actions of all players as well as limited their options, cannot be ignored. We can now see that the Jackson incident was far more serious than previous historians were aware. It also appears to have had more of an effect on the direction of civil administration than the earlier sources indicated. It can now be seen as part of the evolution of government in the Sudan, both in the power relations between the British rulers of the Sudan and the British rulers of Egypt, and in the structures of internal administration.

The Condominium was an anomaly in imperial rule. The Sudan was ostensibly a possession of two independent countries, one under occupation by the other. The lines of authority were not as straightforward as in other British territories. At this period the relative powers of the consul-general, the *de facto* British viceroy of Egypt, and the Governor General were still being defined. Here it was as much Cromer's *position*, built up over the years, as his personality that affected the outcome of the dispute. Wingate, promoted, be-medalled and be-knighted as he was, was in no comparable position to match Cromer. Cromer's handling of Wingate shows not only how deftly he prepared the ground for different eventualities, priming the Foreign Secretary, the War Office and even the Prime Minister should Wingate force a show-down, but how his confidence in the security of his own position meant that he had no need to directly confront or contradict Wingate over his treatment of Jackson. He played Wingate like a fish on a line before landing him exactly where he wanted him. Wingate's authority, despite the apparent supremacy of his double position as commander-in-chief and Governor General, was hedged in by the Khedive, the Foreign Office, and Cromer (though not necessarily in that order of importance). Once he understood that, then a retreat over Jackson was the only way to guarantee his own survival. It was a retreat made all the more possible by Cromer never explicitly suggesting it. Even though the crisis was not of Cromer's instigation, he used it to further his general aim of 'civilianizing' the administration of the Sudan.

Unique in its external structure, the Sudan nevertheless was still confronted by the same problem of making the transition from military to civil rule in its internal administration as were other imperial possessions gained through conquest. Here the military values which originally informed administration, the process by which civil methods were introduced, and the mixture of civil and military administration which resulted, have parallels with imperial administrations in India, in the African colonies, and in the French colonial empire (where the theory of military colonial administration was more explicitly articulated than in British territories). The military legacy in the Sudan's administration should not be overlooked or underestimated, however much the colourful or eccentric personalities of its administrators beg attention. The tension between military and civil rule was inherent in the structure of its administration, and the transition to civil rule was never fully complete. It is here that a fruitful comparison with other imperial systems could begin.

RECENT RAPID URBANISATION IN SUDAN

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INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this study is to investigate the factors that have affected recent rapid urbanization in the Sudan. Since independence in 1956, the (old) Sudan has embarked upon a set of ambitious economic and social development programmes based on agricultural production which has had a significant effect on rapid urbanization, notably in the larger cities (Abu Sin 1980; Davies 1988; El-Arifi 1980; El-Bakri et al.1987; El-Bushra 1980; Hale 1974). Cities are the centres with capital; they possess wealth and manufacturing that provide investment and job opportunities that are becoming increasingly attractive for the younger rural population. As a result, signs of rapid urbanization have been observed in the Sudan since the 1960s because of rural-urban migration rather than annual population increase (Abu Sin 1980; Davies 1988; El-Arifi 1980; El-Bakri et al. 1987; Galal-al-Din 1980).

METHODOLOGY

The primary source for this short paper is the 2008 Sudan Census. Secondary data includes articles that analyzed the 1955/56, 1973 and 1983 Censuses. This paper represents a summary of a book in progress entitled *Recent Changes of Urbanization in the Sudan.*

HISTORY OF URBANISATION IN THE SUDAN

Sudan has a long history of urbanization which began with the establishment of Napata and Meroe in 750 B.C. and 350 B.C. respectively as capitals of the Kushite kingdoms. Since then Sudanese cities have played different roles and functions. They have been established as political, administrative, trade and religious centres. Their roles and functions have changed in accordance with the changing political regimes as well as changes in regional and

international trade. Historically, old Dongola and Soba were the capitals of Christian Nubia (Sudan), while Kobe, El Fasher, El Obeid, Sennar, Arbaji, Shendi, Berber, Ed Damer, Wad Medani, Suakin, Khartoum, and Omdurman were prominent cities between the 10th and the end of the 19th centuries.

The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium government (1898-1955) brought radical changes to the morphologies of cities and their functions, resulting in an increase in the rate of urbanization. It established European-style cities such as Khartoum, Port Sudan, Kosti and Atbara. In addition, the establishment of agricultural schemes, improved roads and rail transport and the establishment of industry in the larger cities increased mobility and urbanization (Babiker 1982; Davies 1988; El-Arifi 1971; El-Bushra 1980).

The proportion of population considered as urban in the country was quantified for the first time in the first Sudanese census in 1955/56. Despite problems with the criteria used to differentiate between villages and towns, (census authorities considered a town as any settlement of 5000 people or more), and some other technical problems (Krotki 1958), the estimate of the urban population in the 1955/56 census ranges between 8% and 8.9% (Abu Sin 1980; El Arifi 1980; Hale 1974; Krotki 1958). Since that census, urban population has increased steadily. Based on available data, there were 39 cities inhabited by at least 10,000 people and more in 1973, which increased to 43 cities in 1993 and to 62 cities in 2008. Based on the 1973 census, total urbanization of the Sudan (The old northern provinces) increased from 25.7% in 1973 to 32.9% in 2008.

Factors behind recent rapid urbanization

Throughout the 1980s, rural-urban migration in Sudan was largely the result of "push" rather than the "pull" factors, including civil wars, drought, famine and poverty (Ibrahim 1985; El-Bushra and Hijazi 1995). This situation has been enhanced since the 1990s by the adversity of government development policies. Since 1992, the government has adopted neoliberal policies of economic

development. These policies encouraged a free market economy and privatization, which stressed the private sector over the public sector. Hence, it represented a radical change in policies of development in a country where economy and investment had been dominated by the public sector. In the past, plans for economic growth depended largely on development in agriculture which employed 80% of all Sudanese. Changes of economic policy have led to the decline of agriculture which puts the majority of the rural population out of work.

As a result, the intensity of poverty has increased, and 90% of the Sudanese population now falls under the poverty line (Ibrahim 2008). In addition, millions in civil unrest areas such as Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and the Blue Nile states have moved out of these areas seeking security elsewhere, in displacement camps and urban centres. This has contributed significantly to rapid urbanization in the country.

Nyala in Southern Darfur and Greater Khartoum have witnessed an unprecedented rapid urbanization, more than any other cities in the country. Between 1955/56 and 2008, Nyala which is both the western terminus of the cross-Sudan railway and the focus of the region most severely affected by both mid-1980s drought and the Darfur displacement crisis, is the fastest growing regional city in the country. It has grown from 12,000 in 1955 to 114,000 in 1983 (Davies 1988) and to 492,984 people in 2008 (Sudan 2008 Census). The population of Greater Khartoum (Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North) has increased from 3.8 million in 1993 to 5.7 million people in 2008. Unofficial sources have suggested that the population of Greater Khartoum has in fact increased to about 8 million by 2008.

The new economic policy has also led to abandonment of primarily public sector light industries in the cities, which chiefly produced textiles, ready-made clothes and vegetable oils. As a result of the lack of government support for cotton cultivation, only three of sixteen textile factories nationwide are still functioning (Kamil 2013). In vegetable oils, in a rich oil seed area such as Umm Ruwaba in East Kordofan, only two of thirty oil factories remain operational. The rest have become storage facilities or retail space.

Neoliberal policies adopted by the Sudanese government, with their discouragement of agricultural and industrial production, have thus had an adverse effect on the socio-economic conditions of both rural and urban centres. First, they have produced an unprecedented exodus of the rural population, with attendant depopulation of the rural areas and concentration of people in cities that lack institutional and infrastructural capacity to absorb these numbers (UN-Habitat 2014). Second, in urban areas such mass migration has produced high rates of unemployment, increases in poverty rates and crime, extensive slums, and the deterioration of social services. This effect may be categorized as a new phenomenon, the "ruralization" of Sudanese cities (Ahmed 2000). Due to the lack of economic opportunities in urban areas, these have turned into parasitic towns and cities.

CONCLUSION

The main objective of this study was to investigate the factors that have influenced recent rapid urbanization in the Sudan. The reasons behind rapid urbanization have changed over the last few decades. In the last three decades, "push" factors were behind the increase in rural to urban migration that contributed to rapid urbanization, unlike early waves of migration which were affected by "pull" factors. These "push" factors include the failure of economic policies and rural development programmes, which have resulted in the increase of poverty, and social insecurity in war-torn areas.

Rapid urbanization will continue, with its resulting large city sprawl. It cannot be controlled through urban planning policies as long as the root causes of the problem have not been addressed. Unless policies of economic development nationwide are addressed, in order to eradicate rural poverty and the problems behind failure of rural development programmes, the process of rural-urban migration will continue and increase urbanization. Hence, current policies of urban planning are expected to fail, as did those of the past. To control rapid urbanization, policies of urban planning should be integrated with successful national economic and rural development plans.

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SUDANESE MEMORIALS

Douglas Johnson

Fort George, Inverness: The Mahdi, the Khalifa and the Ninth Sudanese.

There has been a long association between Sudan and the United Kingdom, and reminders of that association appear in unlikely places; perhaps none more surprising than Fort George, outside of Inverness, in northern Scotland. There are many trophies from the Sudan in military museums but few as significant in Sudanese history as the display in the Regimental Museum of the Queen's Own Highlanders (Seaforth and Cameron Highlanders) in Fort George, outside of Inverness, for it contains the Mahdi's own flag, the Khalifa Abdallahi's elephant tusk trumpet (*ombeya*), and the regimental Banner of the 9th Sudanese Battalion of the Egyptian army. The Mahdi's personal flag is much simpler than the later banners of the Mahdist army, with their multiple declarations of faith and assertions of Muhammad Ahmad's Mahdiship. It measures about 5 feet by 30 inches, is green silk on a plain background, with two lines of embroidered writing on one side only, and embroidered flowers in the top two corners. The Khalifa's *ombeya* is a very large hollowed out elephant tusk encased in leather, with the mouthpiece located near the tusk's tip. It would have made a loud, resonant sound, and was used to summon the army.

The way in which these two important relics found their way to this remote part of the Scottish highlands is explained by the third display, the regimental flag. After occupying Egypt in 1882 Britain disbanded the Egyptian army and raised a new army on a different pattern of conscription. The Sudanese battalions, however, were raised from soldiers in the former Sudanese regiments in the Khedivial army, former slave soldiers from the southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, the Ethiopian foothills, and Darfur. The 9th Battalion was the first such reformed unit, and it was soon stationed on the frontier with Sudan in 1885 as the Gordon Relief Expedition slowly withdrew back

to Egypt. They were garrisoned together with the Cameron Highlanders in Koshe Fort in December 1885 and fought at the Battle of Ginnis – the final battle of Britain's Nile Expedition of the 1880s, and the first battle in which the new Egyptian army took part. A comradeship grew up between the Camerons and the 9th Sudanese, in honour of which the Camerons gave the 9th a regimental flag, which in time came to list all the battle honours the 9th Sudanese had earned in their forty-six year history. This relationship between the 9th and the Camerons led to the introduction of bagpipes to the Sudanese army.

The 9th were present at the final battle of the Mahdiyya, at Umm Diwakarab (or Gedid) in 1899, where the Khalifa Abdallahi wrapped himself in the Mahdi's flag before he was killed. The flag and the *ombeya* were trophies collected and kept by the 9th Sudanese. When they were disbanded in 1930 they chose to return their regimental flag to the Camerons for safe keeping, along with two of the most important relics of the Mahdiyya itself.

BOOK REVIEW

Leonardi, C, **Dealing with Government in South Sudan: Histories of Chiefship, Community and State.** James Currey, 2013.

This reviewer thinks with a near certainty that the dissolving of the native administration by the late president Nimieiri in the early seventies of last century was the main reason for the civil wars that bedeviled the country ever since. The *sheikhs, omdas and nazirs* were stabilizing agents and the link between government and the tribes throughout the Sudan. Their disappearance under the guise of modernization has been the root cause of the many tribal problems in the two Sudans of today.

This book, which was originally a doctoral thesis presented to the University of Durham, deals with the role of such traditional leaders in state formation in the southern Sudan before and after its independence. It traces the history of the South Sudan from the Turco-Egyptian rule of the mid-nineteen century to the present time. The central argument of the book, as stated by the author, is that *"chiefships in the southern Sudan have been appropriated and domesticated as part of local resistance against the colonial state"* and (beyond), p.3.

To support this hypothesis, the author used a wealth of information derived from different sources. She has to be commended for her painstaking effort in visiting such a variety of archives and records depositories including the National Records Office (NRO) in Khartoum, the National Archives in London, and the Sudan Archive at the University of Durham (SAD) as well as the interviews conducted in the South Sudan and elsewhere.

The book is divided into three parts: Part one (pp 1- 59) discusses the transformation of South Sudan from a place governed and ruled mainly by slave traders with their *Zariba (pl Zara`ib)*, the Arabic for thorn-fenced enclosure where slave traders kept their spoils during the Turco-Egyptian rule, to the *Merkaz* (the Arabic word for the district

administrative headquarters during colonial rule). This long history of the South which is termed by many historians as a period of military administration (1840-1920) marked a period of a somewhat limited role of the chiefship as matters were mainly dealt with by approaching directly the representatives of the Condominium authority itself.

Part two (pp. 61-142) deals with the changing roles of chiefs during the great policy changes brought about by the colonial administration in Khartoum regarding the administration of the south and the diminishing roles of the so called "bog barons", the tough, lonely, eccentric administrators in the south who were given a free hand in running their *Muderias and Merkazs* the way they liked. The period from *Makama* (corrupted Arabic of *Mahkama*), or court, to *Mejilis* (Arabic for district council) witnessed profound changes. Chiefs were given limited judicial powers, and up to independence were the main links between the people and government, despite the uncertainties and resistance by the intervention of the government, especially in attempts made during the seventies for the demarcation of the *Muderia* boundaries and the civil wars that followed.

Part three (pp. 143-224) discusses in three chapters the fluctuating expansion of the urban frontier from the time of independence to the formation of the new republic (1956-2005), the military-civilian relationship and the role of chiefs in the internal politics of the south, as well as their role in national politics in the united Sudan.

The book is extensively researched, employing a well-considered multi-disciplinary approach in tackling this lively issue and, as such, it would be of interest to students and scholars of African studies and particularly to those in the fields of anthropology, political science, history, law and economics.

Alhaj Salim Mustafa

SSSUK

NOTICES

SSSUK NOTICES

Sudan Studies Society of the U.K.
28th Annual General Meeting and Symposium

Will be held
(in association with the Africa/Asia Centre of the School of Oriental and African Studies and the Royal African Society)

On

Saturday, 13th September 2014

In

The Khalili Lecture Theatre,
Registration from 09.30: Meeting will end by 16.30

School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
(off Russell Square)

Members are strongly encouraged to attend. This meeting is an excellent way of finding out about recent events in South Sudan and Sudan.
Further suggestions and offers for speakers are very welcome. Please contact Gill Lusk: chair@sssuk.org

Interested non-members are welcome to attend.

Please see enclosed flyer for booking form and other details.

Further final details will be on our website: http://www.sssuk.org

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As the Annual General Meeting is due to take place on Saturday, 13 September 2014, it seems appropriate to inform members of the make-up of the current committee:

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SSSUK welcomes notes and articles intended for publication, which will be assessed by the Editorial Board. The normal maximum length of an article is 5,000 words including footnotes; longer articles may be accepted for publication in two or more parts. Notes and articles should be typed and double spaced and should normally be submitted as paper copy and as word processed files (in PC format) on diskette or preferably as an e-mail attachment, if at all possible. SSSUK retains the right to edit articles for reasons of space and consistency of style and spelling. *Sudan Studies* aims to follow the editorial style of *African Affairs*, the Journal of the Royal African Society.

Manuscripts are not normally returned to authors, but original material such as photographs will be returned.

It is helpful to have, very briefly (2 to 3 lines), any relevant details about the author – any post held, or time recently spent in the Sudan.

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